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Introduction
AI, Law and Logic
Art and music are used within medical protocols, while giant closeups of colourful viruses
and bacteria hang on the walls of art galleries all over the world. Brand new ethical
issues arise from any new technological achievement. It has become quite hard to find
two distinct, not interacting disciplines. Being interdisciplinary is the new imperative.
Sometimes the contamination of fields creates a juxtaposition of distinct flavours. Other
times, however, genuinely new disciplines come up. This happened after the fortunate
encounter of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Law.
The use of technology is pervasive, allowing Artificial Intelligence and Computer
Science to play a central role. Whether used as a mere tool, or as the focus of research,
computers and the likes, along with the whole new world they generated in the past
decades, are an essential part of almost any current scenario.
AI and Law look so distant, and they actually are very far away from each other
under many aspects. For instance, Law was born long ago and it has always concerned
moral antinomies as good and bad, right and wrong. Law is related to the social aspects
of mankind, the need and wish of people to interact within organised societies. Artificial
Intelligence and Computer Science, on the other hand, look contemporary, young, scien-
tific, and technology related, far away from humanities, arts, and culture. However, after
a closer look, their origins date as far back as Law’s. AI and CS were born within the
dream of controlling and mastering large quantities of information in a mechanical way.
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It is possible to see a common path emerging. Both Law and AI share something, as
they both aim at engaging themselves in “flexible problem-solving activities in complex
domains” (Sartor and Rotolo, 2013, 199).
As pointed out by Sartor and Rotolo (2013), AI & Law research covers many different
topics, such as
- formal theories of norms and normative systems,
- computational legal logic,
- argumentation and argumentation systems,
- ontologies for the law,
- game theory as applied to the law,
- formal models of institutions and MAS,
- simulations in legal and social norms,
- rule-interchange languages for the legal domain,
- legal e-discovery and information retrieval,
- NLP in the legal domain,
- machine learning in the law.
AI and Computer Science should not be seen as mere tools to be applied within
the legal field. Actually, the discipline now called AI & Law is genuinely interactive
and interdisciplinary, involving different fields as deontic logics, normative multi-agent
systems, game theory, norms and trust, and norms and argumentation.
The interaction of Law and Logic has great relevance in this framework. Since the
dawn of the research on modal logics, the deontic interpretation of the modal opera-
tors has been present, helping to refine the logical analysis of legal concepts such as
the semantic difference between obligation and norms, the interaction among different
normative systems, the arising of conflicts within legal systems. We find this latter issue
of great interest and relevance. Handling and accommodating conflicts between different
norms is essential for any system aiming at modeling legal concepts. It is a goal that
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can be achieved with different tools and strategies. That of choosing non-normal deontic
logics is one of those and definitely one of the most promising.
This dissertation is devoted to the study of non-normal systems of deontic logics, both
on the propositional level, and on the first order one. We shall present new completeness
results concerning the semantic setting of several systems which are able to handle
normative dilemmas and conflicts. Although primarily driven by issues related to the
legal and moral field, these results are also relevant for the more theoretical field of Modal
Logic itself, as we propose a syntactical, and semantic study of intermediate systems
between the classical propositional calculus CPC and the minimal normal modal logic K.
Thesis Summary
Chapter 1 introduces the main philosophical topics related to the deontic interpretation
of modal logics. Standard tools are known to generate several paradoxes. Some
of these originate within the syntax of given systems, such as deontic explosion.
There are different ways to deduce problematic schemata, and several solutions
have been proposed. We chose to adopt the multi-relational semantics approach,
providing a conceptual interpretation suitable to interpret deontic operators.
– in Section 1.1 we touch upon the Standard Paradigm SDL. After presenting
normal Kripke Semantics, we analyse the standard deontic interpretation and
some of the problems it raises. In particular, in Section 1.1.1 we introduce
some first preliminary modal schemata as well as their deontic interpretation.
– In Section 1.2 we analyse one of the most problematic schemata related to
the deontic interpretation of modal logics, namely, the formula called Deontic
Explosion. Section 1.2.1 is a preliminary syntactic analysis of the systems
generating such schema, underlying the reasons behind the choice of working
with non normal systems. There are several syntactic solutions to prevent the
derivation of deontic explosion formulae, as we see in Section 1.2.2, although
4 CONTENTS
we chose to analyse in detail the ones that are more conservative with respect
to normal modal logics, i.e., those systems that are weak enough to prevent
deontic explosions, yet powerful enough to express juridical sentences. These
systems are the so called non normal Modal logics.
– Non normal systems can be treated semantically using relational structures.
In Section 1.3 we introduce a semantic interpretation of the modal deontic
operators based on Kripke Semantics, or Possible Worlds Framework, as de-
fined in Section 1.3.1. Kripke-frames are very intuitive and useful and provide
an excellent tool to treat normal systems. However, they are known to be
sound and complete with respect to normal systems. In order to keep the
intuitive appeal of the possible worlds framework, and still using non normal
systems, we decided to study further the so called multi-relational frames. In
Section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 we introduce this type of semantics, which is nothing
else than a direct generalisation of standard Kripke Frames and models.
Chapter 2 is mainly technical and it presents some new results concerning non normal
modal systems.
– In Section 2.1 we present some well known non normal calculi, namely the
systems E,M,NM,R as well as a syntactical analysis of the relations between
well known schemata (see Chellas, 1980). In particular we shall see which
systems count DEX among their theorems and which premisses entail schema
DEX.
– Section 2.2 is the core of the Chapter and it is devoted to the semantic
analysis of well known modal schemata within different scenarios. After a
brief technical introduction to both strong, and weak multi-relational seman-
tics in Section 2.2.1, we proceed to show how some well known Kripke-valid
schemata, are no longer valid within the broader semantics described. Then,
CONTENTS 5
in Section 2.2.3 we carry on a comparative analysis of modal schemata and
semantic properties, i.e., we prove characterisation theorems for some well
known schemata, namely, M,C,N,B,T. Section 2.2.4 presents a semantic
analysis of some formulae that are are particular relevant within deontic log-
ics, namely, CON and D. It is well known that both schemata characterise
precisely the same property in Kripke semantics, namely, seriality. However,
this ceases to be true in multi-relational semantics and, as we shall see, these
schemata define different readings of seriality within weak semantics.
– Section 2.3 is focused on proving semantic completeness for several systems
using both strong, and weak semantic tools. We propose direct completeness
proofs via canonical models for both classical systems (Section 2.3.1), and
N-Monotonic systems (Section 2.3.2). Finally, in Section 2.3.3 we prove com-
pleteness theorems with respect to specific classes of frames for a few systems
extending MN with well known schemata, namely, MN ⊕ T, MN ⊕ D, and
MN⊕CON.
Chapter 3 presents free first order extensions of some N-monotonic systems and above
as well as completeness results with respect to multi-relational first order frames.
– Section 3.1 is an introduction to Barcan Formulae and their role within ju-
dicial syllogisms. There are several philosophical as well as related technical
issues.
– Section 3.2 presents some well known results concerning quantified non normal
modal logics and Neighborhood frames, as well as a first technical introduction
to Barcan formulae and the related problems. We shall see the attempts made
to accommodate Barcan schemata within both constant domain, and varying
domain neighborhood frames.
– Section 3.3 is rather technical and presents multi-relational first order frames.
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We chose to analyse frames with varying domains, in order to perform a finer
distinction between actual individuals and possibilia.
– Section 3.4 The traditional distinction between de dicto and de re sentences
is here seen under a new light, in terms of contextual obligation and the role
of quantification within deontic contexts.
– Section 3.5 is the core of this Chapter. We shall present alternative semantic
characterisations for the schema CBF. We compare our results with the
standard ones in Kripke Semantics and we shall see different ways to generalise
the concept of increasing inner domains.
– Section 3.6 is the technical core of the Chapter. Here we provide Henkin-style
completeness theorems for several systems, namely, the smallest free quan-
tified non normal N-monotonic logic Q○=.NM and some extensions, including
Q○=.NM⊕CBF.
– In Section 3.7 we provide characterisation results for BF and we compare it
the case of neighborhood models.
– Finally, in Section 3.8 we discuss the role of identity and we present a com-
pleteness theorem for a system without the identity relation and some exten-
sions.
Chapter 4 presents both a summary of all the results achieved, and some possible ap-
plications within new fields:
– Section 4.1 presents a summary of the technical results, both for the propo-
sitional case (4.1.1), and for the predicative one (4.1.2).
– Section 4.2 is focused on some of the main open problems related to non
normal modal logics, both for the propositional, and the predicative case.
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– In Section 4.3, finally, we present a possible application within epistemic log-
ics. In fact non normal modal systems have been proposed as a possible
solution to deal with the problem of logical omniscience. Here we define the
concept of omniscience from the perspective of propositional modal logic. We
start from the classical propositional calculus, adding and analysing epistem-
ically many of the schemata seen throughout the dissertation.
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Chapter 1
Deontic Logics and Dilemmas
At the beginning of the article soon to become a milestone on the path of deontic logic,
von Wright (1951a) states that “the deontic modes [have] hardly at all been treated
by logicians.” More than sixty years have passed and this statement has seen its truth
value changing radically (see, e.g., A˚qvist, 2001; Carmo and Jones, 2002). Actually
there has been a large amount of research on formal models of normative concepts.
Being essentially an interdisciplinary domain, both logicians (like the already cited von
Wright, 1951a), and legal theorists (such as Alchourro´n, 1969), and computer scientists
(like McCarty, 1986) have merged their efforts. In this Chapter we shall attempt to
provide a brief introduction to some basic aspects of modal deontic logic. In particular,
we shall present the so-called Standard Deontic Logic (SDL hereafter). Although it
is nowadays heavily criticised, SDL has long been considered a reference for deontic
logicians. We shall discuss both standard syntax, and semantics for SDL as this system,
known as it is to generate several deontic paradoxes and problems (A˚qvist, 2001; Carmo
and Jones, 2002), looks like a good touchstone to compare new systems and ideas.
1.1 Once Upon a Time: The Standard Paradigm
Most logical investigations of the main normative legal concepts require a formal account
of deontic notions, such as obligation (duty) and permission. These ideas have been
characterized by using different logical tools, most frequently related to the possible-
9
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worlds semantics of modal logic (for an overview of , see A˚qvist, 2001). Thus, expressions
such as ◻A and ◻¬A mean intuitively that A is obligatory and prohibited, respectively.
Here, however, we shall not investigate specific and subtle aspects of deontic logic such as
the distinction between obligation and permission. Rather, we assume that the operator◇, representing permission, is simply the dual of ◻, i.e., it is defined logically as ¬ ◻ ¬,
whose meaning is not obligatory not. Any deeper philosophical investigation of the
meaning of permission is outside the scope of this work and can be found, for example,
in (Makinson and van der Torre, 2003; Brown, 2000; Stolpe, 2010; Governatori et al.,
2013).
1.1.1 Some Deontic Schemata
A (modal) deontic language can be easily obtained by extending that of classical propo-
sitional calculus (CPC hereafter) with one unary deontic operator ◻. The system SDL,
built on this language, is a first, naive, axiomatic attempt at modeling deontic concepts.
Although it is known to be quite a weak candidate, it is worth a closer look, as our effort
towards this dissertation shall be that of providing an alternative to normal systems.
Let us consider the following schemata:
K ∶= ◻(A→ B)→ (◻A→ ◻B) (1.1)
D ∶= ◻A→ ¬ ◻ ¬A (1.2)
Axiom schema (1.1) looks intuitively acceptable: If it is obligatory that buying a car
implies paying for it, then if one is obliged to buy a car, he must also pay for it.
Axiom schema (1.2) seems to be reasonable: Indeed, if it is obligatory to compensate
damages, then it is permitted to do so.
Other axiom schemata which are usually adopted in other modal logics, though not
acceptable in deontic contexts, are, for instance:
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T ∶= ◻A→ A (1.3)
The schema (1.3), in fact, sounds problematic: Can we say that the mere fact that
it is obligatory to compensate damages implies that we actually do so? Assuming the
validity of such schema would force us to admit that all obligations are indeed fulfilled.
Hence, afteer a first superficial analysis, schemata (1.1) and (1.2) sound reasonable
and might be adopted as axioms of a system, whereas schemata such as (1.3) should
be definitely dropped. Actually, the system SDL is obtained by adding both K, and D
(and a necessitation rule, as we shall see later) to the classical propositional calculus.
1.2 Deontic Dilemmas: A Logical Point of View
The modal system SDL is simple, elegant and enjoys several desirable semantic proper-
ties. However, it raises more problems than it solves. Among the many issues related to
it, one of the most problematic is that SDL is strong enough to generate deontic explo-
sion whenever we can derive conflicting obligations (Goble, 2005). Roughly speaking,
this means that it cannot accommodate deontic dilemmas, although, as we shall see, this
is precisely one of the features a system willing to model deontic concepts should have.
Let us see what this all means.
The traditional alethic intepretation of the modal operators is meant to model philo-
sophical concepts like “necessity” and “possibility.” According to a naif and intuitive
reading of “necessity,” one would deny that both a fact, and its contrary can be neces-
sary at the same time and under a univocal reading of necessity. This can be formally
expressed by the schema
DEX ∶= ◻A ∧ ◻¬A→ ◻B
This says that if such a situation arises, then anything is modally derivable, even
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a contradiction. Intuitively, in deontic logic this means that, whenever we derive, e.g.,
that it is obligatory to pay taxes and it is forbidden to do so, then we obtain any other
obligation, such the obligation to drink water, to fly, . . . . Alethically, the antecedent
of DEX is never fulfilled in a non trivial way and hence it is a perfectly acceptable
schema. Traditionally, necessity implies possiblity. This latter concept is expressed by
the schema
D ∶= ◻A→ ¬ ◻ ¬A
which is logically equivalent to the negation of the antecedent of DEX, since ◻A→ ¬◻¬A
is logically equivalent to ¬(◻A∧◻¬A). Any system counting D among its theorems has
DEX as a theorem too and hence DEX itself collapses into the schema
EFQ ∶= → B
the classic “ex falso quodlibet sequitur,” also known as the “principle of logical explo-
sion.”
However, the power of modal languages is that the operators can be read in different
ways, in order to deal with several scenarios. For instance, if read epistemically, the
situation is analogous to the alethic one. In fact, let us interpret the ◻ operator as
meaning “it is known that . . . ” It is highly against our common intuition to assume
that someone may know both a fact, and its negation. . . If I know that today, in Bologna,
it is sunny and hot, I cannot know that today, in Bologna, it is snowy and cold. Moreover,
it is usually argued that one should keep the principle that “knowledge implies truth”:
T ∶= ◻A→ A
If T is in the system, DEX is again a theorem and it collapses on EFQ.
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Things change, though, when dealing with deontic situations. It happens quite often
to experience conflicts between norms. There might be situations in which the same
state of affairs A both ought to be and ought not to be at the same time. Logically this
means that the antecedent of the entailment DEX may actually be true in a non trivial
way. This is precisely when deontic dilemmas occur. As Goble (2004b) points out1
by a deontic dilemma I mean a situation in which, in a univocal sense of
ought, some state of affairs, A, both ought to be and ought not to be, in
which, that is, both OA and O¬A are true. More broadly, a deontic dilemma
would be a situation in which there are inconsistent states of affairs, A and
B, both of which ought to be, that is, a case where ⊢ A → ¬B and yet OA
and OB are true. More broadly still, a deontic dilemma would be a situation
in which it is impossible for both A and B to be realized even though both
ought to be, where the sense of impossibility could be anything appropriate
to the context of discourse, from some metaphysical impossibility to the most
mundane practical incompatibility. (Goble, 2004b, 75)
Therefore any logic aiming at modeling deontic concepts and norms should be able to
accommodate, rather then preventing, deontic dilemmas.
1.2.1 The Logic behind Explosions
On the logical side, it is crucial for any system aiming at modeling deontic concepts to
be able to avoid the problem of deontic explosion. In any simple modal propositional
system this means that the logic itself should not be powerful enough to generate schema
DEX, nor D (and, obviously T, although it is very counterintuitive and nobody would
argue in favour of a schema stating that anything that ought to be is also the case). The
reason is clear. Let us interpret the operator ◻ in terms of obligation to do something.
1OA reads “it is obligatory that A”, which is standard notation in deontic logic. In this work, we
prefer sticking to the general notation of modal logic, thus using ◻ instead.
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Since in the real world conflicts among different norms may (and actually do) arise
often, any system intended to model deontic behavior in a realistic way should not be
able to generate the schema DEX, otherwise the logic itself could not accommodate
such conflicts.
Schema DEX may be syntactically inferred in a variety of ways. In this preliminary
analysis of the problem, we shall try to keep technicalities to a minimum, in order to
focus on the main philosophical problems related to deontic logics. A proper syntactical
study will be carried out in Chapter 2. Here, however, it is necessary to introduce at
least a couple of inference rules which shall play a central role trhoughout this whole
dissertation:
RE:= ⊢ A↔ B ⇒ ⊢ ◻A↔ ◻B
RM:= ⊢ A→ B ⇒ ⊢ ◻A→ ◻B
and a few well known modal schemata:
EFQ:= A ∧ ¬A→ B (Ex Falso Quodlibet)
M:= ◻(A ∧B)→ (◻A ∧ ◻B) (Distribution)
C:= (◻A ∧ ◻B)→ ◻(A ∧B) (Aggregation)
DEX:= ◻A ∧ ◻¬A→ ◻B (Deontic Explosion)
A few simple deductions can show how to infer DEX within a system containing
either RM, M, C, EFQ and closed under Modus Ponens. Actually it may be easily
inferred the following:
(RM⊕EFQ⊕C) = (M⊕C⊕EFQ⊕RE)⇒DEX
1.2.2 Possible Solutions: An Overview
One thing is now quite clear: Any (modal) deontic logic must not allow schema DEX.
There are several strategies to prevent DEX from being derivable within a system. For
instance, one can (see Goble, 2005):
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• Drop the classical ex falso quodlibet EFQ, modeling deontic concepts on paracon-
sistent propositional logics (see, for instance Da Costa and Carnielli, 1986);
• Handle deontic concepts in a defeasible reasoning setting (see, e.g., Nute, 1997);
• Restrict schema M, or C (or both) (cf. Goble, 2005; Meheus et al., 2010);
• Drop either M, or C.
The last approach leads to the study of the so called non normal modal logics (see
Goble, 2004b,a, 2001, 2005; Chellas, 1980; Schotch and Jennings, 1981). In our opinion
this is the simplest and (logically) most elegant solution and it is, therefore, the approach
we decided to follow. Roughly speaking, non normal modal logics are nothing but modal
theories strictly smaller than the normal logic K. They are obtained by weakening normal
systems by dropping one or more of those axioms which enable the inferential machine to
generate deontic explosions. This may be done by dropping M, C or both while keeping
the classical propositional calculus untouched. As Goble (2004b, 75ff.) points out, there
are several other ways to solve the problem, for instance by applying hybrid approaches
(cf. Van der Torre and Tan, 2000). A complete analysis of such ways, however, is outside
the scope of our current research. We have rather focused our attention on the analysis
of non normal logics.
Non normal modal logics are, we said, systems weaker than normal ones, i.e., systems
weaker than K, the minimal normal modal logic. System K classically amounts to having
schema K plus necessitation, which is equivalent, for example, to adding C to a system
consisting of the closure of ◻ under logical equivalence, and the schemata M and N (i.e.,◻⊺) (Chellas, 1980)2. Since K is complete with respect to Kripke frames, the first obvious
observation is that Kripke semantics cannot be applied to these logics. This would be
a strong deterrent, as Kripke semantics is very intuitive and easy to deal with. This is
probably the main reason that lead modal logics to be so successful. However, this turns
2Details are also given in Chapter 2.
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out to be only partially true and our dissertation aims at showing how a generalised
version of Kripke semantics is actually suitable for a small class of non normal modal
systems. Here, we shall introduce both Kripke semantics, and generalised relational
semantics.
1.3 A Semantic Reading of Deontic Operators
What do we mean when we say that ◻A is true under a deontic interpretation of the
modal operator? Several philosophers argued that this question is meaningless because
norms and obligations are not susceptible of any truth evaluation (see, e.g., von Wright,
1963; Makinson, 1999; Broersen and van der Torre, 2012). However, let us ignore here
this objection (which is outside the scope of this research, as well as debatable) and try
to check when sentences like ◻A are true. For instance, suppose that it is obligatory
to pay taxes. If this is true, this means that in all (e.g., legally) ideal situations we do
actually pay taxes.
How can we formally express this intuition? It is standard to use in deontic logic
the concept of possible worlds (A˚qvist, 2001): Any possible world is a sort of description
of how things are in the current situation (the actual world) or how they could be
(alternatives). Worlds can thus be analysed in terms of possible truth assignments to all
the atomic propositional letters describing how things are in a given situation: In our
world logicians are smart, while we can conceive an alternative situation where they are
not smart at all.
Notice that not all worlds are legally or morally ideal: We can imagine situations
where all individuals massively commit atrocities. However, we can isolate a subset
of possible worlds that are inherently good, where we always pay taxes, compensate
damages, and do not commit any atrocity. At this point, it should clear what we mean
by saying that ◻A is true: it means that A is true in all (legally, morally, etc...) ideal
worlds.
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1.3.1 Kripke Frames and Models
To provide a formal method for checking the truth value of obligations, we mush find a
way to identify, given a world w, a class of worlds that are ideal with respect to w itself.
This can be done using the following formal structures (called Kripke frames and Kripke
models):
Definition 1.3.1 (Kripke frames and models) A Kripke frame F is a structure
⟨W,R⟩
where
• W is the set of all possible worlds;
• R is a binary relation over W that determines the ideal worlds in W for each world
in W .
A Kripke model M based on the frame F is a structure
⟨W,R,V ⟩
where
• F = ⟨W,R⟩;
• V assigns the truth values true or false to any atomic sentence in any given world
(i.e., it states what atomic sentences are true or false in each world). Hence for
any proposition p, V (p) is a set of possible worlds, i.e., all the possible situations
in which p holds true.
First, it should be noticed that logical sentences are evaluated locally: A formula A
(e.g., “we pay taxes”) can be true at world w and false at world v. Second the relation
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R selects for each world w those states of affairs that are ideal with respect to w, and it
plays a central role when evaluating the local truth value of modal formulae.
Formulae of classical propositional logic are evaluated as usual: Each possible world
can be seen as a line within a truth table. Given any Kripke model M and any world
w in it, we write ⊧Vw A to say that A is true at w in M. Hence, if we consider for
instance the propositional connectives ¬ and →, the procedure to check the truth value
of formulae is as follows: gien any Kripke model M and any world w in it
• if A is an atomic formula, ⊧Vw A if and only if w ∈ V (A);
• if A = ¬B then ⊧Vw A if and only if M /⊧Vw B
• if A = B → C then ⊧Vw A if and only if, M /⊧Vw B or ⊧Vw C.
What we have informally said before on the semantic meaning of ◻ should make now
clear how to evaluate any sentence of the form ◻A: given any Kripke model M and any
world w in it
• ⊧Vw ◻A if and only if, for each world w′, if w′ is ideal with respect to w according
to R, then ⊧w′ A.
As usual in any modal logic, notice that this semantics requires to define different
perspectives where a formula can be evaluated:
Definition 1.3.2 A formula A is true in a world w of a model M iff ⊧Vw A. A formula
A is true in a model M, ⊧V A, iff for all w in M, ⊧Vw A. A formula A is valid on a
frame F = ⟨W,R⟩ iff for any model M = ⟨W,R,V ⟩ based on F we have ⊧V A. Given a
class of frames X, a formula A is X-valid, X ⊧ A, iff for any frame F ∈X, F ⊧ A.
In Chapter 2 we shall see semantics features in detail. Here, however, it is enough
to notice that within Kripke Semantics, schema K is valid, unlike T and D. Schema
T, however, is known to be valid in all the reflexive frames, i.e., where the property
1.3. A SEMANTIC READING OF DEONTIC OPERATORS 19
∀w ∈ W, (wRw) holds, whereas D is valid in the class of serial ones, i.e., ∀w ∈ W,∃v ∈
W (wRv).
Kripke Semantics (see Kripke, 1959, 1963, 1980), we said, has a very intuitive in-
terpretation which confers great appeal. The idea behind it is very simple. It takes its
origins in the work of Leibniz, who stated that there is a plurality of possible worlds, and
the actual one is nothing but one of the many possibilities. According to Leibniz, never-
theless, the actual world is definitely the best one among all the possibilities, chosen by
God who has the capability of searching and choosing the perfect solution. Nowadays,
however, researchers in modal logic tend to bypass these theoretical and metaphysical
aspects while keeping the main idea of Leibniz’s approach. For instance, let us suppose
that we want to describe any situation which sees several agents interacting one with
each other. Let us suppose that such agents are, for instance, playing dice. Then when-
ever the pair of dice is cast, there are several possible outputs. We can consider each of
the possible outputs as a different world. This may be of use for instance if we want to
make considerations on probability and so on. Moreover, we may turn our attention to
the analysis of agents’ knowledge. Any fact p is then known by an agent whenever he
cannot consider as possible a state of affairs in which p does not hold. Thus, in epistemic
contexts,
the intuitive idea behind the possible-worlds model is that besides the true
state of affairs, there are a number of other possible states of affairs or worlds.
Given his current information, an agent may not be able to tell which of a
number of possible worlds describes the actual state of affairs. An agent is
then said to know a fact φ if φ is true at all the worlds he considers possible
(given his current information). For example, agent 1 may be walking on
the streets of San Francisco. Thus, in all the worlds that the agent considers
possible, it is sunny in San Francisco. (We are implicitly assuming here that
the agent does not consider it possible that he is hallucinating and in fact it
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is raining heavily in San Francisco.) On the other hand, since the agent has
no information about the weather in London, there are worlds he considers
possible in which it is sunny in London, and others in which it is raining in
London. Thus, this agent knows that it is sunny in San Francisco but he
does not know whether it is sunny in London. Intuitively, the fewer worlds
an agent considers possible, the less his uncertainty, and the more he knows.
If the agent acquires additional information – such as hearing from a reliable
source that it is currently sunny in London – then he would no longer consider
possible any of the worlds in which it is raining in London.(Fagin et al., 1995,
16)
The standard result is that the class of Kripke frames generates all and only the
theorems of K, the smallest normal modal system (Chellas, 1980; Blackburn et al., 2001).
Hence it is straightforward that Kripke frames are not a tool to be used if we aim at
modeling non normal systems, as they generate sets of formulae that are strictly smaller
than K. On the other hand, Kripke frames and models offer a highly intuitive tool to
interpret modal operators using the possible worlds metaphor, whereas other tools like
neighborhood semantics appeal less to intuition and look rather technical. However,
there are ways to overcome this issue. The semantics we shall present in the following
sections is precisely a generalization of Kripke semantics suitable to model non normal
systems.
1.3.2 Semantics for Non Normal Systems
A number of significant contributions in the last four decades show that non-normal
modal logics can be fruitfully employed in several applied fields. One well-known domain
is epistemic logic, where non-normal systems are a solution to alleviate the so-called
omniscience problem that affects stronger (normal) modal systems (Fagin et al., 1995)
(see Chapter 4). Deontic logic is, as we said, another field where non-normal systems
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have been traditionally proposed to avoid many drawbacks of standard deontic logic,
which does not tolerate deontic conflicts and gives rise to a number of paradoxes (Goble,
2005; Jones and Carmo, 2002). Other important applications are those systems that
aim at capturing different aspects of the concepts of action and agency: the modal logic
of agency (Segerberg, 1992; Elgesem, 1997; Governatori and Rotolo, 2005), concurrent
propositional dynamic logic (Goldblatt, 1992), game logic (Parikh, 1985), and coalition
logic (Pauly, 2002), among others, are all examples where some modal operators are
axiomatized in logics weaker than K.
Semantics for non-normal systems have a long and distinguished tradition (Scott,
1970; Montague, 1970; Segerberg, 1971). This tradition goes beyond standard Kripke
semantics and thus interprets modal systems in the so called neighborhood semantics,
also known as Scott-Montague semantics, or minimal-models3. If compared to standard
Kripke frames, neighborhood semantics considers a set of collections of worlds related
to w instead of connecting worlds via an accessibility relation. These collections are the
neighborhoods of w. Formally, a frame is a pair ⟨W,N⟩ where W is a set of possible
worlds and N is a function assigning to each w in W a set of subsets of W (the neigh-
borhoods of w). A model is thus a triple ⟨W,N,V ⟩ where ⟨W,N⟩ is a frame and V is
a valuation function defined as for Kripke models, except for ◻φ, which is true at w
iff the set of elements of W where φ is true is one of the sets in N(w); i.e., iff it is a
neighborhood of w.
Model-theoretic investigations on non-normal modal logics and neighborhood seman-
tics have reached significant results (Hansen, 2003, for an overview) with respect, for for
instance, to completeness (Segerberg, 1971; Chellas and McKinney, 1975; Chellas, 1980),
and incompleteness (starting from Gerson, 1975), decidability (Chellas, 1980), bisimu-
lation (Pauly, 2002; Hansen, 2003), and simulation in multi-modal normal modal logics
(Gasquet and Herzig, 1996; Kracht and Wolter, 1999).
3Technical details are given in Chapter 3.
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However, other two model-theoretic semantic settings can be used for non-normal
modal logics: selection-function and multi-relational semantics. A selection-function
model is a structure ⟨W,f,V ⟩, where W is a set of possible worlds, f is a selection
function with signature P(W )×W Ð→ P(W ), and V assigns to each propositional letter
a subset of W . A formula ◻φ is true at any world w iff w belongs to the set of worlds
that f assigns to w and the truth set of φ. As is well-known, this semantics, if applied
to standard non-normal modal logics, turns out to be a reformulation of neighborhood
semantics (Hansson and Ga¨rdenfors, 1973; Governatori and Rotolo, 2005).
The other alternative is multi-relational semantics.
1.3.3 Multi-relational Frames: Intuition and Technique
Among the alternatives proposed, that of using multi-relational frames can be seen as
the most conservative with respect to Kripke Semantics. Indeed it can be seen as a
direct generalization of Kripke frames. The only technical difference is that frames are
allowed to have more than one relation. Hence multi-relational frames are nothing but
Kripke frames with a set at most countable of binary relations over the base set:
Definition 1.3.3 A multi-relational n-frame is a n+1-tuple Fn ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩ where
W is a non empty set and any Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a binary relation on W .
Notice that the set of relations can be infinite. Within this broader scenario, Kripke
frames are, therefore, a limit case of multi-relational semantics. The key questions here
are two:
a. how can these frames be interpreted from a deontic perspective?
b. can they fix some of the problems related to the deontic reading of the modal opera-
tors?
Goble (2001) provides a partial answer to the first question:
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[. . . ] in the multi-relational semantics, we may regard each relation in the
set R [i.e., any relation Ri] as representing a partucular standard of value
and picking out those worlds, b, that are best with respect to a from the
perspective of that standard, while recognizing that there could be other
standards according to which b is not ideal. [. . . ] when both ◻A and ◻¬A
are true it is because A is prescribed by one set of norms or regulations
while ¬A is prescribed by another, distinct set. [. . . ] Each set of norms or
regulations is presumed to be internally consistent, and conflicts only emerge
as a result of rivalry between sets of norms. (Goble, 2001)
Thus, Kripke frames interpret a univocal notion of obligation, one that cannot be
contradictory. On the other hand, multi-relational frames provide a model closer to real
legal systems: There are different norms, each norm carries obligations, such obliga-
tions may be in conflict with each other although internally consistent. Any agent has
some obligations due to the application of certain norms. However, dilemmas may arise
without generating logical paradoxes.
This view is mirrored by the semantic conditions we impose to interpret modalised
propositions, thus defining a model (being nothing but an interpreted frame):
Definition 1.3.4 A multi-relational n-model is a n + 2-tuple Mn ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn, V ⟩
where ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩ is a multi-relational n-frame and V is a function (assignment)
V ∶ PropÐ→ P(W ).
A valuation is hence a function which assigns to each proposition p a set of worlds,
intuitively those worlds in which p itself is true. It is now possible to define truth values
of modal formulae. Truth is, as usual, a local concept, meaning that it depends on the
place we chose to evaluate a formula. A formula ◻A can be true in a world w and false
in another. Multi relational frames aim to capture the notion that a fact A is obligatory
in a world w if there is a norm imposing A. This happens when there is at least one
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relation Ri connecting to w only worlds in which A itself is true. Thus, if all the worlds
that are ideal with respect to w under an Ri norm, then A itself ought to be the case at
w. Formally this is expressed by:
Truth conditions The truth conditions for all boolean operations are standard. Let
us turn our attention on the ones intended to evaluate boxed formulae.
For any w ∈W :
A. ⊧w ◻A iff ∃Ri∀v(wRiv⇒⊧v A)
Given these conditions, it is straightforward to see that several theorems belonging
to K are no longer valid schemta in this broader scenario. We wondered, however, which
axiomatic system, if any, is sound and complete with respect to multi-relational frames
(with the truth conditions provided above). It turned out that the set of formulae which
are valid on this class of frames is precisely that of N-monotonic logics. In Chapter 2
we shall indeed prove a completeness theorem for this system and some extensions. The
interesting result is that the lowest non normal level one can achieve without dropping
relational semantics as we know it is that of N-monotonic logics, i.e., one must keep
certain schemata, like N and M. If such schemata are to be dropped, multi relational
tools (at least given the truth conditions provided) must be either abandoned, or deeply
modified.
If we evaluate box formulae with the conditions provided, it can be argued that our
logic would be equivalent to a multi-modal system based on a language containing as
many operators as the arity of the relations. Thus, if we have an n-relational frame, it
would be enough to have a normal n-modal system without interaction among operators.
In this case a formula ◻A in our language would be translated as ◻1A∨. . .∨◻nA. However,
two problems arise. First of all our frames might contain a countable number of relations
and thus it would be necessary to use an infinite number of box operators. However,
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for technical reasons, infinitary logical languages are very hard to handle, while it is
much easier to work with a language with a finite set of operators. But there are also
philosophical reasons for our choice. By adding distinct modalities, one should accept
different senses of obligation: how to conceptually distinguish between a potentially
infinite set of obligation types? On the contrary, we think that the concept of obligation
should be rather independent by the norm or set of norms generating it. Norms may be
in conflict, there may arise different senses of ought, although the meaning of obligation
is steady. As Goble (2001) points out
The multiple relations of the multiplex [multi-relational, ndr] models may be
thought to represent different normative standards; each defines a specific
sense of ought. The language of our deontic logic could contain distinct
deontic operators to express each of these senses, but that is not necessary,
and we shall not pursue such a multi-modal logic here. Nonetheless, one
might naturally think of the ought defined through the multiplex rules as
ambiguous between these many specific senses determined by each normative
standard. OA says that it ought to be the case that A, but it does not specify
under which sense of ought. It says only that it ought to be the case that A
under some system of norms. Appeals to ambiguity are often plausible ways
to account for apparent inconsistencies, even deontic conflicts. The multiplex
semantics is made for that kind of account. (Goble, 2001, 119)
In other words, in this dissertation we work on logics designed for just one type of
obligation, one type of obligation that can however be generated by using many norms
or standards distinguished at the semantic level4.
4Notice that a similar view has been defended by Alchourro´n and Bulygin (1984) in regard to the
concept of permission: there is for these authors just one type of permission, while we may have different
permissive norms. We are also in line with some general arguments proposed by (Boella et al., 2009;
Governatori and Rotolo, 2010) in regard to the problem of norm change, which assumed to distinguish
norms from obligations and permissions.
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Indeed a multi-modal language would force us to refer to specific norms and sets
of norms even when one does not want or does not know what to refer to. Keeping
the distinction of one modal operator and many semantic relations mirrors a natural
situation: something ought to be even if we do not explicitly indicate which norm or set
of norms generate such obligation.
Chapter 2
Non Normal Propositional Systems for Deontic
Logics
Within applied logics, non-normal modal systems are one of the most effective alterna-
tives implemented in order to avoid interpretational and theoretical problems generated
by certain logical schemata and rules, as we saw in Chapter 1. For instance, such prob-
lems are related to that of logical omniscience within the field of epistemic logics, or
deontic explosion within that of deontic logics.
The focus of this Chapter is on the technical issues related to multi-relational frames.
Such structures are nothing but Kripke frames with any countable number of binary
relations. While the classical evaluation of boolean formulae is standard and steady, that
of boxed formulae is rather more problematic. Indeed there are two ways of interpreting◻-formulae: We can either chose a strong interpretation, or a weak one. How they differ
on the technical level will be clear later in the chapter. Here, it is enough to say that
strong semantics is a rephrasing of neighborhood semantics, whereas weak semantics
are a direct generalisation of Kripke frames. Thus, those concerning strong semantics
are mainly a rephrasing of other results (see Chellas, 1980) and are thus only partially
original. On the other hand, those concerning weak semantics are indeed original and,
as fare as we are concerned, have not been presented elsewhere so far. The choice
of including a relational account of neighborhood semantics was driven by the will to
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compare and analyse relational structures and special subclasses. For instance, when
we analysed the different meanings of the property of seriality within multi-relational
frames, it was very interesting to compare the results within three different, though
related scenarios. This is patent only if we translate neighborhood semantics within
a multi-relational setting. Moreover, here we provide a direct completeness proof for
multi-relational strong semantics.
Our main goal was, however, to carry on a semantic analysis of generalised Kripke-
frames, or multi-relational weak frames. Our research started from the observation that
although there are so many works within the field of normal logics, Kripke semantics, and
neighborhood semantics, not much has been said about multi-relational weak semantics,
or multiplex semantics as these structures are sometimes called. There are works that
use this kind of semantics (see, for instance, Goble, 2001, 2004b; Schotch and Jennings,
1981; Jennings and Schotch, 1981; Meheus et al., 2010), and there is also a sketch of a
completeness theorem for a specific system.1 However, many prominent questions lay
without an answer. For instance:
(a) which theory is valid in the class of multi-relational weak structures?
(b) how do they differ from multi-relational strong frames (Neighborhood semantics)?
And from Kripke semantics?
(c) the set of formulae which are valid in the class of all multi-relational frames can be
generated by a finite axiomatic system? If so, which one?
(d) how well known modal schemata (among those relevant to deontic logic, like M,C,T,D,
B,CON,DEX, . . . behave within multi-relational weak frames? Do they charac-
terise classes of frames with specific properties?
(e) how can well known first order properties be characterised by propositional schemata,
if we assume a plurality of relations?
1Namely, the logic P in Goble (2001).
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Our work provides an answer, or sometimes a partial one, to all these questions.
Overview. In Section 2.1 we present some well known non normal calculi, namely the
systems E,M,NM,R as well as a syntactical analysis of the relations between well known
schemata (see Chellas (1980)). In particular we shall see which systems count DEX
among their theorems and which premisses entail schema DEX.
Section 2.2 is the core of the Chapter and it is devoted to the semantic analysis of
well known modal schemata within different scenarios. After a brief technical introduc-
tion to both strong, and weak multi-relational semantics in Section 2.2.1, we proceed
to show how some well known Kripke-valid schemata, are no longer valid within the
broader semantics described. Then, in Section 2.2.3 we carry on a comparative analysis
of modal schemata and semantic properties, i.e. we prove characterisation theorems
for some well known schemata, namely, M,C,N,B,T,4. Of course, not all of these
schemata are meaningful in deontic logic—some of them should be in fact avoided—but
their investigation in multi-relational semantics is anyway instructive to illustrate the
formal machinery. Section 2.2.4 presents a semantic analysis of some schemata that
are particular relevant within deontic logics, namely, CON and D. Both enforce in
normal modal logics deontic consistency, hence they deny deontic dilemmas. It is well
known that both schemata characterise precisely the same property in Kripke semantics,
namely, seriality. However, this ceases to be true in multi-relational semantics and, as
we shall see, these schemata define different readings of seriality within weak semantics.
Section 2.3 is focused on proving semantic completeness for several systems using
both strong, and weak semantic tools. We propose direct completeness proofs via canon-
ical models for both classical systems (Section 2.3.1), and N-Monotonic systems (Section
2.3.2). Finally, in Section 2.3.3 we prove completeness theorems with respect to specific
classes of frames for a few systems extending MN with well known schemata, namely,
MN⊕D and MN⊕CON. With the purpose of better illustrating the machinery, we will
also present a completeness result for MN ⊕T, being obvious, however, that schema T
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is usually rejected in deontic contexts.
2.1 Syntax: Modal Schemata and Rules
Below we shall recall some technical definition we have already introduced in Chapter 1
in order to make the material presented self contained.
As usual, a propositional logical language has two components: an alphabet, or
signature, which includes all the symbols one is allowed to use and a series of formation
rules, which gives precise instructions to build grammatical sentences.
The alphabet of the language L includes a countable set of propositional letters
Prop ∶= {p1, . . . , pn, . . .}, round brackets (, ) and the boolean operations {→,} as well a
modal operator ◻. Well formed formulae (wff’s henceforth) are defined as follows: each
propositional letter p ∈ P is a wff and if A is a wff, then so are ◻A. We assume ◇i to be
abbreviations for ¬ ◻ ¬. The boolean operations ¬,∧,∨ are defined in the usual way by
means of → and . In particular ⊺ ∶= →  (see Rybakov, 1997; Blackburn et al., 2001).
Inference Rules:
RE:= ⊢ A↔ B ⇒ ⊢ ◻A↔ ◻B
RM:= ⊢ A→ B ⇒ ⊢ ◻A→ ◻B
RN:= ⊢ A ⇒ ⊢ ◻A
RR:= ⊢ A ∧B →C ⇒ ⊢ ◻A ∧ ◻B → ◻C
RK:= ⊢ A1 ∧ . . . ∧An → B ⇒ ⊢ ◻A1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◻An → ◻B n ≥ 0
Schemata:
EFQ:= A ∧ ¬A→ B
M:= ◻(A ∧B)→ (◻A ∧ ◻B)
C:= (◻A ∧ ◻B)→ ◻(A ∧B)
K:= ◻(A→ B)→ (◻A→ ◻B)
N:= ◻⊺
CON:= ¬ ◻ 
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D:= ◻A→ ¬ ◻ ¬A
T:= ◻A→ A
4:= ◻A→ ◻ ◻A
B:= A→ ◻◇A
DEX:= ◻A ∧ ◻¬A→ ◻B
The major issues to be avoided is the possibility for a system to derive and validate the
schema DEX, the deontic explosion. This schema is derivable in any system above K, the
minimal normal modal logic obtained by adding K and N to the classical propositional
calculus CPC. The way this schema can be inferred is actually quite straightforward.
Nevertheless, we shall prove a few simple lemmas that highlight some logical relations.
In what follows, we shall always assume ⊢ to be CPC usual deduction relation, namely:
Definition 2.1.1 (Derivation, Deduction, Theoremhood) A derivation of a for-
mula A from the premisses A1, . . . ,Aj, in symbols A1, . . . ,Aj ⊢AS A in an axiomatic
system AS is a finite sequence of formulae A1, . . . ,Aj ,A s.t. each Ai is either a premiss,
or an instance of an axiom schema from AS or it has been obtained from a sequence of
formulae Ak1 , . . . ,Akm occurring before Ai via application of an inference rule from AS.
A deduction in AS is a derivation with the empty set of premisses.
A formula A is a theorem in AS, denoted by ⊢AS A, if there is a deduction of A inAS.
Most of the syntactic results presented below concerning non normal modal systems
and their characterisation can be found in Chellas (1980).
Lemma 2.1.2 RM ⊕ EFQ ⊕ C ⇒ DEX
Proof. ⊢ A ∧ ¬A→ B EFQ⊢ ◻(A ∧ ¬A)→ ◻B RM⊢ ◻A ∧ ◻¬A→ ◻B C⊕M
32CHAPTER 2. NON NORMAL PROPOSITIONAL SYSTEMS FORDEONTIC LOGICS
Lemma 2.1.3 If RE is in the system, then RM and M are equivalent.
Proof. 1. ⊢ A ∧B → B⊢ ◻(A ∧B)→ ◻B RM⊢ A ∧B → A⊢ ◻(A ∧B)→ ◻A⊢ ◻(A ∧B)→ ◻A ∧ ◻B
2. ⊢ A→ B assumption.⊢ (A→ B)→ (A→ A ∧B) classical tautology⊢ A→ A ∧B MP⊢ A ∧B → A classical tautology⊢ A↔ A ∧B⊢ ◻A↔ ◻(A ∧B) RE⊢ ◻(A ∧B)→ ◻A ∧ ◻B M⊢ ◻A→ ◻A ∧ ◻B substitution⊢ ◻A→ ◻B
Corollary 2.1.4 (RM ⊕ EFQ ⊕ C) = (M ⊕ C ⊕ EFQ ⊕ RE) ⇒ DEX
There are different systems of propositional modal logics built to model various sit-
uations. In the following table we list some simple systems which may be considered as
a base for more complex systems (for further details, see Chellas, 1980).
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Rules Axioms
E classical RE
M monotonic RM E ⊕M
MN N-monotonic RM⊕RN E ⊕M⊕N
R regular RR E ⊕M⊕C
K normal RK E ⊕K⊕N
E⊕M⊕C⊕N
The lattice depicted in Figure 2.1 illustrates the inclusion relations in non normal
systems.
According to what we have observed above, any logic above R (and hence K) does
not look like a good candidate to accommodate deontic dilemmas. This holds true for
SDL (Standard Deontic Logic as well, as it is a normal logic, i.e., it is a proper superset
of K.
2.2 Semantic tools for Non Normal Systems
2.2.1 Multi-relational Frames
We start by defining Multi-relational frames for modal logics. Below, we shall see how
these frames fail to validate some deontically relevant schemata, that are well known to
be valid in Standard Kripke Semantics.
Definition 2.2.1 A multi-relational n-frame is a n+1-tuple F ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩ where
W is a non empty set, n is at most countable, and any Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a binary relation
on W .
Notice that this definition allows multi-relational frames to have a (countable) infinite
number of binary relations over the base set.
Definition 2.2.2 A multi-relational n-model is a n + 2-tuple Mn ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn, V ⟩
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Figure 2.1: The lattice of non normal propositional systems (cf. Chellas, 1980, 237).
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where ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩ is a multi-relational n-frame and V is a function (assignment)
V ∶ PropÐ→ P(W ).
Truth conditions. The truth conditions for all boolean operations are standard.
Given a multi-relational frame F ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩, a model M ∶= ⟨F , V ⟩ and a world
w from W :
⊧Vw p if and only if w ∈ ∥p∥V for any propositional letter p
/⊧Vw 
⊧Vw A→ B if and only if either /⊧Vw A, or ⊧Vw B
The clauses to evaluate modal formulae are a direct generalisation of the standard
Kripke approach. Here there are two ways to evaluate ◻-formualae, namely by applying
either weak or emphstrong conditions.
Weak modal conditions (A): ⊧Vw ◻A if and only if ∃Ri∀v (wRiv ⇒ ⊧Vv A)
and of course:
(A.2) /⊧Vw ◻A iff ∀Ri∃v(wRiv & /⊧Vv A)
(A.3) ⊧Vw ◇A iff ∀Ri∃v(wRiv & ⊧Vv A)
(A.4) /⊧Vw ◇A iff ∃Ri∀v(wRiv⇒/⊧Vv A)
Strong modal conditions (B): ⊧Vw ◻A iff ∃Ri∀v(wRiv ⇔ ⊧Vv A)
and:
(B.2) /⊧Vw ◻A iff ∀Ri∃v((wRiv & /⊧Vv A) Or (¬(wRiv) & ⊧Vv A))
(B.3) ⊧Vw ◇A iff ∀Ri∃v((wRiv & ⊧Vv A) Or (¬(wRiv) & /⊧Vv A))
(B.4) /⊧Vw ◇A iff ∃Ri∀v(wRiv⇔/⊧Vv A)
A closer look reveals that multi-relational semantics with strong truth conditions is
nothing but a rephrasing of neighborhood frames, though the translation is not always
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obvious Governatori and Rotolo (2005). Moreover, Standard Kripke Semantics is nothing
but a particular case of multi-relational semantics, namely it is the subset of multi-
relational frames with truth conditions A and only one accessibility relation.
Concepts as truth and validity are defined as usual:
Truth in a world A formula A is true in w if and only if ⊧Vw A.
Truth in a model A formula A is true in a model M, in symbols F ⊧V A (or M ⊧ A,
or just ⊧V A if the contest is clear), if and only if ⊧Vw A for any world w ∈W .
Validity A formula A is valid on a frame F , in symbols F ⊧ A, if and only if F ⊧V A
for any valuation V for F .
F-Validity A formula A is valid on a class of frames F, in symbols F ⊧ A, if and only
if F ⊧ A for any Frame F from F.
Notation and abbreviations. Given a relation Ri and a world w, by the symbol
Ri(w) we refer to the set of all the worlds Ri-accessible from w, i.e.: Ri(w) ∶= {x ∶ wRix}.
Given a model M ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rj , V ⟩ and a formula A, we define the truth set of A,
in symbols ∥A∥V , as the set of all the worlds of the model in which A is true, i.e.:∥A∥V ∶= {w ∶ ⊧Vw A}.
The choice of either strong, or weak clauses depends on the philosophical account one
may want to give to ought. As we said, the intuition behind multi-relational semantics
is that any relation can be seen as a set of norms, a standard. Thus, given a possible
situation w, any standard of norms assigns to w a set of possible situations in which
such norms are applied, i.e., those worlds which are ideal with respect to w from the
standpoint of a given set of norms. If smoking is prohibited in public places, ◻¬A,
by some norms, the standard Ri, then in the current state of affair w, the relation Ri
associates to w a set of worlds Ri(w) that are ideal, namely, a set of worlds in which
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nobody actually smokes within public premises. The question, here, is how to chose such
set of worlds. Technically, this means that Ri(w) is a proper or improper subset of the
truth set of the formula ¬A. According to weak evaluation clauses, it is enough to have
a set containing only ideal worlds, i.e., Ri(w) ⊆ ∥¬A∥V . On the other hand, B-clauses
are said strong because they require a world to have access to all and only those possible
situations in which people do not smoke within public places, i.e., Ri(w) = ∥¬A∥V .
Another remark should be made concerning Nighborhood Semantics. While it is quite
straightforward to see the link between strong frames and neighborhood semantics, weak
frames look less similar. However, one may formulate truth evaluation clauses within
Neighborhood Semantics in order to emulate multi-relational weak frames as follows:
⊧Vw ◻A if and only if ∃X ∈ Nw, X ⊆ ∥A∥V
Thus, as one would expect, a formula as ◻⊺ is valid in the class of these models, and
it is indeed a MN-valid formula, as we shall see below.
2.2.2 Schemata and Validity: a Few Examples
It is well known that both neighborhood structures, and multi-relational weak frames fail
to validate some very well known modal formulae that are theorems of normal systems.
Here we shall see how it happens and, more important, we shall carry on a compared
analysis between Kripke, weak, and strong multi-relational frames.
Let us start with the schema named after Kripke himself, namely K ∶= ◻(A→ B)→(◻A→ ◻B). As we said, it is no longer valid.
Lemma 2.2.3 The schema K ∶= ◻(A → B) → (◻A → ◻B) is not valid in the class of
all multi-relational frames (given either truth condition A or B), although it is valid in
any normal modal system (henceforth, K-valid).
Proof. Consider the model M2 ∶= ⟨{w, v, z},R1,R2, V ⟩ where R1 ∶= {⟨w, v⟩}, R2 ∶=
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{⟨w,w⟩, ⟨w, z⟩}, ∥p∥V ∶= {w, z} and V (q) ∶= ∅ as depicted in Figure 2.2. It is easy to see
that there is a relation, namely R1, such that for any x in the base set of the model, wR1x
if and only if ⊧Vx p → q and hence ⊧Vw ◻(p → q). Moreover ⊧Vw ◻p, as for any x we have
that wR2x iff ⊧Vx p. On the other hand, /⊧Vw ◻q, as for both R1 and R2 it holds that there
is some x such that w is linked to it and /⊧Vx q. Therefore /⊧Vw ◻(p→ q)→ (◻p→ ◻q) and
hence there is a multi-relational frame F that does not validate an instance of schema
K.
w
p ¬qv¬p ¬q zp ¬q1 2
2
Figure 2.2: Countermodel for K.
Another controversial schema within the deontic intepretation is, as we saw in Chap-
ter 1, the aggregation of conjunction within the scope of the modal operator, i.e., schema
C ∶= (◻A∧◻B)→ ◻(A∧B). It is widely known as a K-valid schema and it plays a cen-
tral role in the syntactic deduction of DEX. For this and other reasons, several authors
argued to reject it, or at least to restrict it (for a discussion, see (Goble, 2005). See also
(Hansen, 2005).). We will not commit here to any philosophical view on this schema.
We show anyway that C is not a valid formula under both weak, and strong semantic
conditions.
Lemma 2.2.4 The schema C ∶= (◻A ∧ ◻B) → ◻(A ∧B) is not valid in the class of all
multi-relational frames (given either truth condition A or B).
Proof. Consider the model M2 ∶= ⟨{w, v, z},R1,R2, V ⟩ where R1 ∶= {⟨w, v⟩}, R2 ∶={⟨w, z⟩}, ∥p∥V ∶= {v} and V (q) ∶= {z} a depicted in Figure 2.3. It is easy to see that
there are two relations, namely R1 and R2, such that for any x in the base set of the
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model, wR1x if and only if ⊧Vx p and wR2x if and only if ⊧Vx q respectively, hence w ⊧V ◻p
and ⊧Vw ◻q. On the other hand, w /⊧V ◻(p∧q), as for both R1 and R2 it holds that there
is some x such that w is linked to it and /⊧Vx p ∧ q. Therefore /⊧Vw ◻p ∧◻q → ◻(p ∧ q) and
hence there is a multi-relational frame F that does not validate an instance of schema
C.
w¬p ¬qvp ¬q z¬p q1 2
Figure 2.3: The model M2 does not validate schema C.
The main difference between semantic conditions A and B reveals itself when we look
closely at schema M ∶= ◻(A ∧B) → (◻A ∧ ◻B). Indeed, here we see the first and most
important difference: M is in fact a valid formula, if we assume semantic conditions A,
whereas it is not if we assume conditions B.
Lemma 2.2.5 The schema M is valid in the class of all multi-relational frames (given
condition A).
Proof. Assume by reductio that there is a model on a frame F and a world in its base
set such that (i) ⊧w ◻(p∧q) and either (ii) /⊧w ◻p or (iii) /⊧w ◻q. By (i) there is a relation
Ri such that for any x, if wRix then ⊧x p ∧ q. If (ii) holds, then, assuming condition A,
for any relation Rk there is a world x such that wRkx and /⊧x p. Since this must also
hold for Ri, there is a contradiction. Hence condition (iii) must be fulfilled: according
to condition A, for any relation Rk there is a world x such that wRkx and /⊧x q. Again,
this must hold for Ri too and hence there is a contradiction. Therefore for any frameF , F ⊧M, given condition A.
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Lemma 2.2.6 The schema M is not valid in the class of all multi-relational frames
(given condition B).
Proof. Consider the model M2 ∶= ⟨{w, v, z},R1, V ⟩ where R1 ∶= {⟨w, v⟩}, ∥p∥V ∶= {v}
and V (q) ∶= {v,w, z} as depicted in Figure 2.4. Consider the relation R1: it holds that
for any x, wR1x if and only if ⊧x p ∧ q, hence ⊧w ◻(p ∧ q). However, according to
condition B, /⊧w ◻q. Indeed, ∥q∥V ∶= {w, v, z} and for all i, Ri ≠ {w, v, z}. Therefore,
given condition B, schema M is not valid in the class of all multi-relational frames.
w¬p q
v
p q
z¬p q
R1
Figure 2.4: The model M2 does not validate schema M assuming condition B.
In the light of what we have formerly pointed out, it is very easy to observe that
DEX is no longer valid. Actually neither semantic conditions A, nor B allow the validity
of the schema:
Lemma 2.2.7 The schema DEX ∶= ◻A ∧ ◻¬A → ◻B is not valid in the class of all
multi-relational frames (given boh conditions A, and B).
Proof. Let M ∶= ⟨{w, z},R1,R2, V ⟩, where ∥p∥V ∶= {w} and V (q) = ∅; R1 ∶= {⟨w,w⟩},
R2 ∶= {⟨w, z⟩}, as shown in Figure 2.5. Then ⊧Vw ◻p by R1, ⊧Vw ◻¬p by R2 and, since for
all relations there is a world x such that wRix and /⊧Vx q, it holds that /⊧Vw ◻q.
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w
p ¬q z¬p ¬q21
Figure 2.5: Falsification of the DEX schema
Let us consider schema N, i.e., ◻⊺, which is not necessarily dangerous in deontic logic,
although sometimes rejected for conceptual reasons: An obligation having as content the
truth can never be violated (Sergot, 2001).
Lemma 2.2.8 (Schema N, Conditions A) The schema N ∶= ◻⊺ is valid in the class
of all multi-relational frames given semantic conditions A.
Proof. Assume by reductio ad absurdum that N is not valid, given A conditions. Then
for some model M ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . .Rn, V ⟩ and some world w, it holds that /⊧Vw ◻⊺. It follows
that ⊧Vw ◇, i.e., for any i, there is a world v such that wRiv and ⊧Vv . This leads a
contradiction as, by definition, ∥⊺∥V ∶=W .
Lemma 2.2.9 (Schema N– Conditions B) The schema N ∶= ◻⊺ is not valid in the
class of all multi-relational frames, given semantic conditions B.
Proof. Consider the simple model ⟨{w},R1, V ⟩ where R1 ∶= ∅. Since ⊺ is true in any
world, under any valuation, clearly ∥⊺∥V =W . Hence ⊧Vw ◇ and thus /⊧Vw ◻⊺.
2.2.3 Frames and Properties: Comparing Results
According to what happens in Standard Kripke-semantics, different schemata define
different characteristics a multi-relational frame should meet. In the following section
we shall analyse a few well known schemata in order to clarify the differences between
Kripke and Multi-relational semantics. Moreover these characteristics vary according to
the truth conditions we decide to adopt.
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Lemma 2.2.10 (Frame characterisation of M – Conditions B) For any multi-
relational frame F , assuming condition B, the following holds:F ⊧ ◻(A ∧ B) → ◻A ∧ ◻B iff F is supplemented, i.e., for any valuation V , for any
world w ∈ W , for any Ri such that Ri(w) = J ∩K, there are two relations Rj and Rk
such that Rj(w) = J and Rk(w) =K.
Proof. (⇒) Given a multi-relational frame F assume there is a relation such that
Ri(w) = J ∩K and for any Rk, Rj either Rk(w) ≠K or Rj ≠ J . Define a valuation such
that ∥p∥V = J and ∥q∥V = K. Hence J ∩K = ∥p∥V ∩ ∥q∥V = ∥p ∧ q∥V and w ⊢V ◻(p ∧ q).
Since for any relation either Rj(w) ≠ J or Rk(w) ≠K it follows that /⊧Vw ◻p ∧ ◻q.
(⇐) Assume there are a multi-relational frame F , a valuation V and a world w such
that ⊧Vw ◻(p∧q) and /⊧Vw ◻p∧◻q. Then there is a relation Ri such that Ri(w) = ∥p∧q∥V =∥p∥V ∩ ∥q∥V . Since /⊧Vw ◻p ∧ ◻q, it follows that either for any relation Rk, Rk(w) ≠ ∥p∥V
or for any relation Rk, Rk(w) ≠ ∥q∥V .
On the technical side, notice that in any model at any world w, if we assume as
valid schema M and we have at least one boxed formula holding true at w, then we
have N = ◻⊺ too. Indeed for any relation Ri and any world w, it holds trivially that
Ri(w) = R(w)∩W and hence, in such a frame, for any world w, there must always be a
relation such that Rj(w) =W . By definition, for any frame and any valuation W = ∥⊺∥V .
Lemma 2.2.11 (Frame characterisation of C – Conditions B) For any multi-
relational frame F , assuming condition B, the following holds:F ⊧ ◻A ∧◻B → ◻(A ∧B) iff F is closed under intersections, i.e., for any valuation
V , for any world w ∈ W , for any couple of relations Rj and Rk, there exists a relation
Ri such that Ri(w) = Rj(w) ∩Rk(w).
Proof. (⇒) Given a multi-relational frame F assume there are two relations Rj and
Rk such that, given a world w, for any relation Ri, Ri(w) ≠ Rj(w) ∩ Rk(w). Let
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∥p∥V = Rj(w) and ∥q∥V = Rk(w). Clearly ⊧Vw ◻p ∧ ◻q. Since Ri(w) ≠ Rj(w) ∩Rk(w),
i.e., Ri(w) ≠ ∥p∥V ∩ ∥q∥V and hence Ri(w) ≠ ∥p ∧ q∥V , it follows that F , /⊧Vw ◻(p ∧ q).
(⇐) Assume there are a multi-relational frame F , a valuation V and a world w such
that ⊧Vw ◻A ∧ ◻B and /⊧Vw ◻(A ∧B). Then there are two relations Rj and Rk such that
Rj(w) = ∥A∥V and Rk(w) = ∥B∥V . Moreover, for any Ri it holds that Ri(w) ≠ ∥A∧B∥V ,
i.e., Ri(w) ≠ ∥A∥V ∩ ∥B∥V .
The frame characterisation for C with conditions A is very similar to the previous
one, as one would expect:
Lemma 2.2.12 (Frame characterisation of C – Conditions A) For any multi-
relational frame F the following holds: F ⊧ ◻A ∧ ◻B → ◻(A ∧ B) iff for any world
w, for any relation Ri, Rk there exists a relation Rj such that Rj(w) ⊆ Rk(w) ∩Ri(w).
Proof. (⇒) Assume there is a frame F ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩ and suppose that there are
two relations Ri,Rk such that for all j, Rj(w) /⊆ Rk(w) ∩ Ri(w). Define the follow-
ing valuation V for F : ∥p∥V ∶= Ri(w) and ∥q∥V ∶= Rk(w). Clearly ⊧Vw ◻p and ⊧Vw ◻q,
hence ⊧Vw ◻p ∧ ◻q. On the other hand ∥p ∧ q∥V = ∥p∥V ∩ ∥q∥v = Ri(w) ∩Rk(w). By as-
sumption there is no relation Rj such that Rj(w) ⊆ Ri(w)∩Rk(w) and hence /⊧Vw ◻(p∧q).
(⇐) If C is not valid, then there are a frame e F ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩, a valuation V
and a world w such that ⊧Vw ◻A, ⊧Vw ◻B, and /⊧ ◻(A∧B). From this, trivially, it follows
that there are two relations, namely Ri,Rj such that Ri(w) ⊆ ∥A∥V and Rj(w) ⊆ ∥B∥V ,
whereas for any k, Rk(w) /⊆ Ri(w) ∩Rj(w).
Let us consider now schemata T,B,4: they are not usually adopted in deontic
logic—sometimes, like with T—they are avoided. However, their study is instructive
to illustrate multi-relational semantics.
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Lemma 2.2.13 (T: general reflexivity – cond. A and B) For any multi-relational
frame F , assuming either condition A or B, the following holds: F ⊧ ◻A→ A iff for any
world w, for any relation Ri, wRiw, assuming either condition A, or B.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that for some multi-relational frame there are a world w and a
relation Ri such that ¬(wRiw). Let ∥p∥V ) = Ri(w) as shown in Figure 2.6, then clearly⊧w ◻p and, since w /∈ Ri(w), /⊧w p.
w¬p
Figure 2.6: A simple non reflexive frame.
(⇐) Assume that for all w of a given frame, for any i, wRiw. Suppose that for some
valuation V , ⊧Vw ◻A. Hence for some j, Rj(w) ⊆ ∥A∥V . By assumption w ∈ Rj(w), thus
w ∈ ∥A∥V and ⊧Vw A.
Lemma 2.2.14 (B: general symmetry – Conditions A) For any multi-relational
frame F , assuming condition A, the following holds:F ⊧ A→ ◻◇A iff ∀w∃Ri∀v(wRiv⇒ ∀Rk(vRkw)).
Proof. (⇒) Assume that in a frame F , there is the following situation:∃w∀Ri∃vi(wRivi & ∃Rk¬(viRkw)). Let V be a valuation such that ∥p∥V = {w}. Clearly⊧Vw p. By assumption for any relation Ri there is some vi such that wRivi and for some
Rj , ¬(viRjw). Hence for any vi it holds that /⊧Vvi ◇p (recall semantic condition A4).
Therefore /⊧Vw ◻◇ p.
(⇐) Assume (by reductio) that there is a frame F with the following characteristics:
(a) ∀w∃Ri∀v(wRiv⇒ ∀Rk(vRkw))
(b) F /⊧ A→ ◻◇A. Then there is a valuation V on F and a world such that:
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(b.1) ⊧Vw A and (b.2) /⊧Vw ◻◇A, i.e., ⊧Vw ◇◻¬A.
By (b.2) for any relation Ri there is a world v such that (b.3) wRiv and ⊧Vv ◻¬A and
hence (b.4) there is a relation Rk such that for all worlds z, vRkz ⇒ ⊧Vz ¬A. Since by
(a) vRiw for any Ri and ⊧Vw A, such Rk cannot exist.
The condition just described may indeed be called general symmetry. In fact, first
of all, notice that this condition implies the following: Given a frame F ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩,
for any world w there exists one relation Ri such that if Ri(w) ≠ ∅, then all worlds
v ∈ Ri(w) are such that for all j, w ∈ Rj(v), but v ∈ Rj(w) (as the property holds for
all worlds of the frame), so this generates a set of worlds mutually accessible under any
relation. Notice that this is not a cluster, as general reflexivity is not granted here.
Whithin the framework of strong truth conditions, however, the class of frames char-
acterised by Schema B is rather less intuitive.
Lemma 2.2.15 (Frame characterisation of B – Conditions B) For any multi-
relational frame F , assuming condition B, the following holds:F ⊧ A → ◻◇A iff for any valuation V , for any world w ∈ W , w ∈ ∥A∥V , then there is
some relation Rj, such that Rj(w) = {v ∶ ∀Ri (Ri(v) ≠ ∥¬A∥V }.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that there are a valuation V and a world w ∈W such that w ∈ ∥A∥V
and {v ∶ ∀Ri (Ri(v) ≠ ∥¬A∥V )} ≠ Rj(w) for all Rj . The set {v ∶ ∀Ri (Ri(v) ≠ ∥¬A∥V )}
is exactly the truth set of the formula ◇A. Indeed condition B3 says that ⊧w ◇A
iff ∀Ri∃x((wRix & ⊧x A) Or (¬(wRix) & /⊧x A)); given a world z ∈ W , z ∈ {v ∶∀Ri (Ri(v) ≠ ∥¬p∥V )} if and only if for any relation Ri, either there is some u ∈ ∥A∥V
such that zRiu, or there is some world u ∈ ∥¬A∥V such that ¬(zRiu). By assumption
for any Rj it holds that Rj(w) ≠ ∥◇A∥V and hence /⊧Vw ◻◇A and ⊧Vw A.
(⇐) This is very straightforward. Suppose that there are a frame F ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩,
a valuation V on F and a world w where an instance of B is false, i.e., for some formula
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A, ⊧Vw A and /⊧Vw ◻ ◇A. This, by definition, implies both that w ∈ ∥A∥V , and that for
all Rj , Rj(w) ≠ ∥◇A∥V , i.e., Rj(w) ≠ {v ∶ ∀Ri (Ri(v) ≠ ∥¬A∥V )}.
Lemma 2.2.16 (Frame characterisation of 4 – Condition A) For any multi-
relational frame F , assuming condition A, the following holds: F ⊧ ◻A → ◻ ◻ A
iff
∀x∀Ri
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∀y(xR1y⇒ (∀z(yR1z ⇒ (xRiz)) or . . .
or ∀z(yRnz ⇒ (xRiz))))
or⋮
or∀y(xRny⇒ (∀z(yR1z ⇒ (xRiz)) or . . .
or ∀z(yRnz ⇒ (xRiz))))
Proof. (⇒) (contrapositive proposition) Given some multi relational frame F , assume
∃x∃Ri
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∃y1(xR1y1 & (∃z11(y1R1z11 & ¬(xRiz)) & . . .
& ∃z1n(y1Rnz1n & ¬(xRiz1n))))
&⋮
&∃yn(xRnyn & (∃zn1 (ynR1zn1 & ¬(xRizn1 )) & . . .
& ∃znn(ynRnznn & ¬(xRiznn))))
Let V (p) = Ri(x). Since for any world zlm, ¬(xRizlm), it holds that x ⊧V ◻p by Ri.
Moreover it holds that for any world yj and for any relation Rk, there is a world z
j
k such
that yjRkz
j
k and z
j
k /⊧V p and hence yj /⊧V ◻p. Since for any Rj there is such yj and
xRjyj , it holds that x /⊧V ◻ ◻ p.
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(⇐) Assume by reductio that for some frame, valuation and world w /⊧V ◻p→ ◻ ◻ p
for some proposition p. Then w ⊧V ◻p and w /⊧V ◻◻p. For some relation Ri, Ri(w) ⊆ ∥p∥
and for any relation Rj there is a world yj such that wRjyj and yj /⊧V ◻p. Again, for
any such yj and any relation Rk there is some world z
j
k such that yjRkz
j
k and z
j
k /⊧ p.
By hypothesis, there is some world zlm such that for any relation Rk, xRkz
l
m. Since this
holds also for Ri there is a contradiction.
Lemma 2.2.17 (Frame characterisation of 4 – Condition B) For any multi-
relational frame F , assuming condition B, the following holds:F ⊧ ◻A → ◻ ◻A iff for any w ∈ W , Ri and X ⊆ W the following holds: if X = Ri(w),
then {y ∶ ∃Rj(Rj(y) =X)} = Rk(w) for some k.
Proof. (⇒) (contrapositive proposition) Given some multi relational frame F , assume
there are w ∈W , Ri and X ⊆W such that X = Ri(w) and {y ∶ ∃Rj(Rj(y) =X)} ≠ Rk(w)
for all k. Let V (p) = X, then w ⊧V ◻p. Notice that {y ∶ ∃Rj(Rj(y) = X)} = ∥ ◻ p∥ and∥ ◻ p∥ is not empty as it contains at least w. Hence for any relation Rk there is a world
x such that ¬(wRkx) and x ⊧V ◻p and therefore w /⊧V ◻ ◻ p.(⇐) Assume by reductio that for some frame, valuation and world w /⊧V ◻p→ ◻◻p for
some proposition p. Then w ⊧V ◻p and w /⊧V ◻ ◻ p. For some relation Ri, Ri(w) = ∥p∥.
By assumption {y ∶ ∃Rj(Rj(y) = ∥p∥)} = Rk(w) for some k. Since {y ∶ ∃Rj(Rj(y) =∥p∥)} = ∥ ◻ p∥ it follows that w ⊧V ◻ ◻ p which is contradictory.
2.2.4 A Special Case: Schema CON and D
The semantic property of seriality can be decisive in deontic logic, as it usually imposes
consistency of obligations. Of course, one may argue that, when deontic systems are
weakened into non-normal ones in order to tolerate normative dilemmas, we no longer
need to enforce consistency. However, the question is subtler than expected, since dif-
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ferent ideas of seriality can be adopted. Again, we will not commit to any philosophical
view, but simply offer technical alternatives.
Within the framework of Standard Kripke Semantics, it is well known that two
famous schemata, namely D ∶= ◻A → ◇A and CON ∶= ◇⊺, characterise the same class
of Kripke-frames, i.e., the class of serial ones. A Kripke frame is said to be serial when
any world is related to at least one other world:
Definition 2.2.18 (K-seriality) A Kripke frame F ∶= ⟨W,R⟩ is serial if and only if
∀w ∃v (wRv) (2.1)
w v z
R R
R
Figure 2.7: A case of K-seriality
Since there is only one relation, the notion expressed by 2.1 does not look problematic.
But how can seriality be translated when the frame is broader and the number of relations
is bigger than just one? There are several possible alternative answers to this question,
for instance:
∀w ∃i∀v (wRiv) (2.2)
w v
1
1
2
1,2
Figure 2.8: A case of Total seriality
This means that any world is connected to all the others by one relation and it can
be named Total Seriality, in fact a formal alternative formulation of 2.2 is ∀w ∃i such
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that Ri(w) =W .
Alternatively, one may want seriality be expressed by the fact that:
∀w (∃v1(wR1v1) & . . .& ∃vn(wRnvn)) (2.3)
w v
z
1
2
1,2
2
1
Figure 2.9: A case of General Seriality
The property expressed by 2.3 looks closer to the intuition behind seriality in Kripke
Frames and it shall therefore be referred to as General Seriality. However, there are
more ways to capture the idea of seriality, for instance:
∀w∀i∀j (Ri(w) ∩Rj(w)) ≠ ∅ (2.4)
w v
z
1,2
1
2 1,2
2
1,2
Figure 2.10: Seriality as described in 2.4
These are all different ways to model the intuitive concept of seriality within multi-
relational frames. Kripke structures are not expressive enough to capture the difference.
Syntactically this corresponds to the fact that some different schemata collapse on each
other, namely D and CON. Since they characterise the same class of frames, not much
attention is devoted to their deeply different syntactical structure. However this ceases
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to be true if we adopt the broader approach of multi-relational frames.
A first important observation is that CON and D are semantically distinct:
Lemma 2.2.19 Given condition B, both the entailment CON ⇒ D and D ⇒ CON
are not valid.
Proof. (a) Consider the model M2 ∶= ⟨{w, z},R1,R2, V ⟩ where R1 ∶= {⟨w,w⟩},
R2 ∶= {⟨w, z⟩} and ∥p∥V ∶= {w} as depicted in Figure 2.11. In this frame, schema CON
is valid. Indeed, for any world x in the base set of the model (and by definition, for any
valuation), /⊧x . Since for any Ri there is a world x such that wRix and /⊧x , it follows
that /⊧Vw ◻, i.e., ⊧Vw ¬ ◻ . Moreover, the models disproves an instance of D. In fact
for any x, wR1x if and only if ⊧x p and wR2x if and only if ⊧x ¬p, hence ⊧Vw ◻p and⊧Vw ◻¬p, i.e., /⊧Vw ¬ ◻ ¬p. Therefore /⊧Vw ◻p→ ¬ ◻ ¬p.
w
p ⊺ z¬p ⊺
R2
R1
Figure 2.11: In M2 an instance of CON holds true, although an instance of D is not
under semantic condition B. This is a countermodel for the entailment CON→D
(b) Consider a simple dead end frame, i.e., F ∶= ⟨{w},R⟩, where R = ∅. Here, for
any valuation V , schema CON is always false, as R(w) = ∅ = ∥∥, which implies ⊧w ◻,
i.e., /⊧◇⊺. On the other hand, in this frame schema D is valid. Indeed suppose that for
some formula A and for some valuation V , ⊧Vw ◻A. Hence R(w) = ∥A∥V = ∅ = ∥∥V , so⊧Vw ◻ (in such frames, any true boxed formula is equivalent to ◻). Since there is no
Ri, such that Ri(w) = {w}, /⊧w ◻⊺, i.e., ⊧w ◇, and D is a valid schema.
Lemma 2.2.20 Given condition A, for any multi-relational frame F , (a) D ⇒ CON
holds, whereas (b) CON⇒D does not.
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Proof. (a) It is enough to prove that any counter model for CON is based on a
frame in which D is not valid. Indeed, if in a model M ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn, V ⟩, there is
a world in which CON is false, we have that ⊧Vw ◻. If we assume D to be valid on
the frame on which the model is based, we would get that ⊧Vw ◇◻ holds and hence for
any relation of the frame, there must exists at list one connected world in which  holds
true, which is, of course, a contradiction. Hence any counter model for CON cannot be
based on a D-frame.
(b) It follows from Lemma 2.2.19, item (i).
Corollary 2.2.21 The schema ◻A → ¬ ◻ ¬A ↔ ¬ ◻  is not valid in the class of all
multi-relational frames (assuming either condition A or B).
A first analysis of the difference between schema D and CON is proposed by (Jen-
nings and Schotch, 1981, 309) and Schotch and Jennings (1981) although, as far as we
are concerned, no results of characterisation (as those we propose below) have yet been
provided.
Returning to our analysis of the concept of seriality, the formulation expressed by 2.3
is captured by CON, a schema that characterises precisely the class of multi-relational
frames with this condition (assuming either condition A or B).
Lemma 2.2.22 (CON: General Seriality – cond. A and B) For any multi-relational
frame F , assuming either condition A or B, the following holds:
F ⊧CON if and only if ∀x (∃y1(xR1y1) & . . .& ∃yn(xRnyn))
Proof. (⇒) If a frame has a relation Ri that is a dead end in a world w, i.e., Ri(w) = ∅,
then, since given any valuation V , ∥∥V = ∅, we have that ⊧Vw ◻, i.e., the frame falsifies
CON.
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(⇐) This is also quite straightforward. Any frame falsifying CON must contain an
Ri-dead-end world w for some Ri, i.e., a world w such that for some i, Ri(w) = ∅.
A natural question is what (if any) class of frames is characterised by the validity of
schema D. The Lemmas below provide an answer.
Lemma 2.2.23 (Axiom D - Conditions A) For any multi-relational frame F , as-
suming condition A, the following holds:F ⊧D iff for any w ∈W and any pair of relations Ri and Rj, Ri(w) ∩Rj(w) ≠ ∅.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that in a frame F ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩ there are two relations Ri and
Rj such that for some w ∈W , Rj(w) ∩Ri(w) = ∅. There are two possible cases: either
(a) Ri(w) = ∅ or (b) Ri(w) ≠ ∅ and Rj(w) ≠ ∅. If (a) holds, then trivially ⊧Vw ◻ and/⊧Vw ◇ for any valuation V , falsifying D. If (b) holds, then let ∥p∥V = Ri(w) for some
propositional letter p. Hence ⊧Vw ◻p. Since Rj(w) ⊆ ∥¬p∥V , ⊧Vw ◻¬p, a countermodel for
D. (⇐) Assume that F ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩ is a frame in which D is not valid. Then for
some valuation V and some world w, ⊧Vw ◻A and ⊧Vw ◻¬A for some A. Hence for some
i, j, Ri(w) ⊆ ∥A∥V , whereas Rj(w) ⊆ −∥A∥V , and their intersection is, of course, empty.
Notice that this is yet another possible reading of the concept of seriality, namely
what we labeled as 2.4.
It is interesting to notice that if we assume truth conditions B, axiom D does no
longer capture any reading related to seriality, but it characterises those frames whose
relations cannot be complementary (although they can actually be both empty):
Lemma 2.2.24 (Axiom D – Conditions B) For any multi-relational frame F , as-
suming condition B, the following holds:F ⊧ D if and only if for any couple of relations Ri, Rj, Rj(w) ≠ −Ri(w) i.e., relations
cannot be complementary.
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Proof. (⇒) Assume there are two relations Ri and Rj such that for some w ∈ W ,
Rj(w) = −Ri(w). Let ∥p∥V = Ri(w) for some propositional letter p. Then ⊧Vw ◻p. Since
Ri(w) ∪Rj(w) =W and Ri(w) ∩Rj(w) = ∅, the truth set of ¬p is −Ri(w), i.e., Rj(w)
and hence ⊧Vw ◻¬p, meaning that /⊧Vw ◻p→ ¬ ◻ ¬p.(⇐) Assume that F ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩ is a frame in which D is not valid. Then for
some valuation V and some world w, ⊧Vw ◻A and ⊧Vw ◻¬A for some A. Hence for some
i, j, Ri(w) = ∥A∥V , whereas Rj(w) = −∥A∥V .
One last observation should be made about schema N, which is valid on any frame
if we assume conditions A, although it is not if we deal with conditions B. In this latter
case, N captures those frames which are serial according the reading we gave in 2.2:
Lemma 2.2.25 (Axiom N– Conditions B) For any multi-relational frame F , as-
suming conditions B, the following holds: F ⊧ ◻⊺ iff ∀x∃Ri∀y(y ∈ Ri(x)).
Proof. (⇒) Assume that for some multi-relational frame there is a world w such that
for any relation Ri there is at least a world y, y /∈ Ri(w). Since ∥⊺∥V = W for any
valuation, it follows that for any Ri there is a world y such that ¬(wRiy) and y /⊧V 
and hence ⊧Vw ◇ and /⊧Vw ◻⊺.(⇐) Assume that F ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn⟩ is a frame in which N is not valid. Then for
some valuation V and some world w, /⊧Vw ◻⊺ and hence ⊧Vw ◇. This implies that any
relation Ri is such that Ri(w) ≠ −∥∥V and clearly −∥∥V = ∥⊺∥V =W by definition.
Tables below and Table 2.1 offer a comparative synoptical view of this extensive
analysis of seriality and schemata.
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Kripke Semantics
Kripke frames CON⇒D D⇒CON
Multi-relational frames Conditions A CON /⇒D D⇒CON
Multi-relational frames Conditions B CON /⇒D D /⇒CON
Truth Conditions A – Weak Semantics
Schema Class of Frames First Order Property
N all
CON General Seriality ∀x (∃y1(xR1y1) & . . .& ∃yn(xRnyn)) 2.3
D Closed under Intersection ∀w∀i∀j Ri(w) ∩Rj(w) ≠ ∅ 2.4
Truth Conditions B – Strong Semantics
Schema Class of Frames First Order Property
N Total Seriality (contains the unit) ∀w ∃i∀v (wRiv) 2.2
CON General Seriality ∀x (∃y1(xR1y1) & . . .& ∃yn(xRnyn)) 2.3
D Relations are not Complementary ∀w, i, j, Rj(w) ≠ −Ri(w)
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2.3 Completeness Results
The task of this final part is to provide several non normal modal propositional systems
with completeness results with respect to certain class of frames. Although it is quite
straightforward to check the validity of the schemata we presented (and hence to check
the soundness of specific systems containing such axioms), when we focus on proving
completeness of such systems, it is soon clear that standard techniques cannot be applied
without twisting and adjusting them to the new task.
2.3.1 Soundness and Completeness of Classical Systems and above
The first thing to verify before proceeding to show completeness results is to check
whether some specific axiomatic systems produce formulae which are actually valid
within certain specific classes of multi-relational frames, assuming strong semantic con-
ditions, namely what we labeled as B-conditions. Any axiomatic system enjoying such
property with respect to a class of frames is said to be sound with respect to the speci-
fied class of structures. Thus we start by proving that the system E, the minimal modal
system, is a sound system with respect to the class of all multi-relational frames, giving
strong semantics. The theory E is defined as the smallest set of formulae containing all
classical tautologies and closed under the rules MP and RE:
Theorem 2.3.1 (Classical logics - Soundness) Let E⊢ ∶= {A ∣ CPC ⊕RE ⊢ A} and
E⊧ ∶= {A ∣ ⊧ A}, given semantic conditions B. Then E⊢ ⊆ E⊧j, i.e., all theorems are
valid formulae in all multi-relational frames.
Proof. The proof is standard and quite easy. It is carried out by induction on lg(D),
where D ∶= D1, . . . ,Dn is a deduction in the axiomatic system E with A = Dn, i.e., A ∈ E⊢)
If lg(D) = 1, then A is a classical tautology and the proof is trivial. Let us consider the
case lg(D) = k + 1. Then A has been obtained either via MP or via RM. Let us focus
on the latter case. The formula A has the form ◻B ↔ ◻C and it has been obtained via
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the application of RE to a formula Di = B ↔ C, i ≤ k. By induction hypothesis (IH),
it holds that B ↔ C ∈ E⊧. Suppose by reductio that ◻B ↔ ◻C /∈ E⊧, hence there are
a multi-relational frame F , a valuation V and a world w such that either ⊧w ◻B and/⊧w ◻C, or /⊧w ◻B and ⊧w ◻C, given conditions B. Suppose ⊧w ◻B and /⊧w ◻C. By
semantic condition B, ⊧w ◻B implies that there is a relation Ri such that for any world
x, wRix ⇔ ⊧x B. By IH, ⊧ B ↔ C, hence ∥C∥ = ∥B∥. Thus wRix ⇔ ⊧x C and
hence ⊧w ◻C, reaching a contradiction.
Any formula generated by E is valid in the class of all multi relational frames with
B semantic conditions. The goal is thus to show that if a formula A is valid in such
class, then it ought to be generated by the axiomatic system as well. An achievement of
this kind would tell us that the axiomatic system we have described generates all and
only the theorems of E: In other words, the system is sound and complete. Although
all the completeness results for neighborhood semantics can be found in (Chellas, 1980,
248ff.), we restate a few of them using multi-relational semantics (notice that, given
strong conditions, multi-relational frames are equivalent to neighborhood models).
Definition 2.3.2 Given an axiomatic system AS on a language L, a set ∆ ⊂ Fma(L)
is:
(a) AS-consistent iff ∆ ⊬AS ;
(b) L-complete iff ∀A ∈ Fma(L) A ∈ ∆ or ¬A ∈ ∆;
(c) AS-maximal iff ∆ is AS-consistent and L-complete.
Definition 2.3.3 Let M ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn, V ⟩ be a multi-relational model assuming se-
mantic conditions B. M is an E-canonical model for E if and only if:
(a) W ∶= {w ∣ w is E-maximal}
(b) For any formula A ∈ Fma(L), for any w ∈ W , ◻A ∈ w if and only if there is a
relation Ri such that Ri(w) = ∣A∣E, where ∣A∣E ∶= {v ∈W ∣ A ∈ v}
(c) for any propositional letter p ∈ Prop, ∥p∥V ∶= ∣p∣E, where ∣p∣E ∶= {w ∈W ∣ p ∈ w}
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Lemma 2.3.4 Given an E-canonical model M ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn, V ⟩, for any formula
A,B ∈ Fma(L), if ∣A∣E = ∣B∣E, then for any world w ∈ W , Ri(w) = ∣A∣E for some Ri if
and only if Rk(w) = ∣B∣E for some Rk.
Proof. Suppose ∣A∣E = ∣B∣E, then ⊢E A↔ B and ⊢ ◻A↔ ◻B by the RE rule. Hence
for any world w in the E-canonical base set ◻A ↔ ◻B ∈ w. Suppose that, given any
world w, there is some Ri such that Ri(w) = ∣A∣E. Then, by Definition 2.3.3 it holds
that ◻A ∈ w and, since ◻A ↔ ◻B ∈ w, it follows that ◻B ∈ w and thus, by Definition
2.3.3, there is some relation Rk such that Rk(w) = ∣B∣E.
Lemma 2.3.5 (Truth Lemma) Given an E-canonical model M ∶= ⟨W,R1,R2, . . . , V ⟩
for the classical modal logic E, for any formula A ∈ Fma(L), for any world w ∈W , the
following holds: ⊧Vw A ⇔ A ∈ w, i.e., ∣A∣E = ∥A∥V .
Proof. The proof is given by induction on the length of a formula A. The basis of
induction is trivial. Suppose lg(A) = n + 1. The only interesting case is when A has the
form ◻B.
⇒) Suppose ⊧Vw ◻B, then there is a relation Ri such that for any v ∈ W , Ri(w) =∥B∥V . By the inductive hypothesis Ri(w) = ∣B∣E, hence ◻B ∈ w by Definition 2.3.3.⇐) Suppose /⊧Vw ◻B, then for all relations Ri, Ri(w) ≠ ∥B∥V and by the inductive
hypothesis Ri(w) ≠ ∣B∣E. Therefore ◻B /∈ w by Definition 2.3.3.
Let MC ∶= ⟨W,RA1 ,RA2 , . . . , V ⟩ be a multi-relational model such that:
(a) A1,A2, . . . is an enumaration of all the formulae on L
(b) W ∶= {w ∣ w is E-maximal}
(c) For any w ∈W and any formula A ∈ Fma(L) let:
- RA(w) = ∣A∣E if ◻A ∈ w
- RA(w) =X where X is such that X ⊆W and for any B ∈ Fma(L), X ≠ ∣B∣E otherwise
(d) for any propositional letter p ∈ Prop, ∥p∥V ∶= ∣p∣E, where ∣p∣E ∶= {w ∈W ∣ p ∈ w}
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Since condition (b) of Definition 2.3.3 is fulfilled, the model MC is E-canonical.
Indeed suppose ◻A ∈ w for some w. Then RA(w) = ∣A∣E. On the other hand assume
by reductio that ◻A /∈ w and there is some B such that RB(w) = ∣A∣E. By definition ofMC it follows that RB(w) = ∣B∣E, ∣A∣E = ∣B∣E, ⊢E A ↔ B, A ↔ B ∈ w for any w and
hence ◻A↔ ◻B ∈ w (since any w si closed under RE) and by MP ◻A ∈ w, leading to a
contradiction.
Lemma 2.3.6 (Completeness of E – Conditions B) The logic E is complete with
respect to the class of all multi-relational frames (semantic condition B).
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 2.3.5 and the existence of canonical models.
Lemma 2.3.7 (Completeness of M – Conditions B) The logic M is complete with
respect to the class of multi-relational frames (semantic condition B) having the following
property: for any valuation V , for any world w ∈ W , if there exists a relation Ri such
that Ri(w) = J ∩K, then there are two relations Rj and Rk such that Rj(w) = J and
Rk(w) =K.
Proof. Consider a canonical model for M where worlds are pairwise different with
respect to the propositional letters they contain, i.e., a canonical model where there are
no duplicates within the base set. Thus the formula ⋀p∈w p is characterising for w. Take
any w ∈ W and suppose that for some Ri, Ri(w) = J ∩K. Let A ∶= ⋁v∈J ⋀p∈v p and
B ∶= ⋁v∈K ⋀p∈v p; clearly ⊧Vv A iff v ∈ J and ⊧Vv B iff v ∈ K and hence ∥A∥V = J and∥B∥V = K. Then Ri(w) = ∥A∥V ∩ ∥B∥V = ∥A ∧ B∥V . This implies that ⊧Vw ◻(A ∧ B),◻(A ∧ B) ∈ w and hence ◻A ∧ ◻B ∈ w (schema M is in w). Thus ⊧Vw ◻A and there is
a relation Rj such that Rj(w) = ∥A∥V and ⊧Vw ◻B and there is a relation Rk such that
Rk(w) = ∥B∥V .
Lemma 2.3.8 (Completeness of R – Conditions B) The logic R is complete with
respect to the class of supplemented and closed under intersections multi-relational frames
(semantic condition B), i.e., frames having the following properties:
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(a) for any valuation V , for any world w ∈ W , if there exists a relation Ri such
that Ri(w) = J ∩K, then there are two relations Rj and Rk such that Rj(w) = J and
Rk(w) =K.
(b) for any valuation V , for any world w ∈ W , for any couple of relations Rj and
Rk, there exists a relation Ri such that Ri(w) = Rj(w) ∩Rk(w)
Proof. (i) See proof of Lemma 2.3.7.
(ii) Assume that for some w ∈ W there are two relations Rj and Rk such that
Rj(w) = J and Rk(w) = K. Let A ∶= ⋁v∈J ⋀p∈v p and B ∶= ⋁v∈K ⋀p∈v p; clearly ⊧Vv A iff
v ∈ J and ⊧Vv B iff v ∈ K and hence ∥A∥V = J and ∥B∥V = K. Then Ri(w) = ∥A∥V and
Rk(w) = ∥B∥V . This implies that ⊧Vw ◻A ∧ ◻B, ◻A ∧ ◻B ∈ w and hence ◻(A ∧B) ∈ w
(schema C is in w). Thus ⊧Vw ◻(A∧B) and therefore there is some relation Ri such that
Ri(w) = ∥A ∧B∥V = ∥A∥V ∩ ∥B∥V .
2.3.2 Weak Semantics and N-Monotonic Logics
We saw that multi-relational semantics with strong conditions is a good tool to treat a
wide range of non normal systems, namely E,M,C,R and more. However, if assuming
strong semantics, we find that a great part of the intuition behind Kripke semantics is
somehow lost. On the other hand, weak conditions allow for a a simpler picture which
is certainly more appealing form the standpoint of intuition. Thus, a natural question
arises: Which axiomatic system, if any, can be captured by these frames? In other
words, which is the minimal system to be captured by multi-relational frames and weak
semantics? This Section provides an answer to such questions. As far as multi-relational
semantics is concerned, the literature provides only a completeness proof sketch for a
specific deontic system, namely, P (Goble, 2001). A detailed completeness theorem for
non normal systems and multi-relational semantics is presented here for the first time.
Again, a first step is showing that a system is indeed sound with respect to a given class
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of frames:
Theorem 2.3.9 (N-Monotonic logics - Soundness) Let MN⊢ ∶= {A ∣ CPC ⊕RE ⊕
M⊕N ⊢ A} and MN⊧ ∶= {A ∣ ⊧ A}, given semantic conditions A. Then MN⊢ ⊆MN⊧.
Proof. (By induction on lg(D), where D ∶= D1, . . . ,Dn is a deduction in the axiomatic
system M with A = Dn, i.e., A ∈ E⊢) If lg(D) = 1, then A is either a classical tautology
and the proof is trivial, or an instance of the axiom schema M, and it is valid by Lemma
2.2.5, or else an instance of the schema N, and thus it holds by Lemma 2.2.8. Let us
consider the case lg(D) = k + 1. Then A has been obtained either via MP or via RE
(please refer to Theorem 2.3.1).
Completeness will be achieved by turning and changing some very well known stan-
dard technique, as the Lindenbaum’s Lemma and Canonical Models.
Lemma 2.3.10 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma) Given a logic L, if ∆ is a L-consistent set
of formulae, then there is a L-maximal set ∆+ such that ∆ ⊆ ∆+.
Definition 2.3.11 (MN-Canonical Models) Let M ∶= ⟨W,R, V ⟩ be a multi-relational
model. M is a canonical model for MN if and only if:
a. W ∶= {w ∣ w is MN-maximal}
b. For any formula A ∈ Fma(L) let RA be a binary relation over W . For all w, v ∈W ,
wRAv iff ◻A ∈ w⇒ A ∈ v.
c. for any propositional letter p ∈ Prop, ∥p∥V ∶= ∣p∣MN, where ∣p∣MN ∶= {w ∈W ∣ p ∈ w}
Notice that the this definition implies that whenever a formula ◻A does not belong
to a state w, the relation associated to A for w would be RA(w) = W , i.e., the whole
universe. Otherwise if ◻A ∈ w, RA(w) would be exactly ∣A∣MN, where ∣A∣MN ∶= {v ∈W ∣
A ∈ v}. Moreover, it is important to notice that the frame of a MN-canonical model
is not always generally serial. Indeed it allows the presence of empty relations for any
world, and hence the schema CON:=◇⊺ is not valid on the canonical frame.
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Lemma 2.3.12 Given a canonical model M for MN, for any w ∈W , if ◇⊺ ∈ w, then w
is locally serial, i.e., for any formula B ∈ Fma(L) there is a state z such that wRBz.
Proof. Assume ◇⊺ ∈ w, then clearly ◻ /∈ w. Consider any RC . The formula C can
be either (i) a theorem or (ii) a contradiction, or (iii) neither. Suppose that (i) C is a
theorem. Then ⊢MN C implies ⊢MN ◻C by RM, N and MP, for any z ∈W , ◻C,C ∈ z
and hence ◻C ∈ w and RC(w) = W , i.e., RC(w) is not empty. Suppose that (ii) C is
a contradiction, then ⊢MN ¬C and hence ⊢MN ◻ ↔ ◻C. Since by assumption ◻ /∈ w,◻C /∈ w and hence RC(w) = W (by definition of Canonical model) and it is not empty.
Finally suppose that (iii) C is neither a theorem, nor a contradiction. Then ∣C ∣MN
and ∣¬C ∣MN are complementary and none of them is empty. Again, if ◻C /∈ w, then
RC(w) =W and if ◻C ∈ w then RC(w) = ∣C ∣MN and none of these sets is empty.
Lemma 2.3.13 (Existence lemma) Given a canonical model M for MN, for any w ∈
W , if ◇A ∈ w, then for any formula B ∈ Fma(L) there is a state z such that wRBz and
A ∈ z.
Proof. Assume that ◇A ∈ w. Since the schema ◇A → ◇⊺ is a theorem2 of MN, it
follows that ◇⊺ ∈ w and by Lemma 2.3.12, w is locally serial. It remains to show that
for any formula B ∈ Fma(L), RB(w) ∩ ∣A∣MN ≠ ∅, i.e., for any B there is some z such
that zinRB(w) and A ∈ z. (i) If A is a theorem, then ∣A∣NM = W (A belongs to any
maximal consistent set in W ). (ii) A cannot be a contradiction, otherwise ⊢MN ¬A efq,⊢MN ◻¬A, ◻¬A ∈ w, ¬ ◻ ¬A /∈ w, i.e., ◇A /∈ w which leads to a contradiction. (iii) If
A is neither a theorem nor a contradiction, both {A} and {¬A} are MN-consistent and
both ∣A∣MN and ∣¬A∣MN are not empty. Assume by reductio that for some C ∈ Fma(L)
RC(w) ⊆ ∣¬A∣MN. This implies that ◻C ∈ w (otherwise we would have RC(w) =W which
is inconsistent with our assumption). Hence we have that in all MN-maximal sets z,
2Indeed ⊢MN → ¬A ex falso quodlibet, ⊢MN ◻→ ◻¬A by RM, ⊢MN ◇A→◇⊺ by contraposition
2.3. COMPLETENESS RESULTS 63
C → ¬A ∈ z and therefore it is a theorem of MN. Thus ⊢MN C → ¬A, ⊢MN ◻C → ◻¬A,◻¬A ∈ w and hence ◇A /∈ w which is a contradiction.
Lemma 2.3.14 (Truth Lemma) Given a canonical model M ∶= ⟨W,R, V ⟩ for the N-
Monotonic modal logic MN, for any formula A ∈ Fma(L), for any world w ∈ W , the
following holds: w ⊧V A ⇔ A ∈ w.
Proof. The proof is given by induction on the length of a formula A. The basis of
induction is trivial. Suppose lg(A) = n + 1. The only interesting case is when A has
the form ◻B. i. Suppose w ⊧V ◻B, then there is a relation RC ∈ R such that for any
v ∈W , wRCv ⇒ v ⊧V B. By the inductive hypothesis (IH henceforth) B ∈ v. Suppose/⊢MN C → B. Then the set {C,¬B} is consistent and it is contained in a maximal
consistent set y such that y ∈ W . Hence y /⊧V B by IH. This implies ¬(wRCy) and,
by definition of RC , ◻C ∈ w and C /∈ y contradicting the hypothesis C ∈ y. Hence⊢MN C → B and, by the RM rule, ⊢MN ◻C → ◻B. Being w maximal, either (a) ◻C ∈ w
or (b) ◻C /∈ w. If (a) holds, then ◻B ∈ w by modus ponens. If ◻C /∈ w, assume /⊢MN B,
then the set {¬B} is the subset of a maximal consistent set z ∈ W and z /⊧V B. Since◻C /∈ w, it follows that wRCz and hence z ⊧V B and B ∈ z by IH, a contradiction.
Therefore ⊢MN B and ⊢MN ◻B, i.e. ◻B ∈ w.3 ii. Suppose ◻B ∈ w. By Definition 2.3.11
it holds that wRBv iff ◻B ∈ w ⇒ B ∈ v, i.e., v ⊧V B by IH. Hence w ⊧V ◻B.
Consider any formula B such that /⊢MN B. Then ¬B is consistent and there is some
MN-maximal set w such that ¬B ∈ w. By Definition 2.3.11 the world w belongs to the
base set of an MN-canonical model M and, by Lemma 2.3.14 w /⊧V B.
Corollary 2.3.15 (Completeness of MN) The logic MN is complete with respect to
the class of multi-relational frames.
3Indeed assume ⊢MN B, then ⊢MN ⊺↔ B, ⊢MN ◻⊺↔ ◻B by RE, ⊢MN ◻⊺ is an instance of the schema
N and hence ⊢MN ◻B by MP.
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2.3.3 N-Monotonic Logics and Above
As usual, in order to show completeness results of specific systems L with respect to a
restrict class of frames F enjoying a certain property, it is enough to show that if F ⊧ A
for some formula A, then A is also a theorem of L, i.e., ⊢L A. The canonical model
techniques guarantees that if a formula is not a theorem of L, then there exists a model
falsifying A itself. Hence, it is enough to show that such canonical model is based on
a frame of the required kind. Keeping this in mind, we are going to show that the
canonical frame of some specific systems does indeed enjoy certain properties.
Theorem 2.3.16 The logic MN ⊕ T is complete with respect to the class of generally
reflexive multi-relational frames, i.e., for any world w, for any relation Ri, wRiw.
Proof. It is enough to show that if A /∈ MN ⊕ T, then F /⊧ A, where F is the class
of reflexive multi-relational frames. Take any formula A such that A /∈ MN ⊕ T. By
Theorem 2.3.14 there is a canonical model M ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn, V ⟩ for MN ⊕ T such
that for some world w, /⊧Vw A. To show that M is based on a generally reflexive frame.
Consider any formula ◻B; since T is a theorem, for any world v if ◻B ∈ v, then B ∈ v
by T. Hence, by Definition 2.3.11, it holds that any v, for any relation RB, vRBv, i.e.,
the frame is reflexive.
Theorem 2.3.17 The logic MN⊕CON is complete with respect to the class of generally
serial multi-relational frames.
Proof. Let L be the logic generated by MN ⊕ CON. Let Γ be a L-consistent set of
formulae. It is sufficient to find a model M ∶= ⟨W,R, V ⟩ such that (a) w ⊧V Γ for
some world w ∈ W and (b) M is based on a generally serial frame (see Blackburn
et al. (2001)). Let ML ∶= ⟨W L,RL, V L⟩ be a canonical model for L and let Γ+ be a L-
maximal consistent set extending Γ. Then Γ+ ⊧V + Γ by Lemma 2.3.14 and condition (a)
is met. We have to show that the canonical frame is generally transitive and it is really
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quite straightforward. Indeed since any point z in W L is L-maximal and consistent, it
contains ◇⊺ and hence by Lemma 2.3.14 v ⊧V L ◇⊺. By definition of ◇ this means that∀v ∈W L∀RLi ∈RL∃z(vRLi z).
Theorem 2.3.18 The logic MN ⊕ D is complete with respect to the class of generally
serial multi-relational frames.
Proof. Again, it is enough to show that if A /∈ MN ⊕ T, then F /⊧ A, where F is the
class of generally serial frames. Take any formula A such that A /∈MN⊕D. By Theorem
2.3.14 there is a canonical model M ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn, V ⟩ for MN⊕D such that for some
world w, /⊧Vw A. To show that M is based on a generally serial frame. Take any relation
RB: it cannot be empty. Indeed, suppose RB(w) = ∅, then ◻ ∈ w and, by D, ◇ ∈ w,
a contradiction.
When schema D is concerned, another stronger result can be proved:
Theorem 2.3.19 The logic MN ⊕ D is complete with respect to the class of generally
serial multi-relational frames fulfilling the following condition:
for any w ∈ W and any pair of relations Ri and Rj, Ri(w) ∩ Rj(w) ≠ ∅ (see Lemma
2.2.23).
Proof. Take any formula A such that A /∈ MN ⊕ D. By Theorem 2.3.14 there is a
canonical model M ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn, V ⟩ for MN⊕D such that for some world w, /⊧Vw A.
As it follows from Theorem 2.3.18, the frame of the canonical model is generally serial.
Moreover, consider two relations RA and RB. Since no relation is empty, RA(w) = ∥A∥V
and RB(w) = ∥B∥V 4 and hence ◻A ∈ w and ◻B ∈ w. By D, ◇A ∈ w and ◇B ∈ B and,
by M5 ◇(A ∧B) ∈ w and hence ∥A∥V ∩ ∥B∥V ≠ ∅.
4Confer to the remarks after Definition 2.3.11.
5Clearly in its contrapositive version: M⋆ ∶=◇A ∧◇B →◇(A ∧B).
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2.4 Summary, Conclusions, Further Work
In the introduction of this Chapter we have listed a series of questions, namely, those
who drove us to start this research. As we saw, we provided an answer to all of them:
(a) which theories are valid in the class of multi-relational weak structures? Any classi-
cal theory smaller or equal than N-monotonic logics;
(b) how do they differ from multi-relational strong frames (Neighborhood semantics)?
Multi-relational strong frames validate a narrower set of formulae, namely, those
theories smaller or equal than E;
(c) how well known modal schemata (among those relevant to deontic logic, like M,
C, T, D, B,CON,DEX, . . ., behave within multi-relational weak frames? Do
they characterise classes of frames with specific properties? Yes, most of them
characterise some specific classes of frames (please refer to Table 2.1);
(d) how can well known first order properties be characterised by propositional
schemata, if we assume a plurality of relations? We have provided an answer to
reflexivity, seriality, and symmetry;
(e) the set of formulae which are valid in the class of all multi-relational frames can be
generated by a finite axiomatic system? If so, which one? Yes, by the system MN,
which is then sound and complete with respect to the class of all multi-relational
weak frames. Moreover, we saw that the systems MN ⊕T, MN ⊕D, MN ⊕CON
are sound and complete with respect to specific classes of frames.
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In our opinion, the most interesting result we achieved is that generalised Kripke
frames, i.e., the class of all weak multi-relational frames (with A semantics), can generate
precisely MN, namely propositional N-Monotonic logic. Thus, this system enjoys two
interesting characteristics: First of all, it is strictly smaller than the normal system K,
and, most important, it does not generate Deontic Explosion. Although one may argue
that non normal systems can be treated more efficiently with neighborhood semantics
(see Chellas (1980)), we find quite interesting that the simple operation of generalising
Kripke structures (while keeping the whole intuition behind them) is enough to generate
systems which are actually finitely axiomatisable as well as non normal. In short, in order
to avoid deontic dilemmas, one is not forced to drop relational semantics altogether. It
is actually possible to keep relational semantics in a more general definition.
There are, however, some interesting problems yet to be addressed. One may wonder
what class of structures, if any, is characterised by other modal schemata, for instance
by those closer to other fields of applied logics, rather than deontic. One may wonder
what class, if any, is captured by positive introspection, i.e., by schema 4 ∶= ◻A→ ◻◻A,
negative introspection, i.e. 5 ∶= ¬ ◻A→ ◻¬ ◻A, or by other modal axioms.
On the technical side, there are other important issues to be addressed regarding the
system MN:
- the finite model property;
- decidability and complexity;
- extending MN to the first order case.
A first preliminary answer to the latter question is provided in the next chapter. The
others remain to be solved.
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Chapter 3
Beyond Propositional Deontic Logics
Although the field of deontic logic is flourishing and getting increasing attention, the ef-
forts devoted to the analysis of quantifiers within deontic modal logics are still rather lim-
ited. This may be due to the fact that influential authors as Von Wright and Castan˜eda
have expressed sceptical views about extending deontic languages to include predicate
logic. Moreover, those who have argued in favour of such extension have probably
thought that quantified deontic logics (QDL henceforth) follow the same pattern as
alethic modal logic. Although this sounds reasonable if we think about QDL as a mere
extension of SDL (i.e., of the standard normal deontic system, see Chapter 1) the situ-
ation changes radically is the focus is on non normal systems. For instance, the role of
Barcan schemata become significantly different and new patterns and problems of both
philosophical, and technical relevance emerge.
Quantified modal logic has a long and distinguished tradition (Garson, 2001; Fitting
and Mendelsohn, 1998), which is still lively and technically productive (see, among oth-
ers, Corsi, 2002; Brauner and Ghilardi, 2007; Gabbay et al., 2009; Goldblatt, 2011).
Nevertheless, almost all efforts have so far been devoted to the analysis of the normal
case: Besides a few significant exceptions (Arlo´-Costa and Pacuit, 2006; Arlo´-Costa,
2002; Waagbø, 1992; Stolpe, 2003), which are based on neighbourhood semantics, the
study of quantification in non-normal modal logics is still neglected. Despite that, quan-
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tified non-normal modal logics (QNML henceforth) exhibit a different behaviour with
respect to normal modal logics. In particular, in contrast with quantified normal modal
logics results in the literature show, e.g., that the Barcan and the Converse Barcan
schemata (i) are not characterised by decreasing and increasing domains (ii) are tightly
connected to the validity of propositional modal axiom schemata.
This Chapter provides a semantic analysis of quantification in a class of non-normal
modal logics called N-Monotonic (as defined in Chapter 2). Again, instead of following
the neighborhood semantics approach, we shall focus on multi-relational semantics.
As explained in Chapter 2, there are two ways to evaluate ◻-formulae in this frame-
work. A first version (Goble, 2001, 2004b; Schotch and Jennings, 1981) simply extends
the one for Kripke semantics, since it requires that the Kripke-style evaluation clause for◻-formulae is satisfied for at at least one relation in the set of relations of the model. This
is precisely the approach we called weak semantics in Chapter 2, Section 2.2. The other
non-standard evaluation clause has been proposed by Governatori and Rotolo (2005) in
order to cover more non-normal modal systems, including the classical ones. In fact, the
weak semantic approach captures only stronger logics, like MN and above. The scope
of this Chapter is to study quantification using weak semantics as well as considering
frames with varying domains. The choice of weak semantics keeps the intuition behind
Kripke semantics, while working with logics that are stronger than classical systems (E
and above), yet strictly weaker than K. On the other hand, working with varying do-
mains (i.e., with sets of individual existing in possible worlds that can vary from world
to world) technically amounts to studying the most general case of quantified modal
(and so, deontic) logics and, last but not least, means considering a case which is mostly
neglected in the literature on logics weaker than K which are extended to the predicate
case.
From the propositional modal standpoint, as we said in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, as
far as multi-relational semantics is concerned, the literature provides only a completeness
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proof sketch for a specific deontic system, namely the logic P introduced by Goble
(2001, 2004b) and an indirect completeness result for Elgesem’s modal logic of agency
(Governatori and Rotolo, 2005) that exploits the equivalence between neighborhood and
multi-relational models for classical modal logics. We have presented here, for the first
time, a study about how several well known schemata behave within the framework of
multi-relational weak semantics.
As far as we are concerned, from the predicative standpoint, this is the first study
on quantification in multi-relational semantics, the second one investigating the case
of varying domains in non-normal modal logics, and the first that provides a frame
characterization of the Barcan schemata with varying domains.
Chapter Summary
Section 3.1 is an introduction to Barcan Formulae and their role within normative rea-
soning. There are several philosophical as well as technical issues related to such
schemata.
Section 3.2 presents some well known results concerning quantified non normal modal
logics and Neighborhood frames, as well as a first technical introduction to Barcan
formulae and the problems related to such schemata. We shall see the attempts
made to accommodate Barcan schemata within both constant domain, and varying
domain neighborhood frames.
Section 3.3 is rather technical and presents multi-relational first order frames. We chose
to analyse frames with varying domains, in order to perform a finer distinction
between actual individuals and possibilia, namely, between the individuals that
exist in each ideal world and those that are only possible from that viewpoint but
that do not exist there (Garson, 2001; Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998). Also, this
choice technically amounts to studying the most general case of quantified modal
logics.
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Section 3.4 The traditional distinction between de dicto and de re sentences is here seen
under a new light, in terms of contextual obligation and the role of quantification
within deontic contexts.
Section 3.5 is the core of the Chapter. We shall present alternative semantic characteri-
sations for the Converse Barcan schema (CBF). We compare our results with the
standard ones in Kripke Semantics and we shall see different ways to generalise
the concept of increasing inner domains.
Section 3.6 is the technical core of the Chapter. Here we provide Henkin-style complete-
ness theorems for several systems, namely, the smallest free quantified non normal
N-monotonic logic Q○=.NM and some extensions, including Q○=.NM⊕CBF.
3.1 Quantification, Barcan Formulae, and Deontic Logics1
If a legal theorist were asked to formalise the basic structure of a judicial syllogism, he
would very likely answer by providing the following inference schema (Alexy, 1989):
∀x(T (x)→ ◻R(x))
T (s)
◻R(s)
(3.1)
Indeed, suppose the major premise states that, for each individual x, if x commits theft,
then it is obligatory that x gets punished. Hence, the fact that Schulze committed theft,
entails that Schulze ought to be punished. Likewise, however, some legal theorists–being
not so familiar with the complications arising in quantified modal logics2—would not
probably appreciate why a judicial syllogism is correctly captured by (3.1) rather than
1This Section is partially based on an umpulished manuscript written by Antonino Rotolo, Guido
Governatori, and myself.
2But notice that deontic logicians, too, sometimes recognise that the major premise of (3.1) is a good
rendering of practical statements: cf., among others, Schurz (1994).
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by inferences such as, for instance,
◻∀x(T (x)→ R(x))
T (s)
◻R(s)
(3.2)
Technical reasons lead, of course, to reject schema (3.2) as incorrect. But, on the philo-
sophical side, positive arguments—also based on the nature of judicial dynamics—may
explain the preference of those who adopt (3.1). This holds in particular if we adopt the
actualist interpretation of quantification, according to which quantifiers are interpreted
existentially, as they range over individual domains depending on possible worlds, while
parameters of a formula are evaluated as arbitrary individuals (see Fitting and Mendel-
sohn, 1998). Actually, the judicial application of law implies that one or more legal
provisions are applied to a concrete case presented before the judge: For instance, from
the fact that Schulze committed theft, it follows that Schulze ought to be punished. For
it is often said that judges formulate a “decision rule” that makes the law applicable to
the concrete case. Of course, (3.1), too, can be problematic. But, as far as the interplay
between quantifiers and modalities is concerned, only the major premise of (3.1) allows
to refer to concrete and existing individuals.
But there is more to say about such issues. And the core topic is precisely how and
when the interplay between quantifiers over individuals and quantifiers over possible
worlds should be allowed. This role is played by Barcan Schemata. However, a few
technical details are needed before any precise analysis of such topics.
3.2 Neighbourhood Semantics for QNML
Neighborhood Semantics has always played a central role within quantified deontic non
normal logics. As we have already observed, this is the best tool to deal with classical
systems and above. Below we shall summarise the most influential results within this
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area. This approach will be useful to carry out a comparison between Neighborhood
structures and multi-relational ones.
3.2.1 Syntax of Quantified Modal Logics
Let us extend the language L already presented with the universal quantifier ∀, a count-
able set of individual constants Const:={a, b, c, . . .}, a set of individual variables, VAR:={x, y, z, . . .}, the identity predicate =, and a set of n-ary predicate symbols (where
ω > n ≥ 1). A term is either a variable, or an individual constant and t1, t2, . . . are
meta-variables for terms.
Well formed formuale (wff) are defined as usual:
(a)  is wff;
(b) If Pn is an n-ary predicate symbol and t2, . . . , tn are terms, then P
n(t1, . . . , tn) is a
wff;
(c) If A and B are wff, then A→ B, ◻A, and ∀xA are wff;
(d) Nothing else is a wff.
Both boolean operators, and the existential quantifier ∃ is defined as usual: ∃xA↔¬∀x¬A. As usual, A(t/s) is the formula obtained by replacing in A(s) all the free
occurrences of s with t (cf. Corsi, 2002, 1484).
3.2.2 Neighborhood Models
Neighbourhood semantics for quantified modal logics has been introduced a long time ago
(see Gabbay, 1976). Nevertheless, it received very little attention until the beginning of
1990s (cf. Waagbø, 1992). The study of QNML was afterwards the subject of a few works
(cf., for instance, Arlo´-Costa, 2002; Arlo´-Costa and Pacuit, 2006; Stolpe, 2003). While
Waagbø (1992), Arlo´-Costa (2002), and Arlo´-Costa and Pacuit (2006) study the case of
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structures with constant domains, Stolpe (2003) developed a preliminary investigation
of varying domains. In this section we summarise their main results.
Let us consider the case of constant domains.
Definition 3.2.1 (Constant domain neighbourhood frames and models) A con-
stant domain neighbourhood frame F is a structure ⟨W,N ,D⟩ where
- W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
- N is a function from w to 22W ;
- D is a non-empty set of individuals (the domain of the frame).
For any w ∈W , a w-assignment σ is a function σ ∶ V ar(L)↦ Uw.
An x-variant τ of a w-assignment σ is a w-assignment which may differ from σ for
the value assigned to x. A constant domain neighbourhood model M is a structure⟨W,N ,D, I⟩ where ⟨W,N ,D⟩ is a constant domain neighbourhood frame and I is an
interpretation function such that, for any assignment σ and world w:
- Iσw(x) ∈D (global interpretation of variables/terms);
- ∀w, v ∈W,Iσw(x) = Iσv (x) (rigidity of variables/terms);
- Iσw(P (x1, . . . , xn)) ⊆Dn.
Notice that the notion of truth set has to take into account that the truth or falsity
of open formulae depends on particular interpretations.
Definition 3.2.2 Let M be a model with interpretation I, σ an assignment, w any
world, and A any formula. The truth set of A wrt to M and Iσ, ∥A∥σI is thus defined:3
∥A∥σI ∶= {w ∈W ∶M ⊧σw A} .
3When clear form the context, we also omit the reference to the model. The truth set of a closed
formula does not depend on any interpretation and assignment.
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The valuation conditions are as follows:
- M ⊧σw P (x1, . . . , xn) iff ⟨Iσw(x1), . . . , Iσw(xn)⟩ ∈ Iw(P );
- Standard valuation conditions for negation and boolean connectives;
- M ⊧σw ◻A iff ∥A∥σI ∈ Nw;
- M ⊧σw ∀xA(x) iff for every assignment τ that is like σ except for mapping x (i.e., τ is
an x-variant of σ), M ⊧τw A(x).
Let us consider Barcan and Converse Barcan schemata
BF:= ∀x ◻A→ ◻∀xA CBF:= ◻∀xA→ ∀x ◻A.
The choice of constant domains (i.e., that the resulting modal logics are extensions
of standard First Order Logic, FOL henceforth), does not correspond to the validity of
BF and CBF:
Theorem 3.2.3 (Arlo´-Costa and Pacuit, 2006) The class of all constant domain neigh-
bourhood frames is sound and complete for FOL⊕ E.
BF and CBF were characterised in (Waagbø, 1992), but such results have been later
made more precise in (Arlo´-Costa, 2002; Arlo´-Costa and Pacuit, 2006).
Let us consider the following frame properties (Arlo´-Costa, 2002; Arlo´-Costa and
Pacuit, 2006):
Definition 3.2.4 (Frame properties) A frame is consistent iff ∀w ∈W ∶ Nw /= ∅ and{∅} /∈ Nw.
A frame is closed under ≤ κ intersections (where κ is a cardinal) iff
∀w ∈W, ∀X = {Xi∣i ∈ I} where ∣I ∣ ≤ κ, ⋂
i∈IXi ∈ Nw.
A frame is trivial iff ∣D∣ = 1, otherwise it is non-trivial.
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A frame is supplemented iff ∀w ∈W,X ∩ Y ∈ Nw ⇒X ∈ Nw and Y ∈ Nw.
Theorem 3.2.5 ((Arlo´-Costa, 2002)) BF is valid in the class of frames that are
either (i) trivial, or (ii) closed under finite intersection, if D is finite, or (iii) closed
under ≤ k intersections, if D is infinite and ∣D∣ = κ.
Theorem 3.2.6 ((Waagbø, 1992; Arlo´-Costa and Pacuit, 2006)) CBF is valid in
the class of frames that are either supplemented or trivial.
Theorem 3.2.6 establishes a strong relationship between M and CBF, since sup-
plementation characterises M. Hence, for constant non-trivial domain neighbourhood
frames CBF is valid whenever M is. Also, since the closure under ≤ k intersections
implies the closure under intersection, it is not possible to falsify C when BF is valid
(provided that the frame is non-trivial). However, from the above theorem we can build
a countermodel for BF given C (Waagbø, 1992), although this is possible only for infinite
frames (Arlo´-Costa, 2002).
An open problem of this semantics is that the system FOL ⊕ E ⊕ CBF is strongly
complete with respect to the class of frames that are either trivial or supplemented:
Arlo´-Costa (2011) conjectured that M is thus derivable by adding in the logic a schema
expressing non-triviality but no result is available.
Let us now move to the case of varying domains, which was explored only in Stolpe
(2003). The peculiarity of Stolpe (2003)’s analysis is that it woks only with models and
not with frames. Models are standardly defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.7 (Varying domain neighbourhood models) A varying domain neigh-
bourhood frame M is a structure ⟨W,N ,D,Σ, I⟩ where
- W , N , D, and I are like in Definition 3.2.1 and
- Σ is a function assigning to each world w ∈W a set Dw of elements of D.
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The valuation condition for ∀-formulae is now as follows:
M ⊧σw ∀xA(x) iff M ⊧τw A(x) for every x-variant τ of σ such that τ(x) ∈Dw.
Stolpe (2003) defines two classes of varying neighbourhood models that characterize
BF and CBF:
Theorem 3.2.8 (BF and CUPI models) A varying neighbourhood model M =⟨W,N ,D, I,Σ⟩ is a CUPI model iff for any world w ∈ W , if ∥P (x)∥σI ∈ Nw for ev-
ery σ such that σ(x) ∈Dw, then ∥∀xP (x)∥I ∈ Nw.
BF is valid in the class of CUPI models.
Theorem 3.2.9 (CBF and CUPO models) A varying neighbourhood model M =⟨W,N ,D, I,Σ⟩ is a CUPO model iff for any world w ∈ W , if ∥∀xP (x)∥I ∈ Nw, then∥P (x)∥σI ∈ Nw for every σ such that σ(x) ∈Dw.
CBF is valid in the class of CUPO models.
CUPI and CUPO models impose properties that trivially reflect the evaluation of BF and
CBF. The main limit of this approach is that it does not appeal to frames. Thus, Arlo´-
Costa (2011) rightly argues that Stolpe (2003) leaves open many questions, including
the general characterization of BF and CBF. In this Chapter, we attempt to solve this
problem for quantified N-Monotonic logics with varying domains.
3.3 Quantification in N-Monotonic Modal Logics
Several works carry on a semantic analysis of quantified deontic systems using neigh-
borhood semantics. However, as far as we are concerned, very few lines are devoted to
multi-relational semantics in a first order modal framework.
Let us define multi-relational structures for any quantified modal logic.
Definition 3.3.1 (Multi-relational frames) A multi-relational frame is a tuple F ∶=⟨W,R,D,U⟩ where:
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- W is a non empty set of worlds
- R is a (possibly infinite) set of binary relations over W
- D is a function associating to each world w ∈W a set Dw of individuals (the inner
domain of w)
- U is a function associating to each world w ∈W a set Uw of individuals (the outer
domain of w) such that for any w ∈ W , Uw ≠ ∅ and Dw ⊆ Uw and if wRv for some R,
then Uw ⊆ Uv.
The original definition given by Kripke (1963) states that for all worlds w, Uw =⋃v∈W Dv, setting a unique outer domain for the whole frame. However, we decided to
follow the broader approach proposed by Corsi (2002):
The fact that Uw ⊆ Uv, if wRv, does not prevent Dw from being disjoint
from Dv. Kripke (1963) stipulates that for all v ∈ W , Uv = ⋃w∈W Dw. We
generalise Kripke’s original semantics by allowing Uw ⊆ Uv, if wRv, and⋃w∈W Uw ⊇ ⋃w∈W Dw. ⋃w∈W Uw may contain individuals that never happen
to come into existence. (Corsi, 2002, 1485)
Models, assignments and the concepts of satisfaction, truth, validity are defined in
the standard way.
Definition 3.3.2 (Multi-relational models) A multi-relational model is a tuple M ∶=⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ where ⟨W,R,D,U⟩ is a multi-relational frame and I is a function I ∶ L↦
Uw for any w ∈W such that:
- Iw(Pn) ⊆ (Uw)n
- Iw(c) ∈ Uw
- Iw(=) = {⟨d, d⟩ ∶ d ∈ Uw}
Definition 3.3.3 (Assignments) For any w ∈ W , a w-assignment σ is a function
σ ∶ V ar(L)↦ Uw.
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An x-variant τ of a w-assignment σ is a w-assignment which may differ from σ for the
value assigned to x.
Notice that within the semantics framework proposed by Kripke (1963), since the
outer domains are constant, any w-assignment σ is also a v-assignment for any couple
of worlds. However, it should be noticed here that here the fact that Uw ⊆ Uv, if wRv
for some R, still guarantees the fact that if two worlds w, v are related by some R, then
any w-assignment is also a v-assignment, as all the variables of the language are still
mapped on individuals without gaps.
Definition 3.3.4 (σ-interpretation) Given a w-assignment σ
(a) Iσw(c) = Iw(c), and
(b) Iσw(x) = σ(x).
Definition 3.3.5 (Truth conditions) Truth evaluation clauses are as follows:
- M ⊧σw Pn(t1, . . . , tn) iff ⟨Iσw(t1), . . . , Iσw(tn)⟩ ∈ Iw(Pn)
- M /⊧σw 
- M ⊧σw ∃xA iff for some x-variant τ of σ such that τ(x) ∈Dw, M ⊧τw A(x)
- M ⊧σw ∀xA iff for every x-variant τ of σ such that τ(x) ∈Dw, M ⊧τw A(x)
- M ⊧σw ◻A iff ∃Ri∀v(wRiv⇒M ⊧σv A)
- M ⊧σw ◇A iff ∀Ri∃v(wRiv&M ⊧σv A)
Satisfaction, Truth, Validity. A model M satisfies a set of formulae ∆ iff for some
world w and some w-assignment σ, M ⊧σw D for all D ∈ ∆. A formula A is true in a
world w of a model M, M ⊧w A, iff for any w-assignment σ, M ⊧σw A. A formula A is
true in a model M, M ⊧ A, iff for all w, M ⊧w A. A formula A is valid on a frame F ,F ⊧ A, iff for any model M on F , M ⊧ A. Given a class of frames F, a formula A is
F-valid, F ⊧ A, iff for any frame F ∈ F, F ⊧ A. M is a model for a logic L iff M ⊧ A for
all A ∈ L.
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Abbreviations. Given a frame F and a model M on F , for any formula A,
Satisfaction: ∥A∥σI ∶= {w ∣M ⊧σw A}
Truth: ∥A∥I ∶= {w ∣M ⊧σw A, for any assignment σ}
Validity: ∥A∥ ∶= {w ∣ F ⊧σw A for any assignment σ and any interpretation I}
Definition 3.3.6 Given a multi-relational model M = ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩, an individual
constant c is said to be a rigid designator iff ∀w∀v(∃Ri(wRiv)⇒ Iw(c) = Iv(c)).
Lemma 3.3.7 Given a multi-relational model M = ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ and a w-assignment
σ, if an individual constant c is a rigid designator, then ⊧σw A(c/x) iff ⊧τw A(x) for any
w-assignment τ which is an x-variant of σ such that τ(x) = Iw(c). (Cf. (Corsi, 2002,
Lemma 1.1).)
Proof. The proof is given by induction on the length of a formula A. Suppose A has
the form ◻B(x). If ⊧σw ◻B(c/x) then there is a relation Ri such that for any world
v, if wRiv, then ⊧σv B(c/x) and by induction hypothesis we have ⊧τv B(x) where τ is
an x-variant of σ such that τ(x) = Iv(c). Since c is a rigid designator by hypothesis,
Iv(c) = Iw(c), τ is a w-assignment and hence ⊧τw ◻B(x).
If ⊧τw ◻B(x) then there is a relation Ri such that for any world v, if wRiv, then ⊧τv B(x)
and by induction hypothesis we have ⊧σv B(c/x) where τ is an x-variant of σ such that
τ(x) = Iv(c). Since c is a rigid designator by hypothesis, Iv(c) = Iw(c), σ is a w-
assignment and hence ⊧σw ◻B(c/x).
We assume all individual constants to be rigid designators.
Lemma 3.3.8 Given a multi-relational frame F , a model M ∶= ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ on it
and a world w, if σ and τ are two w-assignments which coincide on any free variable
occurring in a formula A, then it holds that M ⊧σw A iff M ⊧τw A.
Proof. The proof is given by induction on the length of a formula A. Suppose A has the
form Pn(t1, . . . , tn), then ⊧σw Pn(t1, . . . , tn) if and only if ⟨Iσw(t1), . . . , Iσw(tn)⟩ ∈ Iw(Pn).
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If ti is an individual constant c, then I
σ
w(c) = Iw(c) = Iτw(c). Otherwise, if ti is a
variable x, Iσw(x) = σ(x) = τ(x) by hypothesis, hence Iσw(x) = Iτw(x). The other steps
are straightforward.
3.4 The Deontic Role of Barcan Schemata
The issues presented in the Introduction of this Chapter are somehow discussed within
deontic literature. Goble (1994, 1973, 1996), for example, provides interesting reasons to
say that deontic operators are referentially transparent with respect to singular terms,
since this assumption seems required to account for an intuitive analysis of the instan-
tiation of general obligations into concrete cases. Goble pays special attention to the
role of definite descriptions, an issue that is outside the scope of our work. However, a
piece of his story should be mentioned here. His argument runs starting from semantical
considerations. Suppose that Jones ought to give $20 to the first homeless person who
begs from him in 2006 and that Smith is such a homeless person. The question is: Is
Jones obligated to give $20 to Smith? The answer is, of course, yes, but the point is
that, if deontic contexts are taken fully intensional, we may argue that Smith is not the
individual corresponding to the first homeless begging from Jones in every ideal world.
Goble’s proposal is thus to change the standard truth-conditions of any formula ◻F (t),
where t is a singular term: Rather than checking whether, for every ideal world v related
to the actual world w, the denotation of t at v is in the extension of F in v, the formula◻F (t) is true iff the denotation of t at w is in the extension of F at v.
Clearly, the foregoing is a roundabout way of considering in deontic logic the meaning
of the distinction between de dicto and de re modal formulae, namely, between formulae
with and without free occurrences of variables within the scope of the modal operator◻.
The conceptual and technical distinction between de dicto and de re formulae has
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been widely investigated in alethic modal logic, i.e., the modal logic of necessity, possi-
bility, impossibility, and contingency (see, e.g., Garson, 2001; Fitting and Mendelsohn,
1998; Gabbay, 1976; Fine, 1978; Cocchiarella, 2001). De dicto sentences occur whenever
a modal property is associated to a dictum or sentence, as in the phrase it is neces-
sary that all men are mortal, where the modal operator is applied to the sentence all
men are mortal and thus necessity refers to the truth of that. On the other hand, we
call a sentence a de re modality if the modal property is given to an object, as in the
phrase all men are necessarily mortal, in which the property being necessarily mortal is
applied to all mankind. It is clear that such a distinction is lost whenever we lose the
expressive power of predicate logics in order to analyse the case of propositional calculus.
A classical example to explain the necessity of possible worlds is provided by Thomas
Aquinas.4 In his Summa contra Gentiles Thomas Aquinas considers the problem of
God’s pre-knowledge. God can, according to the philosopher, see the action which is
taking place. This is coherent with human freedom. In fact consider the truth value of
the following sentence:
(1) If I see someone sitting, he is necessarily sitting.
This is clearly true if read in the de dicto way:
(2) It is necessary that if I see someone sitting, that person is sitting.
which is to say:
(2∗) In every possible world if I see someone sitting, that person is sitting.
The sentence nevertheless ceases to hold true as soon as we apply the de re reading:
4Thomas Aquinas, Summa de veritate catholicae fidei contra Gentiles [1259-1264], Roma: edizione
Leonina, 1918-1930, voll. XIII-XV.
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(3) If I see someone sitting, such person has the necessary property of being sat
i.e., (3∗) If I see someone sitting, then in every possible world that person is sitting
which is clearly false.
It would not be possible, according to (Plantinga, 1974, chap. 1), to understand such
a distinction if we cease to use the possible worlds framework. Just another example
to understand such distinction is provided by (Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998, 86) re-
calling one of Quine’s famous discussions. Consider the sentence The number of planets
is necessarily odd. A de re reading would suggest that the number of planets in the
solar system is odd in every possible world. Any person without radically deterministic
philosophical views would then disagree with it being true. On the other hand its de
re interpretation proves to be true: in every possible world it is true that in the actual
world the number of planets is odd.
Leaving planets and men sitting necessarily or not and moving to something more
useful in our everyday life, Thomason (1968) shows how such a distinction may help in
removing the ambiguity in some English expressions such as any and some. Consider
the following couple of sentences:
(a) Everyone can come along with us.
(b) Anyone can come along with us.
In fact the sentence (a) could be read as It is possible that all come with us, i.e.,◇∀xCome(x,us), whereas (b) would be All can possibly come with us, i.e., ∀x ◇
Come(x,us). As soon as we formalise them, we realise how the syntactic difference
of the two is actually linked to a different scope of the universal quantifier and this can
help us understand the difference in the use of any and some in English (see Calardo,
2008).
But what about deontic contexts? According to Goble’s story, it seems that de re
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formulae play a specific deontic role, as only ∀x◻F (x) can be reasonably instantiated into◻F (a) (where a is typically an individual constant symbol). However, one may argue
that, unlike alethic and other kinds of modalities, in deontic logics it does not make
any sense to distinguish between de dicto and de re modal formulae. In fact, despite
what we said about (3.1) and (3.2), von Wright (1951b, 40) clearly maintains that “the
operators ‘P’ and ‘O’ [. . . ] yield sentences” and so “deontic modalities cannot be taken
alternatively de dicto and de re.” Hector-Neri Castan˜eda (1981), too, is sceptical in this
regard, as he argues in favour of the complete extensionality of ordinary deontic concepts,
thus making deontic de re and de dicto formulae virtually equivalent. Actually, ∀x◻P (x)
and ◻∀xP (x) are intuitively different, as we have above recalled: the former is about
existing individuals with respect to which we may say that P an essential property,
whereas the latter modal statement is purely sentential. This does not hold with the
following two sentences “There is someone for whom it is obligatory that he do A” and
“It is obligatory for someone to do A”; according to semantical conventions in English,
“deontic operators do not in any way affect the range of quantifiers” and so deontic
logic is extensional (Castan˜eda, 1981, 67). Notice that Goble, too, defended the view
that deontic logic is extensional, but, as we mentioned, his conclusions are not radical
as those of von Wright and Castan˜eda.
There may be good reasons to subscribe to von Wright’s and Castan˜eda’s criticism,
but still we have in our hands a formalism—quantified deontic logic based on possible-
world semantics—which technically can embed the distinction bewteen de re and de dicto
sentences. In general, if we adopt the actualist interpretation of quantifiers, it seems to us
that de dicto and de re deontic sentences may correspond, respectively, to non-contextual
(or generic) and contextual (or concrete, actual) obligations. This alternative reading,
given Castan˜eda’s criticism that essential deontic predication does not make any sense,
seems roughly in line with our comments of schemata (3.1) and (3.2) and, also, with
Goble’s general intuitions. In fact, when we have formulae like ◻∀xF (x), obligations may
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leave the problem of reference (application) to existing individuals out of consideration,
as the question of their concrete application is somehow put into brackets. In other
words, we may state that something is obligatory for some individuals independently
of any concern about concrete applicability. This is not absurd as we may argue that
something is deontically correct, it ought to be case, for conceivable individuals that,
as far as we know, may not exist. In the second case—when we have formulae like∀x ◻ F (x)—the focus is rather on the actual world with respect to which we want to
state whether something is or is not obligatory5.
On the other hand, the distinction between contextual and non-contextual (or de re
and de dicto) deontic sentences is still far from being conceptually clear, as a lot depends
on the philosophical role one wants to assign to deontically ideal worlds. This is evident
if we just consider a formula such as ∃x ◻ (x = a). Actually, given this formula, Goble
himself (Goble, 1973, 344) asks: “What would it be for a term to ‘deontically’ denote
something”? Indeed, the question can be more generally reframed as follows: What does
it mean that an individual exists in some deontically perfect worlds but does not in other
perfect worlds? We think this is still an open philosophical question, which is outside
the scope of this research. Despite the fact that we do not have general and conclusive
insights about the meaning of the de re/de dicto distinction in quantified deontic logic,
the role of the deontic versions of Barcan schemata may be anyway crucial. Consider
again these schemata: ∀x ◻ φ(x)→ ◻∀xφ(x) (BF)
◻ ∀xφ(x)→ ∀x ◻ φ(x) (CBF)
5 The thesis that the de dicto/de re distinction is significant in deontic logic is not new ((see, e.g.,
Hintikka, 1957, 1971; Kalinowski, 1973; Kutschera, 1982). Notably, Jakko Hintikka (1957), at least
in some passages, seems to read de re deontic formulae as contextual statements, though he does not
seem to be fully consistent in this regard. However, Hintikka’s analysis is peculiar as, in his approach,
quantifiers range over act-individuals and not over ordinary individuals. Makinson (1981) criticizes the
choice of quantifying over act-individuals, but he seems still to ackowledge the meaningfulness of the de
dicto/de re distinction.
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In standard Kripke semantics, BF corresponds to the condition that the domains of
quantification decrease across possible worlds, whereas CBF to the condition that they
increase; their joint validity leads then to constant domains, which makes inessential
the problem of the existence of individuals. A common philosophical interpretation of
this choice is that quantifiers range over all (conceivable, i.e., existing and non-existing)
individuals (see Cresswell, 1991). Thus, accepting BF and CBF entails weakening the
existential reading of quantifiers, leading to the possibilist interpretation of quantification
(see Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998), which corresponds classically to the well known
standard Kripke semantics with constant domains. This position makes some sense in
deontic logic, as we have seen when we mentioned von Wright’s and Castan˜eda’s view.
It is not by accident, we feel, that Castan˜eda (1981) himself accepts as theorems of his
logic both BF and CBF6. Actually, besides different views such as the peculiar one
proposed by Goble, subscribing to both BF and CBF is one of the most direct options
to weaken the conceptual distinction between de re and de dicto sentences7. And this
seems a good achievement, given the unclear nature of this distinction in deontic logic.
In addition, the joint validity of CBF and BF also allows to keep standard first-order
logic (FOL) untouched as it does not require any constraint on it.
What’s the intuitive reading of BF and CBF in deontic logic? On the semanti-
cal side, once again, much depends on the philosophical interpretation one adopts in
clarifying the notion of individuals’ existence across deontically ideal worlds. At least
provisionally, if we recall the ideas of contextual and non-contextual deontic sentences,
BF states that a (universally quantified) contextual obligation implies a (universally
quantified) non-contextual obligation. Semantically, this is guaranteed by the fact that
BF determines decreasing domains. In other words, the price to pay, for moving from
6Notice that these principles are also adopted in Schurz (1994). Hintikka rejects BF, but, again, his
scepticism mainly depends on the fact that quantifiers range over act-individuals.
7Barcan schemata alone are not, however, sufficient in general to eliminate de re modalities, namely,
to prove that, given any modal logic S, for each formula φ, there exists a de dicto formula φ′ such that
S ⊢ φ↔ φ′. This can be done only adding some extra-conditions and within strong modal systems such
as S5; see, e.g. Fine (1978); Kaminski (1997).
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contextual obligations (for which, in the perspective of their instantiation, actual ex-
istence matters) to non-contextual obligations (for which actual instantation does not
count anymore), is to assume that all individuals, existing in the ideal worlds, exist
as well in the actual world. This intuitive, though partial reading of BF seems to be
confirmed if we introduce the common and weak notion of permission ◇ corresponding
to the dual of ◻. This permits to reframe BF as follows:
◇∃xφ(x)→ ∃x◇ φ(x) (BF′)
(BF′) permits to move from a non-contextual (existential) deontic statement to a con-
textual (existential) one. But this should not confuse the reader as we have to take
into account the peculiar nature of the weak permission, which is nothing but the dual
of an obligation, namely the negation of a prohibition. Analogous considerations may
be reiterated for CBF, which is a principle stating that any non-contextual (generic)
obligation implies that this obligation is applicable to all concrete cases.
It is clear that, under this intuitive but still partial reading, we do not have conclusive
reasons to adopt in general BF and CBF. BF, in particular, can be highly problematic,
both for its intuitive consequences and for the semantic conditions required to validate
it in Kripke models. CBF seems less controversial: if a generic obligation holds, such
an obligation must be applicable in the actual case, at least unless there is no contrary
reason against this. (Also the corresponding condition that domains never decrease looks
more reasonable, from the deontic point of view, as the range of a generic obligation may
exceed the range of an obligation applying to a concrete case.)
On the other hand, as we have seen the joint validity of BF and CBF seems a
first stept towards milding Castan˜eda’s objections. In addition, independently of any
philosophical reflection on the meaning of BF and CBF, their logical role is significantly
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that of making apparent possible deontic dilemmas. Suppose to have
∀x ◻ φ(x) ◻∃x¬φ(x)
Are these formulae in conflict with each other? Syntactically, it is clear that the appeal to
BF is essential if we think that the formulae above are incompatible: ∀x◻φ(x) implies◻∀xφ(x) by BF, while ◻∃x¬φ(x) is equivalent to ◻¬∀xφ(x). Analogously, CBF is
essential, for example, if we want to make apparent the conflict between the following
formulae:
◻∀xφ(x) ∃x◇¬φ(x)
In sum, BF and CBF can be accepted in deontic logic for at least the following two
reasons:
- the joint validity of BF and CBF permits to keep standard FOL untouched and to
weaken the logical distinction between de re and de dicto sentences, a distinction that
can be problematic in deontic contexts;
- the joint validity of BF and CBF allows us to make apparent conflicts between deontic
sentences expressible in quantified deontic logics.
So far, so good. But our question is to see what happens if we move from normal
to non-normal modal logics. This is not only an issue in deontic logic but it concerns
quantification in several intensional logics. But there are specific reasons to pose this
question in deontic logic, as we have recalled in Chapters 1 and 2. As we shall see—
unlike the case of normal deontic and modal logics—the joint validity of BF and CBF is
not guaranteed by imposing constant domains of quantification. Additional conditions
are required, but they pose indeed specific problems in deontic logic.
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3.5 The Converse Barcan and the Ghilardi schemata
As we saw in the previous sections, only a few works have been devoted to the study of
quantified non normal modal logics. Stolpe (2003) is certainly one of the most significant.
However, Stolpe’s aim is to find out “[. . . ] what semantical restrictions must be imposed
on a minimal model in order to validate the Barcan and the converse Barcan formulae”
(Stolpe, 2003, 559, emphasis added). As Arlo´ Costa and Pacuit point out:
[. . . ] unfortunately Stolpe does not appeal to frames in his semantics (he
only uses models). So, it is obvious that there are many open questions
not considered in Stolpe’s paper. For example it would be nice to get frame
conditions characterizing the Barcan and the Converse Barcan in this setting.
(Arlo´-Costa and Pacuit, 2006, 21)
Our aim is rather broader. In this section we shall propose frame conditions for CBF
in multi-relational weak semantics.
Standard results in Kripke Semantics (1-relational frames) state that both BF, and
CBF are valid in constant domain frames (i.e., when Dw and Uw coincide for each w).
Within first order Kripke frames with varying domains, however, these schemata cease
to be valid. Let us recall below the proof of this well known result.
Lemma 3.5.1 CBF is not valid in the class of multi-relational frames with varying
inner domains.
Proof. The proof is trivial. Let M = ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ be a 1-relational model such
that: W ∶= {w, v}, R ∶= {R}, R ∶= {⟨w, v⟩}, Dw ∶= {a, b}, Dv ∶= {a}, Uw = Uv = {a, b},
Iσw(P 1) = ∅ for all σ and Iσv (P 1) =Dv, for σ(x) = a (see Figure 3.1). Then ∥∀x(P )∥σI =Dv
and there is a relation, i.e., R, such that for any world t, wRt (if and) only if ⊧σt ∀xP .
Hence ⊧σw ◻∀xP . Moreover ⊧σw ∃x◇¬P , as ⊧τv ¬P (x) for τ(x) = b.
Recall a definition we gave in Chapter 2:
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Figure 3.1: A frame to build a countermodel for CBF. Indeed set Iσw(P 1) = ∅ for all σ
and Iσv (P 1) =Dv, for σ(x) = a. Hence v ⊧σv ∀xA.
Definition 3.5.2 (Local Seriality) Given a multi-relational frame F , a world w is
locally serial iff for any relation Ri there is a world v such that wRiv.
Below is the characterising condition on frames (and the resulting lemma) for CBF.
Lemma 3.5.3 (CBF Characterisation result) For any multi-relational frame F ∶=⟨W,R,D,U⟩, F ⊧ ◻∀xA→ ∀x◻A iff ∀w ∈W , If w is locally serial, then for any x such
that x ∈Dw, for any relation Rj, there is some relation Ri such that Ri(w) ⊆ Rj(w) and
for all t, (wRit⇒ x ∈Dt).
Proof. According to the statement of the Lemma above, any counter model for CBF
must be based on a frame F with the following three conditions:
there is a world w ∈W , and a w-assignment σ such that:
(a) BOTH w is locally serial, i.e., for all k, Rk(w) ≠ ∅
(b) AND there exists a w-assignment τ , which is an x-variant of σ such that τ(x) ∈
Dw, there is a relation Rj
b.1 BOTH ∃t(wRjt & τ(x) /∈Dt), i.e., the inner domains are not increasing
b.2 AND for all the other relations Ri, IF Ri(w) ⊆ Rj(w), THEN there exists some
world ti such that (wRiti & τ(x) /∈Dti).
Hence, these conditions are necessary and sufficient to build a countermodel for CBF.
The idea is to provide an interpretation which makes the class Rj(w) to be exactly the
truth set of ∀xA for some formula A. Then, we need an individual which actually exists
in w and satisfies ¬A(x) in some Rk-accessible state for all k. Indeed, let P be some
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unary predicate and let I be an interpretation defined in the following way: For any
world z, z ∈ ∥P (x)∥Iϑ if and only if wRjz and ϑ is an x-variant of τ such that ϑ(x) ∈Dz.
Thus, Rj(w) = ∥∀xP (x)∥Iτ and hence ⊧τw ◻∀xP . Consider now any world z such that
z /∈ Rj(w); We defined I in such a way that for any z-assignment ϑ, /⊧ϑz P (x) and thus
this holds also for τ , /⊧τz P (x). Moreover our frame conditions guarantee that for any
relation Ri, if Ri(w) ⊆ Rj(w), then there is some z ∈ Ri(w) such that τ(x) /∈ Dz and,
following our construction of I, /⊧τz P (x). Since τ(x) ∈ Dw by definition, it holds that⊧τw ∃x◇¬P (x).
It is easy to see that if CBF does not hold on a model, its frame fulfills the
conditions stated above. Assume that for some frame F , F /⊧ CBF. Then there
are an assignment σ, a valuation I and a world w such that (a) ⊧σw ◻∀xA and (b)⊧σw ∃x ◇ ¬A for some formula A. From (b) it follows that ⊧τw ◇¬A(x) for some
τ(x) ∈ Dw, thus there exists some n-tuple ⟨z1, . . . , zn⟩ such that wRkzk for any Rk ∈ R
and /⊧τzk A. From (a) it follows that for some relation Ri, Ri(w) ⊆ ∥∀xA∥σI , where∥∀xA∥σI ∶= {t ∣ ⊧τt A(x) for any τ such that τ(x) ∈Dt}. Now, consider any relation Rk;
if Rk(w) ⊆ Ri(w), then by (b), Rk ⊆ ∥∀xA∥σI and by (a) there is some z ∈ Rk(w) such
that z /∈ ∥A(x)∥τI for some τ(x) ∈Dw, thus we must conclude that τ(x) /∈Dz.
This Lemma leads to a result that is very close to that for Kripke semantics, as we
shall see in what follows.
Some remarks on CBF. An immediate, yet interesting result is that the schemata
M and CBF are independent, in contrast with Theorem 3.2.6, which establishes that,
for constant non-trivial domain neighbourhood frames CBF is valid whenever M is.
Indeed by Lemma 2.2.5 it holds that M is a valid schema, whereas it is possible to build
a countermodel for CBF (see Lemma 3.5.1).
Corollary 3.5.4 The validity of M does not imply the validity of CBF.
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Lemma 3.5.3 states some interesting facts about the class of CBF-frames. First of
all it states an important property about individuals and their behaviour in alternative
standards. It is well known that CBF imposes increasing inner domains on Kripke
frames:
Definition 3.5.5 (Increasing inner domains - Kripke semantics) A relational
frame F has increasing inner domains iff for all worlds w, v, if wRv then Dw ⊆Dv.
Theorem 3.5.6 (CBF characterisation in Kripke frames) CBF characterises
the class of Kripke frames with increasing inner domains.
Consider any Kripke-frame F ∶= ⟨W,R,D,U⟩ (which is nothing but an 1-relational
frame with varying domains). From the condition stated above in Lemma 3.5.3 we have
that F ⊧ ◻∀xA→ ∀x◻A iff ∀w ∈W , for any world z, if wRz then for any w-assignment
σ such that σ(x) ∈ Dw, σ(x) ∈ Dz, i.e., Dw ⊆ Dz. Thus the conditions imposed by the
schema CBF are the usual ones: CBF is valid in those frames whose connected worlds
have increasing inner domains.
The situation within N-monotonic logics is rather different, yet connected. The first
question that comes to mind is how to generalise the concept of increasing inner domains.
There are a couple of alternatives at hand, which look very close to the definition given
in Kripke-semantics. We might either define increasing domains in a very strong sense,
by asking that all relation enjoy such property:
Definition 3.5.7 (General increasing inner domains) A multi-relational frame F
has increasing inner domains iff for any couple of worlds w, v for any relation Ri, if
wRiv then Dw ⊆Dv.
or we might keep such property lighter, asking for only one relation to fulfill it:
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Definition 3.5.8 (Restricted increasing inner domains) A multi-relational frameF has increasing inner domains iff for any couple of worlds w, v there is at least one
relation Ri, such that if wRiv then Dw ⊆Dv.
Generally, in the multi-relational weak semantics scenario, CBF does not capture
any of these properties. Indeed Lemma 3.5.3 states that if a world w is locally serial,
i.e., if there is access to other worlds under any standard, then, each actual individual
(i.e., any individual belonging to the inner domain of w) keeps being actual in a subset
of every standard. So it says, somehow, that individuals are bound to ‘survive’ under
alternative relations, although not necessarily altogether. If Mary and Alex are both
alive now (actual) the presence of CBF guarantees that for any standard, there is a
subset of alternative ideal worlds in which Mary keeps being actual, and another one in
which Alex is still actual.
Logically, if we consider the big union of all the inner domains connected to w by
some relation i, the inner domain of w is a subset of it, i.e.:
Lemma 3.5.9 If the schema CBF is valid on a given frame, then on any world w, if
w is locally serial, i.e., for any i, Ri(w) ≠ ∅, then for any relation Ri
Dw ⊆⋃{Dv ∣ v ∈ Ri(w)}
Proof. Assume that the property stated in this Lemma does not hold. Then there are
a locally serial world w and a relation Ri such that for some individual d ∈ Dw, for all
v ∈ Ri(w), d /∈Dv, i.e., Dw /⊆ ⋃{Dv ∣ v ∈ Ri(w)}. Consider an assignment σ on any world
belonging to Ri(w) such that σ(x) = d, then for all v ∈ Ri(w), ⊧σv ¬∃x(x = d) and then⊧σw ◻∀x(x ≠ d). By CBF we get ⊧σw ∀x◻ (x ≠ d), i.e., for any w-assignment τ such that
τ(x) ∈ Dw, ⊧τw ◻(x ≠ d). Since d ∈ Dw, this holds true for σ as well, where σ(x) = d.
Hence we get that the formula ◻(d ≠ d) holds true at w. This would impose that for
some j, Rj(w) = ∅ which is contradictory with the assumptions.
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Hence, within the same set of alternative possible worlds, there is one world in which
Mary lives and another in which Alex lives, although, again, they are not bound to
necessarily coincide. Moreover, this property stated below turns out to be canonical for
a free system with identity which includes the CBF schema (see Lemma 3.6.13).
A natural question is then how to force individuals to survive altogether under some
standard. Well, intuitively, at first sight, it would be enough to add partial closure
under intersection, i.e., the semantic property stated in Lemma 2.2.12 and characterised
by Schema C ∶= ◻A ∧ ◻B → ◻(A ∧B). However, this would generate a normal system
(please refer to the lattice in Figure 2.1). Thus, in the presence of Axiom C, the situation
becomes closer to the Kripkean case. This said, Definition 3.5.8 seems to capture the
concept of ‘increasing domains’ better than the stronger alternative proposed. However,
it turns out that the presence of C is not required to achieve the formerly stated property,
which is actually (partially) granted by the presence of CBF alone:
Theorem 3.5.10 (CBF and Restricted Increasing Domains) For any multi-
relational frame F ∶= ⟨W,R,D,U⟩, F ⊧ ◻∀xA → ∀x ◻ A iff ∀w ∈ W , if w is locally
serial, then for all Rj, there is some relation Ri such that Ri(w) ⊆ Rj(w) and for all
worlds v in Ri(w), Dw ⊆Dv.
Proof. This is very straightforward. In fact, consider the formulation of Lemma 3.5.3,
which states that if w is locally serial, then for any x such that x ∈Dw, for any relation
Rj , there is some relation Ri such that Ri(w) ⊆ Rj(w) and for all t, (wRit ⇒ x ∈ Dt).
Suppose the inner domain of w is the set {a, b}. Then, for any Rj there must be an Ri
such that Ri(w) ⊆ Rj(w) and a belongs to the inner domain of all the worlds from Ri(w).
However, since the statement of Lemma 3.5.3 refers to all relations and all individuals,
we must consider also Ri and b. Hence there is an Rm such that Rm(w) ⊆ Ri(w)
and b belongs to the inner domain of any world from Rm(w). Thus, all the worlds from
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Rm(w) have an inner domain containg both a, and b and their inner domain is, therefore,
a superset of Dw.
By all means, these results are much more specific than those proposed by Stolpe
(2003), as nothing is known about inner domains of related worlds. In fact, by translating
in terms of multi-relational semantics Stolpe (2003)’s CUPO condition (see Theorem
3.2.9) it is quite straightforward to prove a weaker correspondence result for CBF in
multi-relational models.
Lemma 3.5.11 (CUPO models) For any multi-relational model M ∶= ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩,M ⊧ ◻∀xA → ∀x ◻ A if and only if for any world w the following holds: given a w-
assignment σ, if there is a relation Ri such that Ri(w) ⊆ ∥∀xA∥σI , then for all x-variant
τ of σ such that τ(x) ∈Dw there is some j such that Rj(w) ⊆ ∥A(x)∥τI .
Proof. This proof is very simple and straightforward. For the left arrow, suppose
there are a model M ∶= ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn, V ⟩ and a σ such that ⊧σw ∀xA. Hence, for some
i, Ri(w) ⊆ ∥∀xA∥σw. By hypothesis for all x-variant τ of σ such that τ(x) ∈ Dw there is
some j such that Rj(w) ⊆ ∥A(x)∥τI , thus ensuring ⊧τw ◻A(x) and hence ⊧σw ∀x◻A(x).The
other version can be proved accordingly by contraposition.
Mirroring Kripke semantics, CBF and the Ghilardi schema ∃x ◻ A → ◻∃xA (GF)
are semantically equivalent:
Lemma 3.5.12 CBF and GF are semantically equivalent
Proof. To show this result it is enough to check that GF characterises the class of
CBF-frames.
(⇒) According to the statement of Lemma 3.5.3, any counter-model for CBF must be
based on a frame F with the following three conditions:
there is a world w ∈W , and a w-assignment σ such that:
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(a) BOTH w is locally serial, i.e., for all k, Rk(w) ≠ ∅
(b) AND there exists an individual a, a ∈Dw, and there is a relation Rj
(b.1) BOTH ∃t(wRjt & a /∈Dt), i.e., the inner domains are not increasing
(b.2) AND for all the other relations Ri, IF Ri(w) ⊆ Rj(w), THEN there exists some
world ti such that (wRiti & a /∈Dti).
Let us sketch a valuation to build a counter-model for GF. Let A be a unary predicate,
take any w-assignment τ and set I as follows:
(a) IF τ(x) ≠ a, then ∥A(x)∥τI =W ;
(b) OTHERWISE if τ(x) = a, then ∥A(x)∥τI =W −Ri(w).
From (b) it follows that Ri(w) ⊆ ∥¬A(a)∥I , hence ⊧σw ∃x ◻ ¬A(x).
Let us turn our attention to (a). Any world v which is not Ri-seen by w is such
that for any assignment τ , ⊧τv A(x) and hence ⊧Iσ ∀xA(x) for all σ. Concerning Ri the
situation is the following: the fact that ∃t(wRjt & a /∈ Dt) guarantees that ⊧σt ∀xA(x),
whereas the fact that for all the other relations Ri, IF Ri(w) ⊆ Rj(w), THEN there exists
some world ti such that (wRiti & a /∈ Dti), guarantees the fact that there is always a
world z in Rj(w) such that ⊧σz ∀xA(x). This observation, together with the fact that
w is locally serial by assumption, makes sure that ⊧σw ◇∀xA(x), thus disproving an
instance of GF.
3.6 Completeness Results8
3.6.1 The system Q○=.MN
Here we present an axiomatic system extending MN with predicate logic, which is based
on free quantified modal logic (see Corsi, 2002, 1498). The system Q○=.MN (Free Quan-
tified N-monotonic modal logic) contains the following axioms and inference rules:
8I wish to thank Gabriele Tassi for the fruitful discussions and the useful insights he provided while
I was working on this part of my dissertation.
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- Propositional tautologies;
- UI○ ∶= ∀y(∀xA(x)→ A(y/x))
- ∀x∀yA↔ ∀y∀xA
- A→ ∀xA, x not free in A
- ∀x(A→ B)→ (∀xA→ ∀xB)
- I:= t = t
- (s = t)→ (A(s//x)→ A(t//x))
- ND:= ◻A ∧ s ≠ t→ ◻(A ∧ s ≠ t)
- NI:= ◻A ∧ s = t→ ◻(A ∧ s = t)
- M ∶= ◻(A ∧B)→ (◻A ∧ ◻B)
- N ∶= ◻⊺ to Q○=.E
- MP ∶= A→ B,A/B
- RE ∶= A↔ B/ ◻A↔ ◻B
- UG ∶= A/∀xA
Some remarks on Q○=.MN. Besides the propositional part,9 axiom schemata for
the basic predicate part (not considering identity) are those originally proposed by
Kripke (1963) (see Corsi, 2002) plus ∀x∀yA ↔ ∀y∀xA, which is conceptually harm-
less but needed to ensure completeness results (see Goldblatt, 2011). The lan-
guage includes the identity symbol =, which makes the logic very expressive and
able, for example, to handle definite descriptions, such as ‘the first homeless per-
son who begs from Jones in 2006’ (Goble, 1996), which is usually represented
with an expression like λxHomeless Begging 2006 (x) (using lambda notation) and
which is typically taken to be equivalent to ∃x(Homeless Begging Jones 2006 (x) ∧∀y(Homeless Begging Jones 2006 (y) → y = x)). As argued by Goble (1996), expres-
sions such as ‘It is obligatory to help the first homeless person who begs from you in
2006’ are quite significant in normative contexts, even though an analysis of the role of
definite descriptions in deontic logic is outside the scope of this work: anyway, Q○=.MN
can handle those expressions. In quantified alethic modal logic with the identity sym-
bols logicians usually consider whether the following schemata are to be valid (for a
philosophical discussion, see Kripke, 1980):
t = s→ ◻(t = s) t /= s→ ◻(t /= s)
9For alternative axiomatisations of the propositional part, please refer to Section 2.1.
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Here, we consider a version of them that can also capture some quite restricted
versions of C: indeed, ND and NI state that it is possible modally aggregate two
formulae when one is any A (and thus A can also be a ◻ formula) and the other
is either t = s or t /= s; this does not in general entail C. Notice that the schema
NI∗ ∶= t = s → ◻(t = s) is derivable within this system. Finally, it is worth noting that
we will make an essential use of the identity symbol and schemata NI and NI∗ to
ensure completeness of the system Q○=.MN⊕CBF, namely, when we add CBF. We will
show later in the Chapter why this is technically needed.
Given a language L, we shall henceforth refer to the set of its individual constants
with the notation C(L).
Theorem 3.6.1 (Soundness) The system Q○=.MN is sound with respect to the class of
all multi-relational frames with varying inner domains.
Proof. The proof is standard and it is carried out by induction on lg(D), whereD ∶= D1, . . . ,Dn is a deduction in the axiomatic system Q○=.MN with A = Dn, i.e.,
A ∈ Q○=.MN⊢).
(a) if k = 1, A is an axiom. Let us consider just a few cases. For the
propositional schemata, please refer to Theorem 2.3.9. If A has the form∀y(∀xB(x)→ B(y/x)), then assume by reductio that there are a multi-relational frameF , a model M = ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ on F , a world w and a w-assignment σ such thatM /⊧σw ∀y(∀xB(x) → B(y/x)). Then there is a w-assignment τ which is an y-variant
of σ such that M /⊧τw ∀xB(x) → B(y/x) and τ(y) ∈ Dw. Hence M ⊧τw ∀xB(x) andM /⊧τw B(y/x) and τ(y) ∈ Dw. It follows that for any w-assignment ϑ, where ϑ is an
x-variant of τ such that ϑ(x) ∈ Dw, M ⊧ϑw B(x) and M /⊧τw B(y/x) for τ(y) ∈ Dw.
Since one must consider all the x-variants of τ which map x to an element of the inner
domain of w and since τ(y) ∈Dw, there is an assignment ϑ⋆ such that it is an x-variant
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of τ , ϑ⋆(x) = τ(y), M ⊧ϑ⋆w B(x) and M /⊧τw B(y/x).
If A has the form B → ∀xB for x not free in B, then suppose by reductio that there
are a multi-relational frame F , a model M = ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ on F , a world w and
a w-assignment σ such that M /⊧σw B → ∀xB, thus M ⊧σw B and M /⊧σw ∀xB, i.e.,M ⊧σw ∃x¬B. From this it follows that M /⊧τw B for some x-variant τ of σ such that
τ(x) ∈ Dw. Since x is not free in B, σ and τ coincide on any free variable occurring in
B, hence, by Lemma 3.3.8 it holds that M ⊧σw B and M /⊧σw B.
If A has the form ∀x(B → C) → (∀xB → ∀xC), then suppose by reductio that
there are a multi-relational frame F , a model M = ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ on F , a world w
and a w-assignment σ such that ⊧σw ∀x(B → C), ⊧σw ∀xB and ⊧σw ∃x¬C. Thus (i)M ⊧τw B → C for any x-variant τ of σ such that τ(x) ∈ Dw; (ii) M ⊧ϑw B for any
x-variant ϑ of σ such that ϑ(x) ∈ Dw; (iii) M /⊧υw C for some x-variant υ of σ such that
υ(x) ∈Dw. From (i) it follows that for any x-variant τ of σ such that τ(x) ∈Dw, eitherM /⊧τw B, contradicting (ii), or M ⊧τw C, contradicting (iii).
If A has the form ◻B ∧s = t→ ◻(B ∧s = t), then assume that there are a model, a world
and an assignment such that ⊧σw ◻B ∧ s = t. This entails the existence of a relation
Ri such that Ri(w) ⊆ ∥B∥σI . Take any v ∈ Ri(w). If t (or s) is an individual constant,
then Iσw(t) = Iσv (t), since constants are rigid designators; on the other hand if t (or s) is
a variable, than, since Uw ⊆ Uv, it holds that Iσw(t) = σ(t) = Iσv (t). Thus ⊧σw ◻(B∧(t = s)).
(b) If k = n+1, then A is an axiom (see previous cases) or it has been obtained either
via MP, or via RM, or else via UG. For the first two cases, please refer to Theorem
2.3.9. Let us focus on the latter case. If A has been obtained via the rule UG, it has
the form ∀xB and it has been derived applying UG to a formula B. By IH, ⊧σw B for
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any valuation I, any world w and any assignment σ. In particular this holds true for
any assignment τ which is an x-variant of σ such that τ(x) ∈Dw and hence ⊧σw ∀xB.
3.6.2 Some Auxiliary Results
Following Corsi (2002), let us establish some auxiliary results.
Definition 3.6.2 Let L be a logic on the language L, ∆ ⊆ L and Q ⊆ C(L).
- ∆ is L-consistent iff ∆ /⊢L .
- ∆ is L-deductively closed iff for any sentence A of L, ∆ ⊢L A iff A ∈ ∆.
- ∆ is L-complete iff for any sentence A of L, either A ∈ ∆ or ¬A ∈ ∆.
- ∆ is L-maximal iff ∆ is L-consistent and L-complete.
- ∆ is Q-universal iff if ∀xA(x) ∈ ∆, then A(c/x) ∈ ∆, for all individual constants
c ∈ Q.
- ∆ is Q-existential iff if A(c/x) ∈ ∆ for some individual constant c ∈ Q, then∃xA(x) ∈ ∆.
- ∆ is Q-inductive iff if A(c/x) ∈ ∆ for all individual constants c ∈ Q, then ∀xA(x) ∈
∆.
- ∆ is Q-rich iff if ∃xA(x) ∈ ∆ for some individual constant c ∈ Q, then A(c/x) ∈ ∆.
- ∆ is L-saturated iff if ∆ is L-maximal and for some Q ⊆ Const(L), ∆ is Q-universal
and Q-rich.
Lemma 3.6.3 Let L ⊆ Q○=.MN be a logic on L. Let C be a denumerable set of individual
constants not occurring in L, let LC be the language obtained adding C to C(L) and LC
be the logic on LC .
i. If ⊢LC A(c1, . . . , cn), then ⊢LC A(x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn) where x1, . . . , xn are variables
not occurring in A(c1, . . . , cn).
ii. If ⊢LC A and no constants of C occur in A, then ⊢L A.
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iii. If ∆ is an L-consistent set of sentences and no constant from C occurs in ∆,
then ∆ is LC-consistent. (Cf. (Corsi, 2002, Lemma 1.6))
Lemma 3.6.4 Given an L-maximal set ∆ of sentences in L and Q ⊆ C(L), if ∆ is
Q-universal then ∆ is Q-existential.(Cf. (Corsi, 2002, Lemma 1.11))
Proof. Assume A(c/x) ∈ ∆ for some individual constant c ∈ C(L) and ∃xA /∈ ∆. Since
∆ is L-maximal, ¬∃xA(x) ∈ ∆ and hence ∀x¬A(x) ∈ ∆. Thus, since ∆ is Q-universal by
definition, ¬A(c/x) ∈ ∆ and hence  ∈ ∆, contradicting the consistency of ∆.
Lemma 3.6.5 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma) Given a logic L, if ∆ is a L-consistent set of
formulae, then there is a L-maximal set ∆+ such that ∆ ⊆ ∆+.
Lemma 3.6.6 Let ∆ be an L-consistent set of sentences of L. Then for some not-empty
denumerable set C of new constants, there is a set Π of sentences of LC such that ∆ ⊆ Π,
Π is LC-maximal, Π is Q-universal and Q-rich for some set Q ⊆ C(LC). (cf. (Corsi,
2002, Lemma 1.16))
3.6.3 Canonical models
In order to define canonical models for a language with identity, we need to introduce a
binary equivalence relation on individual constants:
a ∼ b if and only if (a = b) ∈ w
Any individual constant c may be interpreted on its equivalence class [c], where [c] ∶={a ∣ c ∼ a}.
Definition 3.6.7 (Non normal canonical model for Q○=.MN) Let L ⊇ Q○=.MN be a
logic based on L. Let V be a set of constants with cardinality ℵ0 such that V ⊃
Const(L) e ∣ V − Const(L) ∣= ℵ0. A non normal canonical model for L is a tupleM = ⟨W,R1, . . . ,Rn,D, I⟩ such that:
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- W is the class of all Lw-saturated sets of sentences w, where Lw = LS for some set
S of constants such that C(LS) ≠ ∅, S ⊂ Q and ∥Q −C(LS)∥ = ℵ0.
- For any formula A ∈ Fma(L) let RA be a binary relation over W . For all w, v ∈W ,
wRAv iff ◻A ∈ w ⇒ A ∈ v and for any constant c ∈ Const(Lw), [c]w = [c]v, where[c]v = {b ∈ Const(Lv) ∶ (b = c) ∈ v}. The set of relations R is the collections of all such
relations.
- Dw = {[c]w ∶ ∃x(x = c) ∈ w}.
- Uw = {[c]w ∶ c ∈ const(Lw)}
- Iw(c) = [c]w.
- Iw(Pn) = {⟨[c1]w , ..., [cn]w⟩ ∶ Pn(c1, ..., cn) ∈ w}.
Lemma 3.6.8 (Existence lemma) Given a canonical model M for Q○=.MN, for any
w ∈W , if ◇A ∈ w, then for any formula B ∈ Fma(L) there is a set v such that:
1. v belongs to the base set of M
2. A ∈ v
3. If ◻B ∈ w then B ∈ v
4. Const(Lw) ⊆ Const(Lv)
5. for any individual constant c ∈ Const(Lw), [c]w = [c]v.
Proof. Below we shall define a procedure to construct any such v for any formula B.
Let C be a denumerable set of constants which do not belong to Lw and let LCw =Lw ∪C. Let H1,H2,H3, ... be an enumeration of all the existential formulae of LCw with
infinite repetitions.
Let Γ be a chain of sets as defined below:
1. Γ0:
(a) If ◻B ∈ w, then Γ0 ∶= {B} ∪ {A}
(b) otherwise, Γ0 ∶= {A}.
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2. Γ1 ∶= Γ0 ∪ {(a = b) ∣ (a = b) ∈ w}
3. Let Γn be already defined for 1 ≤ n and let Hn+1 = ∃xF (x). The set Γn+1 is defined
as:
(a) If ∃xF (x) contains at least one constant c such that c ∉ Const(Γn), then
Γn+1 ∶= Γn.
(b) otherwise, if any constant occurring within ∃xF (x) is already in Γn, then
there are a few cases:
(b.1) If Γn ∪ {∃xF (x)} is LCw-consistent, then
(b.1.1) Γn+1 ∶= Γn ∪ {∃xF (x)} ∪ {F (b/x)}, where b ∈ Const(Γn) and Γn ∪{F (b/x)} is LCw-consistent;
(b.1.2) Γn+1 ∶= Γn ∪ {∃xF (x)} ∪ {F (c/x)} ∪ {(c ≠ b) ∣ b ∈ Const(Γn)}, if
Γn ∪ {F (b/x)} is not LCw-consistent for any b ∈ Const(Γn), and c ∈ C is a
constant not occurring in Γn.
(b.2) Otherwise if Γn ∪ {∃xF (x)} is not LCw-consistent, then Γn+1 = Γn.
4. Γ = ⋃n∈N (Γn).
In order to show that Γis LCw-consistent, we have to check that for any n, Γn is
LCw-consistent.
1. Γ0 is consistent. Indeed:
(a) If Γ0 ∶= {A,B} and ◻B ∈ w, then suppose ⊢MN A ∧ B → , then ⊢MN B →(A → ), ⊢MN B → ¬A and ⊢MN ◻B → ◻¬A by the RM rule. By definition,
it follows that w ⊢MN ◻¬A, ¬ ◇ A ∈ w, leading to a contradiction as w is
consistent by assumption.
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(b) If Γ0 ∶= {A}, then assume it is not consistent and hence ⊢MN A→ , i.e., ⊢MN¬A. Thus by the necessitation rule we have ⊢MN ◻¬A and this implies that¬◇A ∈ w and hence ◇A /∈ w, which is in contradiction with our hypothesis.
2. Γ1 is consistent. Indeed assume it is not. There are two cases:
(a) Γ0 ∶= {A,B} and ◻B ∈ w, then ⊢MN B → (a = b→ (A→ )) for some a = b ∈ w.
Then ⊢MN B → (a = b → ¬A), and ⊢MN ◻B → ◻((a = b) → ¬A) by the RM
rule. By definition of w and MP, it follows that w ⊢MN ◻((a = b) → ¬A).
Thus by the RM rule ⊢MN ◻(a = b) → ◻¬A. But ◻(a = b) ∈ w by the NI∗
schema, hence ¬◇A ∈ w, ◇A /∈ w, which contradicts the hypothesis.
(b) If Γ0 ∶= {A}, then ⊢MN (a = b) → A → , i.e., ⊢MN (a = b) → ¬A for some(a = b) ∈ w. Thus by the RM rule ⊢MN ◻(a = b)→ ◻¬A. But ◻(a = b) ∈ w by
the NI schema, hence ¬◇A ∈ w, ◇A /∈ w, which contradicts the hypothesis.
3. Γn+1 is also consistent, in fact:
(a) Γn+1 is LCw-consistent by Inductive Hypothesis (IH henceforth).
(b.1.1) Γn+1 is LCw-consistent by construction.
(b.1.2) Γn ∪ {∃xF (x)} is consistent by hypothesis. First of all, let us show
that Γn ∪ {F (c/x)} is LCw-consistent. Assume by reductio that Γn ∪ {F (c/x)}
is not LCw-consistent. Then there are sentences {D1, ...,Dk} ∈ Γn such that⊢LCw D1 ∧ ... ∧Dk ∧ F (c/x)→ 
Γn ⊢LCw ¬(F (c/x)
Γn ⊢LCw ¬F (y/c)
Γn ⊢LCw ∀y¬F (y/c)
Γn ⊢LCw ¬∃yF (y)
contrary to the fact that Γn ∪ {∃xF (x)} is LCw-consistent by hypothesis, thus
Γn ∪ {F (c/x)} is LCw-consistent.
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Assume by reductio that Γn+1 is not LCw-consistent. Hence for some finite set
of individual constants {b1, ..., bh} ⊆ Const(Γn),
Γn ⊢LCw F (c/x) ∧ (c ≠ b1 ∧ ... ∧ c ≠ bh)→ 
Γn ⊢LCw F (c/x)→ ¬(c ≠ b1 ∧ ... ∧ c ≠ bh)
Γn ⊢LCw F (c/x)→ (c = b1 ∨ ... ∨ c = bh)
Γn ∪ {F (c/x)} ⊢LCw c = b1 ∨ ... ∨ c = bh
hence for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ h, Γn ∪ {F (bi/x)} is LCw-consistent, in contradiction
with the assumption that there is no constant b ∈ Const(Γn) such that Γn ∪{F (b/x)} is LCw-consistent. Therefore Γn+1 is LCw-consistent.
(b) ( b.2) Γn+1 is LCw-consistent by IH.
4. Γ e` LCw-consistent by the Chain Lemma.
Let Q = Const(Γ). We start by showing that
(∗) For any existential formula ∃xF (x) of LQw there is some Γk such that either ∃xF (x) ∈
Γk+1 or Γk ∪ {∃xF (x)} is LCw-inconsistent.
Let c1, . . . , cj be all the constants occurring in ∃xF (x). Since ∃xF (x) ∈ LQw , {c1, . . . , cj} ⊆
Q, hence for some j, {c1, . . . , cj} ⊆ Const(Γj). Since ∃xF (x) occurs infinitely many times
within H1,H2,H3, ..., then ∃xF (x) = Hk for some k > j. Therefore the (b) step of our
construction is applied to ∃xF (x) and hence (∗) is proved. It follows that Γ e` LQw-rich.
The set Γ can be extended to some v which is LQw-consistent and L
Q
w- maximal.
Let Lv = LQw . The extension v does not compromise richness. Indeed, if an existential
formula of LQw belongs to v, by (∗) it is also in Γ, and hence some exemplification of it is
also in Γ and sinde Γ ⊆ v, it is also in v. Therefore v is L=v-saturated and it hence belong
to the canonical base set. Therefore:
1. v ∈W .
2. Since A ∈ Γ0 and v ⊇ ⋃n∈N (Γn), it follows that A ∈ v.
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3. Moreover it holds true that if ◻B ∈ w, then B ∈ v
4. Since Const(Lw) ⊆ Const(LQw) it holds that Const(Lw) ⊆ Const(Lv).
5. The set v is LQw-maximal: the only constants occurring in v are those already
present in Γ. Since by construction {(a = b) ∣ (a = b) ∈ w} ⊆ Γ, it follows that
for any b, [b]w ⊆ [b]v. On the other hand, suppose that there is some c from
Const(Lv) which does not occur in Const(Lw). Then c has been added at some
point in the construction of the Γj sets. The step (iii.b.1.2) is the only possible way
to add the new constant c to Γj+1 and it guarantees that for any d ∈ Const(L(Γj)),
c ≠ d ∈ Γj+1, so c /∈ [b]v for any b ∈ Const(Lw).
Lemma 3.6.9 (Truth Lemma) Given a canonical model ML = ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ for a
quantified N-Monotonic modal logic L extending Q○=.MN, for any formula A ∈ Fma(L),
for any world w ∈W , the following holds: ⊧σw A(xi) ⇔ A(σ(xi)/xi) ∈ w
Proof. By induction on the length of a formula A. We omit details of the induction
base.
Suppose lg(A) = n + 1 and A has the form ∃xB(x, y1, . . . , ym).
(i) ⊧σw ∃xB(x, y1, . . . , ym) iff for some x-variant τ of σ such that τ(x) ∈ Dw,⊧τw B(x, y1, . . . , ym). Suppose τ(x) = c. Since by assumption all constants are
rigid designators, by Lemma 3.3.7 it holds that ⊧σw B(c/x, y1, . . . , ym). Hence
B(c/x,σ(y1), . . . , σ(ym)) ∈ w by IH. Since w is Dw-universal, w is also Dw-
existential by Lemma 3.6.4 and hence ∃xB(x,σ(y1), . . . , σ(ym)) ∈ w. (ii) Assume∃xB(x,σ(y1), . . . , σ(ym)) ∈ w. Since w is Dw-rich, B(c/x,σ(y1), . . . , σ(ym)) ∈ w for
some c ∈ Dw. Thus, by IH, ⊧σw B(c/x, y1, . . . , ym) and, by Lemma 3.3.7 it holds that⊧τw B(x, y1, . . . , ym) for some w-assignment τ which is an x-variant of σ such that
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τ(x) = Iw(c) = c. Therefore ⊧σw ∃xB(x, y1, . . . , ym). If lg(A) = n + 1 and A has the
form ◻B, please refer to Lemma 2.3.14.
Lemma 3.6.10 Let ML ∶= ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ be a canonical model for a logic L ⊇ Q○=.MN.
If ∆ is an L-consistent set of formulae, then for some w ∈ W and some w-assignment
σ, ML ⊧σw D for any D ∈ ∆. (cf. (Corsi, 2002, Lemma 1.19))
Let L be any logic L ⊇ Q○=.MN. Consider any formula A such that /⊢L A. Then {¬A}
is L-consistent. By Lemma 3.8.6 there is a world w of a canonical model ML for L and
a w-assignment σ such that ML /⊧σw A and hence ML /⊧ A.
Corollary 3.6.11 (Completeness of Q○=.MN) The logic Q○=.MN is strongly complete
with respect to the class of all multi-relational frames.
Recalling the results given in Chapter 2, we can state the following:
Corollary 3.6.12 The logic Q○=.MN⊕
- T is complete with respect to the class of generally reflexive multi-relational frames,
i.e., for any world w, for any relation Ri, wRiw;
- CON is complete with respect to the class of generally serial multi-relational frames;
- D is complete with respect to the class of generally serial multi-relational frames;
- D is complete with respect to the class of generally serial multi-relational frames ful-
filling the following condition:
for any w ∈W and any pair of relations Ri and Rj, Ri(w) ∩Rj(w) ≠ ∅.
3.6.4 Completeness of Q○=.MN⊕CBF
Turning our attention to the CBF schema, we can show that the logic Q○=.MN ⊕CBF
is sound and complete with respect to an interesting class of frames. Again, this is
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but a generalisation of the Kripkean case. Recall that in Kripke semantics the logic
Q○=.K ⊕ CBF is sound and complete with respect to the frames with increasing inner
domains, i.e., for any worlds w, v, if wRv, then Dw ⊆ Dv. In the multi-relational case,
the result is, again, more general. Adding CBF to class of axioms gives the following
result. If we take any world which is connected to at least one point for any relation
(i.e., is locally serial) and we consider any actual individual (i.e., belonging to the inner
domain of the world), we can show that thank to the schema CBF, such individual
survives somewhere, namely each each relation Ri contains at least one point in which
such individual belongs to the inner domain. This is stated formally in the following
theorem:
Theorem 3.6.13 (Completeness of Q○=.MN⊕CBF) The logic Q○=.MN ⊕ CBF is
complete with respect to the class of multi-relational frames with the following prop-
erty. For any world w, if w is locally serial, i.e., for any i, Ri(w) ≠ ∅, then for any
relation Ri
Dw ⊆⋃{Dv ∣ v ∈ Ri(w)}
Proof. Let M be a canonical model for Q○=.MN⊕CBF. Take any world w and assume
it is locally serial. Then the schema ◇⊺ belongs to w. By lemma 3.6.8, it follows that
for any formula Bi ∈ Fma(L) there is a world vi such that wRBivi and Const(Lw) ⊆
Const(Lvi) and for any individual constant c ∈ Const(Lw), [c]w = [c]vi . This implies
that Uw ⊆ Uvi . Take any [c] ∈ Dw; by definition it holds that ∃x(x = c) ∈ w. From
these facts it follows that ⊧σw x = c for some σ such that σ(x) ∈ Dw and, moreover,
for each i, ⊧σvi x = c. Hence ⊧σw ◇(x = c) and since σ(x) ∈ Dw, ∃x◇ (x = c) ∈ w. By
CBF ◇∃x(x = c) ∈ w. This means that for every existing individual b from Dw, for any
relation RB, there is a world t ∈ RB(w) such that b ∈ Dt and therefore for any relation
Ri, Dw ⊆ ⋃{Dv ∣ v ∈ Ri(w)}.
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3.7 The Barcan Formula: A Work in Progress
3.7.1 BF and CGF: Semantic Considerations
We have previously argued that, if we read de re and de dicto deontic statements as con-
textual and non-contextual obligations, respectively, then CBF seems less controversial
than BF. Additional technical difficulties make BF harder to handle. The remainder
of this Section provides some first preliminary results.
As for the case of CBF, the non validity of the BF schema follows immediately from
its analogous result in Kripke semantics.
Lemma 3.7.1 BF is not valid in the class of multi-relational frames.
Proof. Consider the following model: M ∶= ⟨W,R1,D,U, I⟩ where W ∶= {w, z}, R1 ∶={⟨w, z⟩}, Dw = {a}, Dz = {b}, Uw = Uz = {a, b}, P (a) ∈ Iz(P ) and P (b) /∈ Iz(P ). Then
it holds that for any x − variant of a σ-assignment τ such that τ(x) ∈ Dw, ⊧τw ◻P (x)
and hence ⊧σw ∀x◻P (x). Moreover there is an x-variant θ of σ such that θ(x) ∈Dz and
P (x) ∈ Iθz (P ), i.e. θ(x) = b and since wR1z it holds that ⊧σw ◇∃x¬P (x). (See Figure
3.2)
a b
w
Dw
a b
v
DvR
Figure 3.2: A Kripke frame to build a countermodel for BF .
Lemma 3.7.2 (BF Characterisation Result) For any multi-relational frame F ∶=⟨W,R,D,U⟩, F ⊧ ∀x ◻ A → ◻∀xA iff ∀w ∈ W , either there is an Ri ∈ R such that
Ri(w) = ∅ or for any n-tuple ⟨z1, . . . , zn⟩ such that n is the cardinality of R and wRkzk
for any Rk ∈R, for any m-tuple ⟨Rj1 , . . . ,Rjm⟩ where ∥Dw∥ =m, i.e. m is the number of
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individuals belonging to the inner domain of w, there is a world t ∈ {z1, z2, . . .}∩Rj1(w)∩
. . . ∩Rjm(w) such that Dw ⊇Dt.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that ∃w ∈ W such that for all Ri ∈ R, Ri(w) ≠ ∅ and for some⟨z1, . . . , zn⟩ such that wRkzk for any Rk ∈R, for some m-tuple of relations ⟨Rj1 , . . . ,Rjm⟩
the following holds: for all t ∈W , if t ∈ {z1, z2, . . .}∩Rj1(w)∩ . . .∩Rjm(w) then Dw ⊂Dt.
We shall now define an interpretation I in order to build a countermodel for BF in
this frame. Let Dw ∶= {d1, . . . , dm} and consider the w-assignments σ1, . . . , σm such
that for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, σi(x) = di. For some unary predicate P , for any i, let∥P (x)∥σiI ∶= Rji(w). Then clearly ⊧σiw ◻P (x) for each i and hence, since σ1, . . . , σm are
all the x-variant of a w-assignment σ such that σi ∈Dw for each i, ⊧σw ∀x◻P (x). Consider
now any zi from ⟨z1, . . . , zn⟩ and define a zi-assignment ϑi such that ϑi(x) /∈ Iϑizi (P (x))
and ϑi(x) ∈ Dzi . Notice that it is always possible to define such an assignment. In
fact even if zi ∈ Rj1(w) ∩ . . . ∩ Rjm(w), by assumption we have that Dzi ⊃ Dw. Hence⊧ϑizi ¬P (x) and hence ⊧σzi ¬∃xP (x) which implies that /⊧σw ◻∀xP (x).(⇐) Assume that for some frame F , F /⊧ ∀x◻A→ ◻∀xA for some formula A. Then
there are a world w, an interpretation I and an assignment σ such that (a) ⊧σw ∀x◻A(x)
and (b) ⊧σw ◇∃x¬A(x). Given that Dw ∶= {d1, . . . , dm}, from (a) it follows that there
are σ1, . . . , σm w-assignments which are all the x-variants of σ such that σi(x) ∈Dw and⊧σiw ◻A(x). Thus there is a set of relations R1, . . . ,Rm such that for any Ri, Ri(w) ⊆∥A(x)∥σiI .
From (b) it follows that there is an n-tuple ⟨z1, . . . , zn⟩ of worlds such that for each
Ri, wRizi (hence for each Ri, Ri(w) ≠ ∅) and for each i, ⊧σzi ∃x¬A(x). Thus for each zi
there is some zi-assignment ϑi such that ϑi(x) ∈Dzi and ⊧ϑizi ∃x¬A(x).
Clearly all the worlds t belonging to the intersection Rj1(w)∩ . . .∩Rjm(w) are such
that ⊧σit A(x) for all the x-variants of σ such that σi(x) ∈ Dw and hence if a world zi
belongs to such intersection, the zi-assignment ϑi must be such that ϑi(x) ∈ Dzi but
ϑi(x) /∈Dw and therefore for any such world Dw ⊂Dzi .
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Again, mirroring Kripke semantics, the schemata BF and CGF ∶= ◻∃xA → ∃x ◻A
are equivalent.
Lemma 3.7.3 The schemata BF and CGF characterise the same class of multi-
relational frames.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that ∃w ∈ W such that for all Ri ∈ R, Ri(w) ≠ ∅ and for some⟨z1, . . . , zn⟩ such that wRkzk for any Rk ∈R, for some m-tuple of relations ⟨Rj1 , . . . ,Rjm⟩,
where m is the number of individuals belonging to Dw, the following holds: for all t ∈W ,
if t ∈ {z1, z2, . . .} ∩Rj1(w) ∩ . . . ∩Rjm(w) then Dw ⊂Dt.
We shall now define an interpretation I in order to build a countermodel for CGF
in this frame. Let Dw ∶= {d1, . . . , dm} and consider the w-assignments σ1, . . . , σm such
that for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, σi(x) = di. For some unary predicate P , for any i, let∥P (x)∥σiI ∶= Rji(w). Then clearly ⊧σiw ◻P (x) for each i and hence, since σ1, . . . , σm are
all the x-variant of a w-assignment σ such that σi ∈Dw for each i, ⊧σw ∀x ◻ P (x).
Consider now any zi from ⟨z1, . . . , zn⟩ and define a zi-assignment ϑi such that ϑi(x) /∈
Iϑizi (P (x)) and ϑi(x) ∈Dzi . Notice that it is always possible to define such an assignment.
In fact even if zi ∈ Rj1(w)∩ . . .∩Rjm(w), by assumption we have that Dzi ⊃Dw. Hence⊧ϑizi ¬P (x) and hence ⊧σzi ¬∃xP (x) which implies that /⊧σw ◻∀xP (x).(⇐) Assume that for some frame F , F /⊧ ∀x◻A→ ◻∀xA for some formula A. Then
there are a world w, an interpretation I and an assignment σ such that (a) ⊧σw ∀x◻A(x)
and (b) ⊧σw ◇∃x¬A(x). Given that Dw ∶= {d1, . . . , dm}, from (a) it follows that there
are σ1, . . . , σm w-assignments which are all the x-variants of σ such that σi(x) ∈Dw and⊧σiw ◻A(x). Thus there is a set of relations R1, . . . ,Rm such that for any Ri, Ri(w) ⊆∥A(x)∥σiI .
From (b) it follows that there is an n-tuple ⟨z1, . . . , zn⟩ of worlds such that for each
Ri, wRizi (hence for each Ri, Ri(w) ≠ ∅) and for each i, ⊧σzi ∃x¬A(x). Thus for each zi
there is some zi-assignment ϑi such that ϑi(x) ∈Dzi and ⊧ϑizi ∃x¬A(x).
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Clearly all the worlds t belonging to the intersection Rj1(w)∩ . . .∩Rjm(w) are such
that ⊧σit A(x) for all the x-variants of σ such that σi(x) ∈ Dw and hence if a world zi
belongs to such intersection, the zi-assignment ϑi must be such that ϑi(x) ∈ Dzi but
ϑi(x) /∈Dw and therefore for any such world Dw ⊂Dzi .
By translating in terms of multi-relational semantics also Stolpe (2003)’s CUPI con-
dition (see Theorem 3.2.8) it is quite straightforward to prove a weaker correspondence
result for BF in multi-relational models.
A weaker correspondence result for the schema BF can be obtained by rephrasing
the CUPI schema introduced by Stolpe Stolpe (2003). However this implies conditions
on models instead of frames.
Lemma 3.7.4 (CUPI models) For any multi-relational model M ∶= ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩,M ⊧ ∀x ◻ A → ◻∀xA if and only if for any world w the following holds: given a w-
assignment σ, if for any x-variant σi such that σi(x) ∈ Dw there exists a relation Ri
such that Ri(w) ⊆ ∥A(x)∥σiI , then there is a relation Rk such that Rk(w) ⊆ ∥∀xA∥σI .
Proof. The left to right arrow is trivial. For the other direction consider the con-
trapositive proposition. Assume that for some world w ∈ W it holds true that, for all
w-assignments σ, (a) for any x-variant σi of σ, σi(x) ∈ Dw, there exists a relation Ri
such that Ri(w) ⊆ ∥A(x)∥σiI and (b) for any relation Rk, Rk(w) /⊆ ∥∀xA∥σI . From (a) it
follows that for any σi, ⊧σiw ◻A(x) and hence ⊧σw ∀x ◻A(x) whereas from (b) it follows
that /⊧σw ◻∀xA, thus /⊧σw ∀x ◻A→ ◻∀xA.
3.7.2 The independence of the schemata C and BF
Recall that the schema C imposes on frames the following property: F ⊧ ◻A ∧ ◻B →◻(A∧B) iff for any world w, for any relation Ri, Rk there exists a relation Rj such that
Rj(w) ⊆ Rk(w) ∩Ri(w). Hence for any C-frame, the characterisation result for BF is
the following:
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Lemma 3.7.5 (BF on C-frames) Let F be any C-frame. Then for any world w ∈W ,
given that ∥Dw∥ = k, if w is locally serial, then for all sets of relations with cardinality
up to k {Ri1, . . . ,Rik}, for all worlds v ∈ Ri1 ∩ . . . ∩Rik it holds that Dw ⊇Dv.
Proof. Indeed if we assume that the BF-condition does not hold on a C-frame, we
would get the following situation. For some world w such that w is locally serial and∥Dw∥ = k, there is some set R1, . . . ,Rk of relations such that for some world v ∈ R1(w)∩
. . .∩Rk(w) it holds that Dw /⊇Dv. It is easy to build a counter-model in such situation.
In Kripke semantics this is equivalent to deny decreasing domains.
It is easy to find a frame validating C but not BF: It is enough to consider the frame
described in Lemma 3.7.1, which is Kripkean and hence validates C.
It is not hard to show that the schema BF does not imply C. Below we describe a
countermodel for C based on a frame for BF. Consider the model M ∶= ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩
where W = {w, z1, z2}, R ∶= {R1,R2}, R1 ∶= {⟨w, z1⟩}, R2 ∶= {⟨w, z2⟩}, Dw = Dz1 = Dz2 ={d}, σ is a w-assignment such that σ(x) = d. Let P and Q be two unary predicates such
that ∥P (x)∥σI = {z1} and ∥Q(x)∥σI = {z2}. Then ⊧σw ◻P (x) ∧ ◻Q(x) but /⊧σw ◻(P (x) ∧
Q(x)). Moreover M is built on a frame which fulfills the conditions imposed by BF.
Indeed w is locally serial but there is only one tuple ⟨z1, z2⟩ such that wR1z1 and wR2z2.
The number of individuals from Dw is 1, thus: z1 ∈ {z1, z2} ∩R1(w) and Dw ⊆ Dz1 and
z2 ∈ {z1, z2} ∩ R2(w) and Dw ⊆ Dz2 . Notice that any countermodel for C based on a
BF-frame must contain a locally serial world w whose inner domain contains at most
one individual and the frame of such model should have more than one relation.
Corollary 3.7.6 The schemata BF and C are semantically mutually independent.
The importance of this result is limited at the moment, as it lays only on semantic
grounds. In fact, without a completeness result, one cannot infer that adding BF to a
system does not generate normal systems, i.e., it is not clear wether BF does or does
not syntactically imply C.
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3.8 The Role of Identity
The choice of a language with the identity relation was driven by different reasons.
First of all, the expressive power increases greatly. Nevertheless, there is also a technical
reason behind it. Working with the identity symbol allowed us to build canonical models
for CBF-frames, a very difficult goal to be achieved without it. It is actually much easier
to prove completeness for systems without identity, at least for those systems which do
not include any form of Barcan schema.
3.8.1 Completeness without Identity
Below we present a completeness theorem for an analogous system built on a language
without identity. The axiomatic system Q○.MN is obtained by deleting all the schemata
concerning identity:
The system Q○.MN contains the following axioms and inference rules:
- Propositional tautologies;
- UI○ ∶= ∀y(∀xA(x)→ A(y/x))
- ∀x∀yA↔ ∀y∀xA
- A→ ∀xA, x not free in A
- ∀x(A→ B)→ (∀xA→ ∀xB)
- M ∶= ◻(A ∧B)→ (◻A ∧ ◻B)
- N ∶= ◻⊺ to Q○=.E
- MP ∶= A→ B,A/B
- RE ∶= A↔ B/ ◻A↔ ◻B
- UG ∶= A/∀xA
Theorem 3.8.1 (Soundness) The system Q○.MN is sound with respect to the class of
all multi-relational frames with varying inner domains.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 3.6.1.
Lemma 3.8.2 Let ∆ be an L-consistent set of sentences of L. Then for some not-empty
denumerable set C of new constants, there is a set Π of sentences of LC such that ∆ ⊆ Π,
Π is LC-maximal, Π is Q-universal and Q-rich for some set Q ⊆ C(LC). (cf. (Corsi,
2002, Lemma 1.16))
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Definition 3.8.3 (Non normal Canonical Models) Let L be a non normal quanti-
fied modal logic on the language L such that L ⊇ Q○.MN. Let Q be a set of constants of
cardinality ℵ0 such that Q ⊃ C(L) and ∥Q−C(L)∥ = ℵ0. A non normal canonical modelML = ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ for L is defined as follows:
- W is the class of all Lw-saturated sets of sentences w, where Lw = LS for some set
S of constants such that C(LS) ≠ ∅, S ⊂ Q and ∥Q −C(LS)∥ = ℵ0.
- For any formula A ∈ Fma(L) let RA be a binary relation over W . For all w, v ∈W ,
wRAv iff ◻A ∈ w⇒ A ∈ v. The set of relations R is the collections of all such relations.
- Dw = {c ∈ C(Lw) ∣ ∀xA→ A(c/x) ∈ w, for all sentences ∀xA of Lw}.
- Uw = C(Lw)
- Iw(c) = c
- Iw(Pn) = {⟨c1, . . . , cn⟩ ∣ Pn(c1, . . . , cn) ∈ w}
Lemma 3.8.4 (Existence lemma) Given a canonical model M for Q○.MN, for any
w ∈W , if ◇A ∈ w, then for any formula B ∈ Fma(L) there is a state z such that wRBz
and A ∈ z.
The proof follows directly from Lemma 2.3.13.
Lemma 3.8.5 (Truth Lemma) Given a canonical model ML = ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ for a
quantified N-Monotonic modal logic L extending Q○.MN, for any formula A ∈ Fma(L),
for any world w ∈W , the following holds: ⊧σw A(xi) ⇔ A(σ(xi)/xi) ∈ w
Proof. By induction on the length of a formula A. We omit details of the induction
base. Suppose lg(A) = n + 1 and A has the form ∃xB(x, y1, . . . , ym).
(i) ⊧σw ∃xB(x, y1, . . . , ym) iff for some x-variant τ of σ such that τ(x) ∈ Dw,⊧τw B(x, y1, . . . , ym). Suppose τ(x) = c. Since by assumption all constants are
rigid designators, by Lemma 3.3.7 it holds that ⊧σw B(c/x, y1, . . . , ym). Hence
B(c/x,σ(y1), . . . , σ(ym)) ∈ w by IH. Since w is Dw-universal, w is also Dw-existential by
Lemma 3.6.4 and hence ∃xB(x,σ(y1), . . . , σ(ym)) ∈ w.
3.8. THE ROLE OF IDENTITY 117
(ii) Assume ∃xB(x,σ(y1), . . . , σ(ym)) ∈ w. Since w is Dw-rich,
B(c/x,σ(y1), . . . , σ(ym)) ∈ w for some c ∈ Dw. Thus, by IH, ⊧σw B(c/x, y1, . . . , ym)
and, by Lemma 3.3.7 it holds that ⊧τw B(x, y1, . . . , ym) for some w-assignment τ which
is an x-variant of σ such that τ(x) = Iw(c) = c. Therefore ⊧σw ∃xB(x, y1, . . . , ym). If
lg(A) = n + 1 and A has the form ◻B, please refer to Lemma 2.3.14.
Lemma 3.8.6 Let ML ∶= ⟨W,R,D,U, I⟩ be a canonical model for a logic L ⊇ Q○.MN.
If ∆ is an L-consistent set of formulae, then for some w ∈ W and some w-assignment
σ, ML ⊧σw D for any D ∈ ∆. (cf. (Corsi, 2002, Lemma 1.19))
Let L be any logic L ⊇ Q○.MN. Consider any formula A such that /⊢L A. Then {¬A}
is L-consistent. By Lemma 3.8.6 there is a world w of a canonical model ML for L and
a w-assignment σ such that ML /⊧σw A and hence ML /⊧ A.
Theorem 3.8.7 (Completeness of Q○.MN) The logic Q○.MN is strongly complete
with respect to the class of all multi-relational frames.
Corollary 3.8.8 The logic Q○.MN⊕
- T is complete with respect to the class of generally reflexive multi-relational frames,
i.e., for any world w, for any relation Ri, wRiw;
- CON is complete with respect to the class of generally serial multi-relational frames;
- D is complete with respect to the class of generally serial multi-relational frames;
- D is complete with respect to the class of generally serial multi-relational frames ful-
filling the following condition:
for any w ∈W and any pair of relations Ri and Rj, Ri(w) ∩Rj(w) ≠ ∅.
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3.8.2 Some Remarks on Identity
The completeness proof for a system without identity follows from the propositional
results given in Chapter 2, and from those stated by Corsi (2002). However, things
change radically when the identity symbol is included. As Corsi (2002) observes:
In a language with identity, the fact that constants are rigid designators can
be expressed by the schema:
(x = a)→ ◻(x = a)
Therefore (. . . ) all the systems of Q.M.L. with identity we are going to
discuss are bound to be systems with rigid terms. (Corsi, 2002, 1499)
However this ceases to be true in the broader framework of multi-relational semantics.
In fact if there is only one relation within a frame (the Kripke case), the problem of
rigidity can be easily solved by stating that if two names denote the same individual in
a world, then this is bound to be the case in all accessible worlds. On the other hand, if
interpreted in the multi-relational case, this would only state that under some standard
this couple of names denote the same individual. This is obviously not enough. Our
version of the necessity of identity schema
NI ∶= ◻A ∧ (a = b)→ ◻(A ∧ (a = b))
says something more. It states that for any formula, i.e., semantically, for any rela-
tion, this must hold. It is a restricted form of axiom C, which holds only for specific
formulae, namely identities. The same holds for the necessity of diversity, ND. The
resulting system is still a proper subset of K even though it includes a restricted type of
aggregation.
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This may explain what happened in Lemma 3.6.8, in the construction of the set Γ1.
In the proof of Lemma 3.6.8, the set Γ0 is built to ensure the truth of modal formulae:
Γ0 ∶=
1. If ◻B ∈ w, then Γ0 ∶= {B} ∪ {A}
2. otherwise, Γ0 ∶= {A}.
This is not sufficient to preserve rigidity of denotation. However, it can be amended
by adding a further step in the construction:
Γ1 ∶= Γ0 ∪ {(a = b) ∣ (a = b) ∈ w}
This further step is necessary to keep rigidity of designation as well as the validity of
axiom NI. Moreover, the consistency of Γ1 is guaranteed by the presence of NI in the
system.
This is even more obvious within the proof of Theorem 3.6.13, where we make an es-
sential use of identity formulae. In fact, when it comes to prove completeness results for
systems including CBF, if identity is not present, it is very difficult to denote the same
individual across different worlds. One may think about adding an existence predicate,
but, besides the definitive philosophical objection that existence is not a predicate, this
would be just a definite description in disguise. The standard way to introduce an exis-
tence predicate is to add to the language a unary predicate symbol E whose extension,
for any world, is equal to the inner domain:
⊧σw E(x) if and only if σ(x) ∈Dw
This is clearly equivalent to state that E(a) is satisfied in a world if and only if the
formula ∃x(x = a) holds. Hence, adding an existence predicate would make very little
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difference, if not at all, on the technical level and would not take us any closer to proof
completeness for systems including CBF, which is still an open problem.
3.9 Conclusions and Further Work
This Chapter provided a semantic study in multi-relational semantics of quantified N-
Monotonic modal logics with varying domains (Q○=.MN):
- We defined multi-relational weak structures and proved soundness results for N-
Monotonic systems;
- We provided Completeness results for Q○=.MN and extensions;
- We provided Completeness results for Q○.MN and extensions;
- We proved semantic equivalence for the couples CBF - GF, and BF - CGF;
- We provided frame characterisation results for both CBF, and BF;
- We provided Completeness results for Q○=.MN⊕CBF and extensions;
- We showed that Schema M does not entail CBF;
- We proved that schema C and BF are semantically independent.
Problems related to the completeness of non normal systems, with and without
identity, which include BF are still open and require a deeper analysis. Concerning
systems without identity, this problem concerns both CBF, and BF. Moreover, we see
other important directions for future research.
A preliminary question—somehow broader than the scope of this dissertation—
regards the general relation between multi-relational and Neighborhood semantics. For
propositional non-normal modal logics the two semantics are equivalent Governatori and
Rotolo (2005). However, it is not obvious if they are still equivalent (in regard, e.g., to
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completeness and incompleteness results) above K: Normal systems do not necessar-
ily make Governatori and Rotolo (2005)’s semantics collapse on Kripke’s. Regarding
quantified modal logics, a full comparison of the two semantics is anyway needed.
An immediate extension of the present work is to consider constant domains (FOL⊕
MN). It is definitely less trivial to adopt Governatori and Rotolo (2005)’s semantics and
study the open problem that Arlo´-Costa (2011) mentioned for FOL⊕E⊕CBF, as well as
to investigate other quantified (classical, monotonic, and regular) systems with constant
and varying domains.
Finally, a question concerning Kracht and Wolter (1999)’s proof that non-normal
modal logics can be simulated by a normal modal logic with three modalities. This result,
which holds for MN, is of great interest in the context of multi-relational semantics,
whose structures can in fact recall Kripke frames for multi-modal logics. However, when
predicate calculi are added to the propositional modal base we can obtain unexpected
interactions between Barcan schemata and modal axioms. Hence, extending Kracht and
Wolter (1999)’s case to quantified non normal modal logics is an open question.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions, Applications, Future Work
4.1 Conclusions
The problems and paradoxes generating within the standard modal approach to deontic
logics are relevant and numerous. Nevertheless, there are several possible solutions
to amend them. We investigated further one of those, namely we studied a semantic
framework to deal with non normal systems. Far from being the definitive answer to most
problems related to deontic modal logics, we think, however, that the modal approach
is definitely worthy of further attention and investigation. We decided to follow the
multi-relational semantics paradigm, in order to limit deontic paradoxes while keeping
the intuition and techniques associated to Kripke Semantics for normal modal systems.
Even though the logical systems that can be treated with these tools are reacher and
more powerful (and hence more problematic) than classical ones (traditionally associated
to neighborhood semantics), they provide the possibility to use intuitive semantic tools.
As we saw in Chapter 1, the choice of studying non normal deontic systems was driven
by the consideration that several philosophical issues related to deontic paradoxes orig-
inate within the syntax of given systems, such as deontic explosion. There are different
ways to deduce problematic schemata, and several solutions have been proposed. In
Section 1.1 we touched upon the Standard Paradigm SDL and presented normal Kripke
Semantics, in order to focus on some of the problems it raises. In particular, in Section
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1.1.1 we introduced some first preliminary modal schemata as well as their deontic in-
terpretation. One of the most controversial dontic schemata, namely the formula called
Deontic Explosion has been introduced in Section 1.2.1, where we proposed a prelimi-
nary syntactic analysis of the systems generating such schema, underlying the reasons
behind the choice of working with non normal systems. There are several syntactic
solutions to prevent the derivation of deontic explosion formulae, as we saw in Section
1.2.2, although we chose to analyse in detail the ones that are more conservative with
respect to normal modal logics, i.e., those systems that are weak enough to prevent
deontic explosions, yet powerful enough to express juridical sentences. These systems
are the so called non normal modal logics. We also provided an informal introduction
to non normal systems, their schemata and rules. Several different systems can be built
on such syntactic foundations. Non normal systems can be treated semantically using
relational structures. Moreover, we introduced a semantic interpretation of the modal
deontic operators based on Kripke Semantics, or Possible Worlds Framework, as defined
in Section 1.3.1. Kripke-frames are very intuitive and useful and provide an excellent
tool to treat normal systems. However, they are known to be sound and complete with
respect to normal systems. In order to keep the intuitive appeal of the possible worlds
framework, while still using non normal systems, we decided to study further the so
called multi-relational frames. In Section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 we introduced this type of
semantics, which is nothing but a direct generalisation of standard Kripke Frames and
models.
Given this scenario, we decided to carry out a semantic analysis of multi-relational
frames to provide tools to deal with non normal N-monotonic systems. Technical details
of systems as well as several original completeness theorems were proposed in Chapter
2 and 3. In particular the first proposes an analysis of the propositional case, whereas
the latter of the predicative one.
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4.1.1 Propositional Results
In Chapter 2, for the first time, we carried out a semantic and syntactic analysis of several
systems and modal schemata. In Section 2.1 we presented some well known non normal
calculi, namely the systems E,M,NM,R as well as a syntactical analysis of the relations
between well known schemata. The most interesting results, however, can be found in
Section 2.2, where we provided frame-characterisation of several modal formulae, namely,
M,C,N,B,T,4. Section 2.2.4 presented a semantic analysis of some schemata that are
relevant within deontic logics, namely, CON and D. It is well known that both schemata
characterise precisely the same property in Kripke semantics, namely, seriality. However,
this ceases to be true in multi-relational semantics and, as we shall see, these schemata
define different readings of seriality within weak semantics.
Section 2.3 is focused on proving semantic completeness for several systems using
both strong, and weak semantic tools. We proposed direct completeness proofs via
canonical models for both classical systems (Section 2.3.1), and N-Monotonic systems
(Section 2.3.2). Finally, in Section 2.3.3 we prove completeness theorems with respect
to specific classes of frames for a few systems extending MN with well known schemata,
namely, MN⊕T, MN⊕D, and MN⊕CON.
Summarising, we provided an answer to several technical questions, namely:
(a) which theories are valid in the class of multi-relational weak structures? Any classical
theory smaller or equal than N-monotonic logics;
(b) how do they differ from multi-relational strong frames (Neighborhood semantics)?
Multi-relational strong frames validate a narrower set of formulae, namely, those
theories smaller or equal than E;
(c) how well known modal schemata (among those relevant to deontic logic, like
M,C,T,D, B,CON,DEX, . . ., behave within multi-relational weak frames? Do
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they characterise classes of frames with specific properties? Yes, most of them char-
acterise some specific classes of frames (please refer to Table 2.1);
(d) how can well known first order properties be characterised by propositional schemata,
if we assume a plurality of relations? We have provided an answer to reflexivity,
seriality, and symmetry;
(e) the set of formulae which are valid in the class of all multi-relational frames can be
generated by a finite axiomatic system? If so, which one? Yes, by the system MN,
which is then sound and complete with respect to the class of all multi-relational
weak frames. Moreover, we saw that the systems MN ⊕T, MN ⊕D, MN ⊕CON
are sound and complete with respect to specific classes of frames.
4.1.2 Predicative Results
Although quantified modal logic has a long and distinguished tradition, almost all efforts
have so far been devoted to the analysis of the normal case: Besides a few significant
exceptions based on neighbourhood semantics, the study of quantification in non-normal
modal logics is still neglected. Despite that, quantified non-normal modal logics (QNML
henceforth) exhibit a different behaviour with respect to normal modal logics. In par-
ticular, results in the literature show, e.g., that the Barcan and the Converse Barcan
schemata (i) are not characterised by decreasing and increasing domains (ii) are tightly
connected with the validity of propositional modal axiom schemata. In Chapter 3 we
provided a semantic analysis of quantification in a class of non-normal modal logics called
N-Monotonic (as defined in Chapter 2). Again, instead of following the neighborhood
semantics approach, we shall focus on multi-relational semantics. presents free first or-
der extensions of some N-monotonic systems and above as well as completeness results
with respect to multi-relational first order frames. As far as we are concerned, from the
predicative standpoint, this is the first study on quantification in multi-relational se-
mantics, the second one investigating the case of varying domains in non-normal modal
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logics, and the first that provides a frame characterization of the Barcan schemata with
varying domains.
Section 3.1 is an introduction to Barcan Formulae and their role within judicial
syllogisms. There are several philosophical as well as technical issues related to such
schemata. Section 3.2 presents some well known results concerning quantified non nor-
mal modal logics and Neighborhood frames, as well as a first technical introduction to
Barcan formulae and the problems related to such schemata. We shall see the attempts
made to accommodate Barcan schemata within both constant domain, and varying do-
main neighborhood frames. Section 3.3 is rather technical and presents multi-relational
first order frames. We chose to analyse frames with varying domains, in order to perform
a finer distinction between actual individuals and possibilia. Section 3.4 The traditional
distinction between de dicto and de re sentences is here seen under a new light, in terms
of contextual obligation and the role of quantification within deontic contexts. Section
3.5 is the core of this Chapter. We shall present alternative semantic characterisations for
the schema CBF. We compare our results with the standard ones in Kripke Semantics
and we shall see different ways to generalise the concept of increasing inner domains.
Section 3.6 is the technical core of the Chapter. Here we provide Henkin-style com-
pleteness theorems for several systems, namely, the smallest free quantified non normal
N-monotonic logic Q○=.NM and some extensions, including Q○=.NM⊕CBF.
In this chapter, we provided an answer to several open questions, namely:
(a) We defined multi-relational weak structures and proved soundness results for N-
Monotonic systems;
(b) We provided Completeness results for Q○=.MN and extensions;
(c) We proved semantic equivalence for the couples CBF - GF, and BF - CGF;
(d) We provided frame characterisation results for both CBF, and BF;
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(e) We provided Completeness results for Q○=.MN⊕CBF and extensions;
(f) We showed that Schema M does not entail CBF;
(g) We proved that schema C and BF are semantically independent.
4.2 Open Problems and Future Work
The field of N-monotonic logics and multi-relational semantics is wide and, in our opin-
ion, worthy of further investigation. Moreover, the area of interest is broader than
deontic logics, since it is concerned with the whole field of modal logics. There are many
open problems to be addressed, especially within the first order non normal systems.
Concerning the propositional case, one may wonder what class of structures, if any,
is characterised by other modal schemata, for instance by those closer to other fields
of applied logics, rather than deontic. One may wonder what class, if any, is captured
by positive introspection, i.e., by schema 4 ∶= ◻A → ◻ ◻ A, negative introspection, i.e.
5 ∶= ¬ ◻A→ ◻¬ ◻A, or by other modal axioms.
On the technical side, there are other important open issues to be addressed in regard
to the system MN:
- the finite model property;
- decidability and complexity.
From the predicative standpoint, there are even more open questions, for instance
those related to the completeness of non normal systems which include BF are still open
and require a deeper analysis. Moreover, we see other important directions for future
research.
A preliminary question—somehow broader than the scope of this dissertation—
regards the general relation between multi-relational and Neighborhood semantics. For
propositional non-normal modal logics the two semantics are equivalent Governatori and
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Rotolo (2005). However, it is not obvious if they are still equivalent (in regard, e.g., to
completeness and incompleteness results) above K: Normal systems do not necessar-
ily make Governatori and Rotolo (2005)’s semantics collapse on Kripke’s. Regarding
quantified modal logics, a full comparison of the two semantics is anyway needed.
An immediate extension of the present work is to consider constant domains (FOL⊕
MN). It is definitely less trivial to adopt Governatori and Rotolo (2005)’s semantics and
study the open problem that Arlo´-Costa (2011) mentioned for FOL⊕E⊕CBF, as well as
to investigate other quantified (classical, monotonic, and regular) systems with constant
and varying domains.
Finally, a question concerning Kracht and Wolter (1999)’s proof that non-normal
modal logics can be simulated by a normal modal logic with three modalities. This result,
which holds for MN, is of great interest in the context of multi-relational semantics,
whose structures can in fact recall Kripke frames for multi-modal logics. However, when
predicate calculi are added to the propositional modal base we can obtain unexpected
interactions between Barcan schemata and modal axioms. Hence, extending Kracht and
Wolter (1999)’s case to QNML is an open question.
4.3 Applications: Beyond Deontic Logics
As we said, that of non normal modal systems is a rather broad field and it concerns
modal and applied logics besides deontic logics. There may be several applications
within epistemic logics, for instance, as these systems can prevent one or more forms
of omniscience. We have decided to conclude this dissertation by discussing a possible
application of non normal systems in epistemic contexts, although the perspective taken
is upside down. In fact, we decided to apply non normal concepts to define omniscience,
rather than to block it. This final section does not provide any new result, nor it goes
into great technical details. It can be seen as a technically light practical example of the
flexiblity of both modal languages, and non normal systems.
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Even though it can be argued that they do not represent a perfect solution for the
problems we touched upon in Chapter 1, Non Normal modal logics are, however, a far
better tool than normal systems to deal with deontic concepts. Their expressive power,
moreover, is not limited to applications within legal and moral field. Indeed, non normal
systems are a natural candidate within the field of epistemic logics when the goal is that
of avoiding logical omniscience (Fagin et al., 1995, 335). In fact non normal logics may
solve several problems related to epistemic concepts. Below we shall analyse the concept
of omniscience form the modal standpoint.1
4.3.1 Defining Omniscience: a Logical Perspective
One of the major problems the logician willing to model knowledge and belief has to face
is that of avoiding, or at least alleviating, the problem of omniscience. The efforts are
usually focused on creating models for agents (either human or artificial) with bounded
rationality and finite cognitive capabilities: such agents, thus, do not possess complete
information about how the world is. Logical omniscience is often seen, therefore, as a
problem to be solved and the solutions proposed so far are numerous (Fagin et al., 1995;
Meyer, 2001).
Nevertheless, if the issue to be addressed is that of understanding and studying
the concept of omniscience, such perspective should be reversed, in order to push the
concept of knowledge to its most extreme possibilities. This stated, one may think that
1In a recent work, namely (Rotolo and Calardo, 2013), we actually have argued that such systems
are a good tool even for the logical and philosophical analysis of traditional concepts like the problem
of defining God’s omniscience. Instead of trying to avoid, as it usually the case, agents’ omniscience,
in our paper we decided to build logically such concept starting from the epistemic reading of modal
schemata. The usual approach is that of starting from a system like K and to weaken it until one reaches
the desired level of ignorance. In our work, however, we have adopted the opposite perspective, namely
we started from a system with ignorant agents and we kept adding axioms in order to achieve a perfect
level of omniscience. We argued that one must start from the Classical Propositional Calculus CPC
adding to it one by one all those rules and axioms useful to define total omniscience. However, and it
is not surprising, we argued that in order to achieve the goal one must assume the modal system to be
normal. In this Section, we shall summarize our work up to the point when adding normal schemata is
necessary, in order to show with a practical example how any modal system weaker than K is actually
better than a normal one to treat ignorance. This analysis will also provide a deeper analysis of the
epistemic reading of several modal schemata.
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omniscience is quite an easy property to get and hence to formalise. However, this is
only partially true. If on the one hand it is quite easy to define logical omniscience in
terms of knowledge of the logical truths (Fagin et al., 1995), on the other it turns out to
be rather difficult to formally capture the insight of factual omniscience, which has to
do with propositions having a different status (Girle, 2000).
A first informal definition may be that omniscient is the agent that has complete or
maximal knowledge. What this informal definition means precisely is the research issue
we address in (Rotolo and Calardo, 2013).
Even though we are exploring a different scenario, we shall use the same modal
schemata we have already seen throughout this dissertation. We list them below just
to make this Section somehow self contained. Here we used Ki (used instead of ◻) is
an epistemic unary operator indexed with the label of an agent operating in the system
and a formula as KiA is to be read agent i knows A.
4.3.2 Principle of Co-extensionality: The Minimal Epistemic Logic E
Any system of epistemic logic, if based on the standard modal-logic paradigm (Meyer,
2001), should assume to enjoy some minimal formal properties. In particular, it is well-
known that any modal logic should at least be closed under logical equivalence (Chellas,
1980). This will be our starting point to formally analyse the notion of omniscience.
When dealing with CPC, one standard and well-known option is adopting a Fregean
approach to semantics. In a given state of affairs, propositions are taken to be different
names of the only two semantical objects populating the universe: Truth and Falsehood.
A tautology is a proposition which is true only in virtue of its logical form: the truth
values of its components do not influence the truth of the whole in the slightest. The set
of tautologies can hence be described as the class of all the true names of Truth: those
propositions whose truth is certain and unchangeable. A most famous result in formal
logic states that all theorems of CPC are tautologies and vice versa.
132 CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSIONS, APPLICATIONS, FUTURE WORK
Two propositions that share always the same extension, can be regarded as logically
equivalent and, in a logical sense, identical. This can be expressed symbolically as A ≡ B:
whichever truth value A is given, it would be identical to B’s and vice versa.
A basic requirement the knowledge base of any omniscient agent should meet is the
principle that for any known sentence A, all its equivalents are also known. What we are
stating is merely that if something is known, then all those facts which ‘look’ different but
are actually the same (logically, extensionally) must also be known. This is a well-known
modal principle and it can be compared to Leibniz’s Law, here applied to propositional
logic. What this principle states is that if two propositions are logically equivalent, they
are epistemically interchangeable and, as we saw in Chapter 1, it is captured formally
by the rule
RE ∶= A ≡ B / ◻A ≡ ◻B
As we explained in Chapter 2, it can be added to CPC to generate the minimal
system of Classical Propositional Modal Logic E.
When knowledge and belief are modeled in epistemic logics like E, which are much
weaker than K, then the epistemic logics can have a peculiar semantic reading, which
is suitable to provide a fine-grained interpretation of logical omniscience. Modal logics
weaker than K—which are called generically non-normal, in contrast with any normal
logic that is stated to be as strong as, or stronger than, K (Chellas, 1980)—can be
interpreted, as we have seen in Chapter 2 on multi relational models with strong truth
conditions. The introduction of a plurality of worlds connected via a given accessibility
relation R stems in epistemic logics from the need to represent agents’ relative ignorance
(i.e., partial knowledge) about the world. Given a state w, all the R-associated worlds t
are seen as epistemic alternatives to w itself (Fagin et al., 1995; Meyer, 2001): When we
have such a relation R which connects a world w with all alternatives where A is true,
then we can say that ◻A is true in a world w—and ◻A is meant to say that an agent
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knows/believes that A is true. The plurality of worlds captures the notion of partial
knowledge as follows. Suppose an agent i lives in Paris and does not know if today it
is raining in London (p:= ‘It is raining in London’). If i does not have access to any
reliable source of information, he simply ignores all about the weather in London; hence
he has at least two epistemic alternatives: for i in the perspective of Paris, (1) p is true,
(2) p is false. However, as soon as the agent gains access to new pieces of information
concerning the meteorological situation of London, the number of alternatives that he
considers possible drops. If, for instance, he reads that it is currently raining in London,
the epistemic alternatives he considers are only those which reflect the real situation,
i.e., only those in which the proposition p is true. Her knowledge base would then change
accordingly. However, the plurality of worlds expresses only one aspect of agents’ relative
ignorance. As we said, we also assume to work with a plurality of accessibility relations
as discussed in Chapter 2.
Originally, as we have already stated, multi-relational semantics was developed in the
field of deontic logic. In deontic logic the Kripke accessibility relation selects for each
world those states of affairs that are (morally, legally, etc.) ideal with respect to it: hence,
if ◻A is true in a world w, this simply means that A is the case in all ideal alternatives to
w. The interpretation of multi-relational models, as given for example in deontic logics,
is thus that each accessibility relation corresponds to a particular “standard of value”
or a norm that selects those ideal worlds; however, it is not guaranteed that such worlds
are still ideal according to different standards of value or norms, namely, according
to different accessibility relations. In this perspective, different relations correspond
to different deontic standards or that conflicting norms are obtained from otherwise
consistent different systems of norms.
If we import this intuition in the domain of epistemic logics, the multiplicity of re-
lations may express the idea that there exist many epistemic standards and that the
truth-conditions for knowledge assertions can vary across contexts as a result of shifting
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epistemic standards. The idea of plurality of epistemic standards (Pollock, 1986, 190–
3) was defended within different philosophical theories of knowledge (Malcolm, 1952;
Goldman, 1976; Rorty, 1979), none of which should be necessarily assumed to confer a
minimal philosophical meaning to epistemic multi-relational models. Let us just con-
sider how Hector-Neri Castan˜eda (Castan˜eda, 1980, 217) illustrates what a plurality
of epistemic standards means and how it may affect the truth conditions of knowledge
assertions:
Example 4.3.1 (Discovering America example adapted from (Castan˜eda, 1980))
“What counts as knowing” that Cristoforo Colombo discovered America on October 12,
1492 might change depending on whether we are considering (i) a television quiz show,
(ii) a high school student’s essay, or (iii) a defense of the traditional dates of America’s
culture from some famous Harvard historian. Hence, we have in this example three
epistemic standards. The fact that
Ki(Colombo discovered America on October 12, 1492) (4.1)
is true according, for example, to standard (i) does not entail that it is also true according
to standard (iii), which is somehow more demanding.
Hence, in general, we could tolerate epistemic expressions such as
KiA ∧Ki¬A (4.2)
because different standards can lead to know that Colombo discovered America or to
know that this was plainly false. This can said to be true even when the epistemic agent is
the same. For instance imagine a modern scientist, who believes in darwinian evolution,
who happens to be also a fervent Catholic. According to his scientific paradigm, he
believes A ∶= living beings evolved through the ages from very simple and different forms
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to take their actual shape and ¬A:= living beings were created by God precisely as they
are now and evolution is a lie. Well these statements, although contradictory, can be
known by the same agent, at the same time under different paradigms. Clearly one has to
add a further condition here, namely that knowledge does not entail truth. Indeed, if we
do not impose any special condition on multi-relational frames, then we have the modal
system E. In this setting, it is easy to check that formula (4.2) is not contradictory.
Hence, if we interpret relations as different epistemic standards, it is not required
that the truth of (4.2) corresponds to a genuine cognitive dissonance (Aronson, 1969),
because there is no real epistemic conflict between KiA and Ki¬A: Each formula refers
to a different standard. A true cognitive dissonance rather occurs when Ki(A ∧ ¬A) is
true, because this sentence means that there is a logical conflict within a same standard.
Assume now to formalize Example 4.3.1 following the above semantic intuitions.
Example 4.3.2 (Discovering America (cont’d)) Let us denote ‘Colombo discov-
ered America on October 12, 1492’ with A and represent standards as follows:
(i) a television quiz show = R1
(ii) a high school student’s essay = R2
(iii) a defense of the traditional dates of America’s
culture from some famous Harvard historian = R3
For formula
KiA (4.3)
it is sufficient that A is true in all worlds selected by one standard, as the model in
Figure 4.1 shows.
This analysis suggests that the agents’ ignorance is not only captured by having more
alternatives for a given world, but also by having more standards. In fact, the standards
(i), (ii), and (iii) of Example 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 represent different contexts as well as “per-
136 CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSIONS, APPLICATIONS, FUTURE WORK
w
A ◻A ◻ ¬A
v
A
s
¬A
z¬A
1
2
2, 3
1
Figure 4.1: A simple model illustrating Castae˜da’s example.
spectives” of knowledge, which overall express the fact of a structural bounded epistemic
capability with regard to the time when America was discovered: for an omniscient agent
g it would be odd to argue that in a certain perspective g knows that P is false while in
another perspective he knows that P is true, because an omniscient being is supposed
to know precisely what is objectively true: hence, a multiplicity of epistemic standards
reflects a certain degree of ignorance, at least insofar as the absence of ignorance is
taken to correspond to omniscience. Indeed, reducing the number of relations lessens
the structural degree of ignorance of agents and leads to a higher degree of agents’
omniscience.
4.3.3 An Easy Step after E
As already stated several times, the first step in the path that leads from E to full logical
omniscience, is adding schema M, i.e.,
M ∶= Ki(A ∧B)→ (KiA ∧KiB)
This schema seems relatively acceptable in epistemic logic. First of all, its validity is
assumed in most non-normal modal systems—it is actually discarded only by the system
E. Second, the schema looks conceptually harmless: if I know/believe both sentences
together, at the same time, then it must be also true that I know/believe that America
was discovered by Colombo on October 12, 1492 and that I know/believe that Betsy
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Ross reported in May of 1776 that she sewed the first American flag. Semantically, M
corresponds to the property stated by Lemma 2.2.6. In other words, if there is one
epistemic standard according to which A and B are jointly true, there are two standards
that validate respectively A and B.
Consider the following example:
Example 4.3.3 (Colombo and Betsy Ross) Let us denote ‘Colombo discovered
America on October 12, 1492’ with P and ‘Ross reported in May of 1776 that she sewed
the first American flag’ with Q. Again, suppose to work with the mentioned epistemic
standards:
(i) a television quiz show = R1
(ii) a high school student’s essay = R2
(iii) a defense of the traditional dates of America’s
culture from some famous Harvard historian = R3
For formula
Ki(P ∧Q)→ (KiP ∧KiQ) (4.4)
it is sufficient to have supplemented models (see Lemma2.2.10) such as in Figure 4.2.
wP ¬Q
v
¬P Q
s
P ¬Q
z
P Q
2
3
3
2
1
3
Figure 4.2: A simple model M illustrating Example 4.3.3.
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In the model M represented in the figure, for any x ∈W , we have that x ⊧Ki(P ∧Q)
because there is a relation R1 such that R1(w) = {z} = ∣∣P ∣∣∩ ∣∣Q∣∣. All epistemic alterna-
tives that make both P and Q true are related to w via the perspective of the standard
“(i) a television quiz show”; hence, it is true in w that the given agent knows/believes
that P ∧Q is the case. Also, the other two standards, “(ii) a high school student’s essay”
and “(iii) a defense of the traditional dates of America’s. . . ” connect w respectively to
precisely those worlds that make true the sentences P (via R3) and Q (via R2), hence
- Ki(P ∧ Q) is true in w (via standard (i), i.e., relation R1), KiP is true in w (via
standard (iii), i.e., relation R3) and KiQ is true in w (via standard (ii), i.e., relation
R2);
- for any other world x ∈ {v, s, z}, we have that x /⊧Ki(P ∧Q); therefore
- formula (4.4) is true in M.
4.3.4 Conflicts, Coherence and Epistemic Paradigms
There is a further important schema that from the perspective of epistemic systems plays
a central role in our quest for a logical definition of the concept of omniscience, namely,
the schema C:
C ∶= (KiA ∧KiB)→Ki(A ∧B)
Adding C to the formerly defined system M generates the system R, the smallest regular
modal logic. This system shows very interesting properties. Let us focus on C. If there
are two standards guaranteeing respectively that KiP and KiQ are true, then there is
possibly a third standard that selects all the epistemic alternatives in which P ∧ Q is
true, namely, Ki(P ∧Q) holds. In general, the result for C is the following:
Example 4.3.4 (Colombo and Betsy Ross (cont’d)) For formula
(KiP ∧KiQ)→Ki(P ∧Q) (4.5)
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it is sufficient to have structures closed under intersections. Notice that the model in
Figure 4.2 also validates (4.5). However, consider a subtle variation, as depicted in
Figure 4.3.
wP ¬Q
v
¬P Q
s
P ¬Q
z
P Q
1,2
3
3
2
1,3
Figure 4.3: A variation M′ of the model M of Figure 4 that validates (4.4) but falsifies
(4.5).
The model M′ in Figure 4.3 still validates (4.4). However,
- KiP is true in w (via standard (iii), i.e., relation R3) and KiQ is true in w (via
standard (ii), i.e., relation R2);
- Ki(P ∧Q) is false in w because ∣∣P ∣∣ ∩ ∣∣Q∣∣ = {z} but there is no accessibility relation
Rj such that Rj(w) = {z}.
- formula (4.5) is false in w and not valid in M′.
Here, we may have indeed two epistemic standards that individually support the agent’s
knowledge/belief that ‘Colombo discovered America on October 12, 1492’ and ‘Ross re-
ported in May of 1776 that she sewed the first American flag’ are true, but it is far
from obvious that there is a standard that support them jointly. On the other hand, the
difficulty in saying that there is such a standard for P ∧Q does not undermine the truth
of (4.4), since, if there is no such relation, then the formula is trivially true in w (its
antecedent is false).
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Notice that schema C plays a crucial role in enforcing cognitive dissonances and in
making explicit epistemic conflicts. Indeed, let us take Example 4.3.4 and replace Q
with ¬P . Hence, we can simply consider the following instance of C:
(KiP ∧Ki¬P )→Ki(P ∧ ¬P ) (4.6)
Since (4.6) is true for example in w, then there is at least an epistemic standard (rep-
resented in the example and in Figure 4.2 by R1) that connects w to all epistemic
alternatives that make P ∧ ¬P true. However, P ∧ ¬P ≡ , hence the standard refers
to a contradiction, which makes void R1 and hence we should have that R1(w) = ∅. In
a different but related perspective, since the modal system R makes valid the inference
rule RR, i.e., ⊢ A ∧B → C ⇒ ⊢KiA ∧KiB →KiC (Chellas, 1980, chap. 2), then, if
we have KiP and Ki¬P , we obtain KiX for any sentence X: (P ∧¬P )→X is in fact a
tautology of CPC. Hence, suppose we know/believe that P and know/believe that ¬P .
We could obtain KiQ, Ki¬Q, Ki(Q ∧ ¬Q), Ki(Bologna is in the UK), and so forth.
4.3.5 A Different Path: Truth and Logical Omniscience
We have discussed some very weak epistemic logics. However, we highlighted that com-
bining schemata M and C results in the well-known modal system R, where a much
stronger version of logical omniscience emerges: Here, we can easily include any tautol-
ogy and logical truth in an omniscient agent’s knowledge base as well as making explicit
any cognitive dissonance.
A different (and not equivalent) path can be taken to capture full understanding by
assuming M and state that an agent knows the Truth. This last statement is expressed
by the axiom schema known in the alethic tradition as the Necessity of Truth:
N := ◻ ⊺
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As formerly observed, the propositional constant ⊺ is taken to mean the Truth and its
truth value is, accordingly, always true. Notice that the schema N is enough to include
any tautology and logical truth in an omniscient agent’s knowledge base. Knowing only
one theorem, only one logical Truth would be enough to know all the classical theorems.
Indeed for any theorem A it holds that A ≡ ⊺ and it is enough to apply RE and MP to
derive ◻A. Hence, it is sufficient to add the schema N to the system E to state that any
omniscient agent knows all the truths of logic, i.e., all the theorems generated within
the system. This intuition is usually captured by the rule RN:
RN := A / ◻A
As we saw in Chapter 2, NM-systems is that it enables the switch from multi-
relational strong semantics to weak frames.
Notice that N states something rather strong. It says, in fact, the any agent operating
within the system knows all the truths of logic, all the theorems. However this type
of omniscience still concerns the abstract truths of mathematics rather than contingent
facts. This difference turns rather more evident if looked at from a semantic perspective.
What the schema claims, in fact, is that an agent knows all valid propositions, i.e. those
formulae which are true everywhere, in all possible worlds of all possible frames and
under all possible valuations. On the other hand, if a fact happens to be true in a
specific state of a model, under a specific valuation (but it can still be false under other
conditions) there is no way—yet—to infer that an agent knows it.
So far we have presented a semantic scenario designed to accommodate different
epistemic perspectives and paradigms. In fact, given the laws of CPC, we are bound to
accept that any proposition has one and, even more important, only one truth value:
the law of excluded middle A∨¬A is a classical tautology. Semantically this is mirrored
by the fact that the intersection of two complementary sets of epistemic alternatives is
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always empty. Hence no genuine epistemic standard (i.e., a relation which is not empty)
can accommodate both A and ¬A. That known facts should be coherent is suggested, as
we already said, by the schema C; it states is that if an agent knows two distinct facts
and such facts are contradictory, then he must also use a further epistemic standard
which is trivial, i.e. a standard which makes him believe everything (semantically: an
empty binary relation). On the other hand, if the two facts are indeed consistent with
each other (semantically: the intersection of ∥A∥ and ∥B∥ is not empty), then, by C,
the agent must possess another epistemic standard to accommodate both propositions.
In general for any couple of genuine epistemic paradigms, there must exist a third one
which takes into account those facts that are common to both. This means that true
knowledge is consistent and cannot handle contradictions, i.e., all non trivial epistemic
paradigms are coherent with each other. Intuition would suggest that this is equivalent
to possessing only one epistemic standard and this is perfectly consistent with our idea
of perfect knowledge. Recall that, semantically, a multi-relational weak frame with only
one binary relation is called a Kripke-frame.
It is often argued that from the epistemic perspective normal systems are too strong
to model human agents and in this section we understood why: Despite the manageabil-
ity of such logics for AI applications and their low computational complexity, normal
epistemic logics raise a number of difficulties if employed to philosophically clarify the
nature of human knowledge and belief. One of the most well-known problems is that
normal epistemic logics are affected by various forms of logical omniscience, which looks
mostly unsuitable for modeling human epistemic capabilities (Fagin et al., 1995; Meyer,
2001).
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